First Shock: Montenotte
Beaulieu Attacks
As the Austrian attack was under way, Bonaparte replaced Schérer and immediately changed his orders. The French right wing, with the Cervoni Brigade at Voltri and Meynier's division and Masséna's "corps" (Laharpe and Augereau) behind it, stopped its movement towards Genoa. 28 March to April 8, the entire army turned northeast and deployed to execute Bonaparte's Millesimo breakthrough plan. As a covering force, Sérurier's division was at Garessio to watch the key Sardinian fortress and logistical pivot of Ceva, and Meynier's division put garrisons into several strongholds around Cadibona and Giovo Pass. Cervoni still was at Voltri to deceive Beaulieu making him believe the French were still heading for Genoa. On 1st April, the Austrians entered the Genoese territory with the two divisions that would carry out the attack - Argenteau and Sebottendorf, with 35 battalions (24,152 men) and 38 guns.
Through the first week in April, some not negligible brushes between French and Sardinian patrols occurred as the French were probing the Sardinian positions in front of them. On one occasion, Sardinian light infantry took 200 French prisoners. A team of Nice Light Infantry led by Sergeant Maurizio Massena - relative of General Masséna - captured a French general, Barthélemy. On their part, French patrols killed the Light Legion Major Perrone in action. This activity along his southern front suggested to Colli that instead of marching on Genoa, the French be turning against him to break through his line and move along the Bormida Rivers valleys towards the Piedmont plain. He wrote to Beaulieu about that, but the latter didn't pay any heed to Colli's misgivings and went on with his plan.
On 8 April, Sebottendorf pushed Cervoni's vanguard back as a preparatory move. Two days later the offensive started in earnest. Sebottendorf drove Cervoni out of Voltri and as the French brigade was retreating towards the town of Savona along the coastal road, Nelson's fleet shot at it from the sea - but mildly (which annoyed Beaulieu).
At the same time, Argenteau, to the right of Sebottendorf, attacked from northeast. His division was split into three "brigade" columns. The right column under Colonel Rukawina also included four small Sardinian infantry battalions under Brigadier Avogadro di Valdengo. Its mission was getting to Dego and link up with Colli. The left column, led by baron Vukassovic, would link up with Sebottendorf across the Giovo Pass. The division commander, Argenteau - a poor quality officer, who had won its position by exploiting his Vienna Court connections, and was despised by Beaulieu himself - was with the center column, moving towards the Montenotte hills to smash and cut off the French strongholds around Cadibona.
Soon he run into the Mount Negino - San Giorgio reboubts, manned by 1,200 men from the 21st Demi-Brigade led by Brigadier Fornasy, a stalwart 46 years old career officer. Fornasy could count on the support of Brigadier Rampon, in reserve position nearby with his 1,500 men. (Fornasy actually fought and won, but the sly, diplomatically able Rampon took all the credit for the success and rose to generalship, also under the Restoration monarchy. Fornasy, instead, died poor and forgotten in 1809 in his native town).
Meanwhile Rukawina's column had reached Dego and, wheeling to his left across the Montenotte hills, brushed some French outposts aside and linked up with Argenteau's column. The two columns then proceeded to attack Fornasy on Negino with 3,700 men. It was 11 April, 1796.
Through the first week in April, some not negligible brushes between French and Sardinian patrols occurred as the French were probing the Sardinian positions in front of them. On one occasion, Sardinian light infantry took 200 French prisoners. A team of Nice Light Infantry led by Sergeant Maurizio Massena - relative of General Masséna - captured a French general, Barthélemy. On their part, French patrols killed the Light Legion Major Perrone in action. This activity along his southern front suggested to Colli that instead of marching on Genoa, the French be turning against him to break through his line and move along the Bormida Rivers valleys towards the Piedmont plain. He wrote to Beaulieu about that, but the latter didn't pay any heed to Colli's misgivings and went on with his plan.
On 8 April, Sebottendorf pushed Cervoni's vanguard back as a preparatory move. Two days later the offensive started in earnest. Sebottendorf drove Cervoni out of Voltri and as the French brigade was retreating towards the town of Savona along the coastal road, Nelson's fleet shot at it from the sea - but mildly (which annoyed Beaulieu).
At the same time, Argenteau, to the right of Sebottendorf, attacked from northeast. His division was split into three "brigade" columns. The right column under Colonel Rukawina also included four small Sardinian infantry battalions under Brigadier Avogadro di Valdengo. Its mission was getting to Dego and link up with Colli. The left column, led by baron Vukassovic, would link up with Sebottendorf across the Giovo Pass. The division commander, Argenteau - a poor quality officer, who had won its position by exploiting his Vienna Court connections, and was despised by Beaulieu himself - was with the center column, moving towards the Montenotte hills to smash and cut off the French strongholds around Cadibona.
Soon he run into the Mount Negino - San Giorgio reboubts, manned by 1,200 men from the 21st Demi-Brigade led by Brigadier Fornasy, a stalwart 46 years old career officer. Fornasy could count on the support of Brigadier Rampon, in reserve position nearby with his 1,500 men. (Fornasy actually fought and won, but the sly, diplomatically able Rampon took all the credit for the success and rose to generalship, also under the Restoration monarchy. Fornasy, instead, died poor and forgotten in 1809 in his native town).
Meanwhile Rukawina's column had reached Dego and, wheeling to his left across the Montenotte hills, brushed some French outposts aside and linked up with Argenteau's column. The two columns then proceeded to attack Fornasy on Negino with 3,700 men. It was 11 April, 1796.
Mount Negino's Thermopylae
The French redoubts on San Giorgio - Mount Negino hills were exceptionally strong positions very hard to capture, due to the extremely steep slopes. Argenteau and Rukawina attacked twice, and twice the attack stalled, with not negligible losses. The French defense was stout, but Napoleonic propaganda hyped the success out of all proportion, presenting the Negino battle as the Thermopylae of France. The French had 2 dead and 10 wounded, the Austrians about 100 killed, wounded and missing. For a comparison, the siege of Cosseria a few days later cost the French the equivalent of a regiment of troops, and of a battalion of troops to the Allies.
Then Argenteau made his worst mistake. In a show of 18th century "take-it-easy-style" warfare, and holding the newly appointed, very young Bonaparte in deep contempt, he decided to break the attacks off for the day and go to sleep till the next day. Thus allowing Bonaparte to react swiftly through the night. If he had understood that the surprise attack on the French outposts had failed, he should have retreated and joined up with either Colli or Beaulieu, saving his division from the fate that would befall it soon. But it is also true he didn't know he had come up against an extraordinarily reactive French commander.
French superiority in leadership, speed, ruggedness (about 1,000 French soldiers marched SHOELESS) and knowledge of the operation area and its terrain features started paying off immediately. Bonaparte moved his divisions and brigades as across a chessboard, weaving a deadly cobweb around the snoozing Argenteau. By 8:00 am the next morning, when Argenteau's troops were preparing for the decisive assault on the French redoubts, they were already trapped. Morning fog lifted and Argenteau all of a sudden spotted 16 French battalions (Laharpe and Cervoni) on his left. A totally unexpected sight.
Then Argenteau made his worst mistake. In a show of 18th century "take-it-easy-style" warfare, and holding the newly appointed, very young Bonaparte in deep contempt, he decided to break the attacks off for the day and go to sleep till the next day. Thus allowing Bonaparte to react swiftly through the night. If he had understood that the surprise attack on the French outposts had failed, he should have retreated and joined up with either Colli or Beaulieu, saving his division from the fate that would befall it soon. But it is also true he didn't know he had come up against an extraordinarily reactive French commander.
French superiority in leadership, speed, ruggedness (about 1,000 French soldiers marched SHOELESS) and knowledge of the operation area and its terrain features started paying off immediately. Bonaparte moved his divisions and brigades as across a chessboard, weaving a deadly cobweb around the snoozing Argenteau. By 8:00 am the next morning, when Argenteau's troops were preparing for the decisive assault on the French redoubts, they were already trapped. Morning fog lifted and Argenteau all of a sudden spotted 16 French battalions (Laharpe and Cervoni) on his left. A totally unexpected sight.
Bonaparte's First Victory: Montenotte
Moving fast over broken terrain, much faster than the stiff Austrian formations, the French split into two attack columns and threw the Ausrtrians back and into the Montenotte gullies, inflicting serious casualties. Half an hour later, the fog lifted also on Argenteau's right and more French troops were seen coming on. Those were Masséna and Menard's columns. A bayonet charge swept the surprised Austrians away. Disordered Austrian regiments repeatedly tried to make a stand, but all resistance was overcome. Command and control was lost, some formations started disintegrating and the bewildered troops, continuously outflanked by the more mobile French, streamed to the rear. The ring was closing around them and Argenteau had to break out of the pocket fighting all the way back to the village of Lower Montenotte. A rearguard of 500 Hungarian troops surrendered without fighting. The French followed the fleeing Austrians until nightfall, and Bonaparte imparted the orders for the next day - Masséna would occupy Carcare and start cracking the Millesimo gap open.
The battle of Montenotte was over. As the stepping-stone to Bonaparte's glory, the French have largely inflated the battle and its consequences. Montenotte basically was a successful surprise attack with superior (also numerically) forces and a rapid exploitation of the enemy rout. French propaganda claimed the Austrian lost 2,400 dead and missing and 2,000 prisoners, which is a huge exaggeration. More credible French sources put enemy losses to 700 dead and several hundred prisoners, but that's still too high. The tally in fact is 290 dead and wounded and about 1,000 prisoners and missing. On their part the French lost about 100 dead and wounded - and an entire artillery battery, captured by a patrol of 15 Sardinian Marines.
Beaulieu made a half-hearted attempt to support Argenteau, but in the end he didn't get much done. Had he reacted vigorously, he could have taken Bonaparte from behind by pushing with his whole force towards Dego and Savona; and he could have activated Colli's corps, too. But Beaulieu did not send any message to Colli, who on his part was still unaware of the Montenotte rout. So an Allied golden chance was missed. Beaulieu was neither cowardly nor stupid. He may well have seen the chance. But his infantry was proving too inferior to the French over hilly and rugged terrain, its leadership not equal to the occasion. And his Savona offensive plan aimed at driving the French back, not at achieving any decisive victory. Instead, he had lost a division in one day of fighting and the French were on the offensive. His orders were to protect Lombardy rather than Piedmont, and acting consistently, he fell back along his retreat line, disregarding Colli and the Sardinians.
The battle of Montenotte was over. As the stepping-stone to Bonaparte's glory, the French have largely inflated the battle and its consequences. Montenotte basically was a successful surprise attack with superior (also numerically) forces and a rapid exploitation of the enemy rout. French propaganda claimed the Austrian lost 2,400 dead and missing and 2,000 prisoners, which is a huge exaggeration. More credible French sources put enemy losses to 700 dead and several hundred prisoners, but that's still too high. The tally in fact is 290 dead and wounded and about 1,000 prisoners and missing. On their part the French lost about 100 dead and wounded - and an entire artillery battery, captured by a patrol of 15 Sardinian Marines.
Beaulieu made a half-hearted attempt to support Argenteau, but in the end he didn't get much done. Had he reacted vigorously, he could have taken Bonaparte from behind by pushing with his whole force towards Dego and Savona; and he could have activated Colli's corps, too. But Beaulieu did not send any message to Colli, who on his part was still unaware of the Montenotte rout. So an Allied golden chance was missed. Beaulieu was neither cowardly nor stupid. He may well have seen the chance. But his infantry was proving too inferior to the French over hilly and rugged terrain, its leadership not equal to the occasion. And his Savona offensive plan aimed at driving the French back, not at achieving any decisive victory. Instead, he had lost a division in one day of fighting and the French were on the offensive. His orders were to protect Lombardy rather than Piedmont, and acting consistently, he fell back along his retreat line, disregarding Colli and the Sardinians.