1792 - 1795: War of the Alps - Operational History
1792
September - October
After months of diplomatic and political attrition between revolutionary France and the Kingdom of Sardinia - quite obviously ill-disposed towards the Republic of the murderers of King Victor Amadeus' relative, King Louis XVI - the French set out to attack the Kingdom and conquer Savoy and Nice, the two regions the French regarded as parts of their own nation. (Savoy was actually a 100% French-speaking region, but Nice was only partly so).
The Sardinian Army was woefully unprepared to face the onslaught. After nearly 50 years of peacetime, the army - despite its magnificent and powerful, but misleading, appearance - was a rusty, dusty organization, untested in combat, filled with inept or unlearned officers who had risen through the ranks thanks to their aristocratic connections rather than merit and efficiency. The army corps commanders in both Savoy and Nice and most of their staffs were very old men utterly unfit for the task. Both army corps were in a state of organizational disarray and no one had a clue about what to do should the French attack. There was a carefully drawn up plan for the defense of Savoy, but the staff and the top rank officers were not privy to it; they didn't even know such a plan exists. It seems the Court in Turin did not believe the French would attack - they had their hands full with what was going on along the Rhine, on the Holy Roman Empire border, and it was unlikely they would divert forces to a secondary front like Italy. Thus the forces in Savoy and Nice lulled themselves into apathy, complacency and listlessness. Probably the quality of the French revolutionary soldiers was heavily underrated. If the French ragamuffins came on, the professional Army would quickly dispose of them. And probably, the fear to do something that might trigger a French overreaction along the border also weighed on the Sardinian commanders' minds and reinforced their inertia.
While the commanders snoozed, the Sardinian intelligence was at work and alarming reports about the real French intentions and preparations on the other side of the border flowed to the Sardinian HQs. But such reports were dismissed, ignored, not paid any heed to. (According to an informer, some French officers confidentially stated their invasion plan was a folly - their troops would cut to pieces by the superior Sardinians. Funnily enough, they were right. The plan was really almost suicidal for the French - IF the Sardinians had been even just barely able to exploit its weakness, which they were not).
Savoy
On September 22nd, the French general Montesquiou attacked into Savoy with less than 10,000 men. Two columns marched along the valleys of the rivers Arc and Isère. Their goal was overrunning Savoy and getting to and occupying the Alpine passes into Piedmont - Montgenèvre, Montcenis, St. Bernard.
The decrepit Sardinian general Lazary went off his head and threw his whole organization into panic and chaos. He had over 10,000 men, most of whom excellent regular troops, under his command. If effectively employed, those troops might well stop and probably crush Montesquiou's hastily formed battalions. A few hours prior to the French invasion, an officer informed Lazary about the impending attack, but Lazary did not listen and went to sleep. When the French crossed the border, Lazary ordered a general withdrawal towards and past Montmélian, the big fortress and military heart of Savoy. The key bridges on the Isère River were hurriedly blown up regardless of the fact that some Sardinian troops still were on the wrong bank of the river. The retreat turned into a stampede as discipline and order disintegrated and the panicking troops and officers streamed back towards the Alps, under a battering rain. Only not far away from the Alpine passes, at St-Jean-de-Maurienne, the rout was stopped by an energetic regiment commander. Upon getting to know what was happening, the King ordered Lazary to stop running, turn about and face the French, but it was too late. Savoy was lost almost without firing a shot. Lazary was promptly sacked, but members of his staff - who shared his responsibility - were kept in service and even promoted. The shaken Sardinians began to consolidate on the Piedmontese Alps - the French were too few and too tired to march further on, and stopped the pursue west of the Alpine passes.
The decrepit Sardinian general Lazary went off his head and threw his whole organization into panic and chaos. He had over 10,000 men, most of whom excellent regular troops, under his command. If effectively employed, those troops might well stop and probably crush Montesquiou's hastily formed battalions. A few hours prior to the French invasion, an officer informed Lazary about the impending attack, but Lazary did not listen and went to sleep. When the French crossed the border, Lazary ordered a general withdrawal towards and past Montmélian, the big fortress and military heart of Savoy. The key bridges on the Isère River were hurriedly blown up regardless of the fact that some Sardinian troops still were on the wrong bank of the river. The retreat turned into a stampede as discipline and order disintegrated and the panicking troops and officers streamed back towards the Alps, under a battering rain. Only not far away from the Alpine passes, at St-Jean-de-Maurienne, the rout was stopped by an energetic regiment commander. Upon getting to know what was happening, the King ordered Lazary to stop running, turn about and face the French, but it was too late. Savoy was lost almost without firing a shot. Lazary was promptly sacked, but members of his staff - who shared his responsibility - were kept in service and even promoted. The shaken Sardinians began to consolidate on the Piedmontese Alps - the French were too few and too tired to march further on, and stopped the pursue west of the Alpine passes.
Nice
In the County of Nice, things went more or less as in Savoy. The French general Anselme, tasked with the occupation of the County, had a division of 7,500 men (four line infantry regiments, a battalion of Corsican Light Infantry, two cavalry squadrons and some battalions of volunteers). Before the invasion the French spread rumors about a French force of 35 or 40,000 men poised to attack across the border. Sardinian spies provided well grounded information about the real situation of the French but their reports were dismissed. Instead, the rumors were assessed as realistic at the Sardinian HQs, even in Turin. The old, wobbly Sardinian general De Courten had a chief of staff - colonel Pinto - whose advice consisted in evacuating the County without a fight, purely and simply. The French fleet came into sight off Nice and De Courten feared French landings behind his lines. A hasty retreat was ordered, just like in Savoy. The powerful forts of Montauban and Villefranche, with their garrisons, were forsaken; nothing was done to support them. Anselme crossed the Var River, border on the Kingdom of Sardinia, only after De Courten's troops had evacuated their positions and were racing eastwards. The forts surrendered to the invaders.
Early in October, the French attacked into the mountains between Nice and Piedmont but a force made up by Nice militia and volunteers held their ground. On October 18th Anselme seized the important position of the Col de Brouis, but suffered severe losses in the process. A French brigade under Barral, with André Masséna at the forefont, took more positions but was driven off and thrown back by Nice militiamen. The Piedmontese-owned Ligurian town of Oneglia was attacked and pillaged. On October 22nd, the hapless De Courten was finally removed from command, and colonel Pinto kicked out of the Army. De Courten was replaced by another old man, but one made of much sterner stuff: Lieutenant General Thaon de Revel, from Nice. With Revel, a good general with backbone and a firm hand, in command, the Sardinian rout was stopped and a solid defensive front finally built up.
Early in October, the French attacked into the mountains between Nice and Piedmont but a force made up by Nice militia and volunteers held their ground. On October 18th Anselme seized the important position of the Col de Brouis, but suffered severe losses in the process. A French brigade under Barral, with André Masséna at the forefont, took more positions but was driven off and thrown back by Nice militiamen. The Piedmontese-owned Ligurian town of Oneglia was attacked and pillaged. On October 22nd, the hapless De Courten was finally removed from command, and colonel Pinto kicked out of the Army. De Courten was replaced by another old man, but one made of much sterner stuff: Lieutenant General Thaon de Revel, from Nice. With Revel, a good general with backbone and a firm hand, in command, the Sardinian rout was stopped and a solid defensive front finally built up.
November - December
Seesaw fighting in the Nice Alps. Sardinian resistance grew stronger, under the firm leadership of Revel, while the French were hampered by local insurgents (contrary to the French nationalistic myth, many people in the County of Nice didn't feel "French" and hated them). To uplift the shaken Sardinian morale, Revel planned and executed a complex operation that would lead to the recapture of the alpine village of Sospel, On November 18th, despite some mishaps - inevitable in such multi-pronged mountain attacks and often fatal to the attacker - four columns of infantry supported by a mountain guns battery surged forward and stormed the village, causing 150 French dead and wounded and taking a few prisoners and five guns. Brunet retreated to Escarène. The key positions of Col de Brouis and Col de Braus also falls in Sardinian hands.
In December, an aborted French landing in Sardinia took place. In the Alps of Nice, where the Sardinians had no more than 3,000 regulars, 600 Austrian regulars and some militia the French counterattacked in the Sospel - Braus sector, thinly held by a few companies and some local militiamen under the Swiss colonel Streng (Regiment De Courten). Leading a surprise attack with numerical superiority, and overcoming the Sardinians' stout resistance lasting for some hours, Masséna pushed back the small Streng force and retook the Cols and Sospel. On December 22nd, another multi-pronged Sardinian attack, forcefully led by competent, albeit green, officers, expelled the French from Braus once again, but the Sardinians could not occupy it due to their scanty numbers. More Sardinian local successes in Vésubie Valley, where Major Castelberg cleared the area of French infiltrations, helped stabilize the situation in the sector. The Sardinian had proved that under a solid leadership they could stand their ground and quickly recover from defeat.
In December, an aborted French landing in Sardinia took place. In the Alps of Nice, where the Sardinians had no more than 3,000 regulars, 600 Austrian regulars and some militia the French counterattacked in the Sospel - Braus sector, thinly held by a few companies and some local militiamen under the Swiss colonel Streng (Regiment De Courten). Leading a surprise attack with numerical superiority, and overcoming the Sardinians' stout resistance lasting for some hours, Masséna pushed back the small Streng force and retook the Cols and Sospel. On December 22nd, another multi-pronged Sardinian attack, forcefully led by competent, albeit green, officers, expelled the French from Braus once again, but the Sardinians could not occupy it due to their scanty numbers. More Sardinian local successes in Vésubie Valley, where Major Castelberg cleared the area of French infiltrations, helped stabilize the situation in the sector. The Sardinian had proved that under a solid leadership they could stand their ground and quickly recover from defeat.
1793
January - February: Bloody Farce in Sardinia
Until late February, small detachments' war on the Nice mountains, with some Sardinian successes. Late February, French offensive in Vésubie Valley; the Sardinians lost the village of Lantosque, but not without putting up some resistance (Nice militiamen led by the valiant Tribaud distinguish themselves). Tne Sardinians fell back to the Mount Raus positions. General Anselme was replaced by Brunet. The first Austrian unit sent to bolster the Sardinians (Strassoldo) crossed swords with the French for the first time. In return for the meager aid, the Austrians imposed one of their generals - the elderly and passive De Vins - as supreme commander of the Alpine front. On the other hand, on account of the incredible meltdown in Savoy and Nice, the Sardinian Army and the King's leadership now were severely criticized by the Allies.
Sardinia was attacked again by the French. A fleet under Admiral Truguet heavily shelled Cagliari, the island's capital city, and put a motley crowd of Marseille volunteers militia ashore. The French envisioned an easy job as the Piedmontese bigwigs and even some military commanders on the island were shamelessly ready to give up, and they knew it. Instead, they ran into the stubborn opposition of the locals and the indigenous Parliament - the Stamenti - who rushed local militia to back up the few regulars. The Marseillaise rabble broke and ran, and quickly re-embarked.
An even more farcical French fiasco took place at the opposite (northern) end of the island, involving the young Bonaparte. A joint Franco-Corsican expedition force was sent by the Paris government and - reluctantly - by the Corsican President Paoli to attack and occupy the small island of La Maddalena, garrisoned by Sardinian Navy personnel and coastal artillery emplacements. Bonaparte, chief of the artillery, managed to land on a nearby island and his ordnance opened up on the Sardinians across the sea straits. However, the Sardinian Navy's prompt and vigorous reaction marred the whole operation and the Franco-Corsicans were put to flight, including a chagrined and angry Bonaparte. French histories state the botched expedition was doomed from the start by Paoli's ill will, whereas Piedmontese (and Italian) histories underscore the role played by the Sardinian Navy in repulsing the invasion (two Sardinian seamen earned the first Gold Medals for Valor in modern Italian history). Both versions of the facts are founded.
Sardinia was attacked again by the French. A fleet under Admiral Truguet heavily shelled Cagliari, the island's capital city, and put a motley crowd of Marseille volunteers militia ashore. The French envisioned an easy job as the Piedmontese bigwigs and even some military commanders on the island were shamelessly ready to give up, and they knew it. Instead, they ran into the stubborn opposition of the locals and the indigenous Parliament - the Stamenti - who rushed local militia to back up the few regulars. The Marseillaise rabble broke and ran, and quickly re-embarked.
An even more farcical French fiasco took place at the opposite (northern) end of the island, involving the young Bonaparte. A joint Franco-Corsican expedition force was sent by the Paris government and - reluctantly - by the Corsican President Paoli to attack and occupy the small island of La Maddalena, garrisoned by Sardinian Navy personnel and coastal artillery emplacements. Bonaparte, chief of the artillery, managed to land on a nearby island and his ordnance opened up on the Sardinians across the sea straits. However, the Sardinian Navy's prompt and vigorous reaction marred the whole operation and the Franco-Corsicans were put to flight, including a chagrined and angry Bonaparte. French histories state the botched expedition was doomed from the start by Paoli's ill will, whereas Piedmontese (and Italian) histories underscore the role played by the Sardinian Navy in repulsing the invasion (two Sardinian seamen earned the first Gold Medals for Valor in modern Italian history). Both versions of the facts are founded.
March - June: Great Battle of the Authion
March to June, the French carried out small scale offensive operations and took some operationally significant positions as a preliminary work preparatory for a big push east to finally throw the Allies out of the Nice Alps and into Piedmont. They are overall successful, also because De Vins stuck to a strict defensive (partly because of his Vienna orders) and prevented the most active Sardinian commanders from launching spoiling attacks.
Encouraged by the Allied passiveness and lack of reactions, the French government - through the dreaded "representatives at the military HQs", the eyes and ears of the revolutionary government, whose judgment may seal any commander's fate - decided to tackle the main obstacle lying between the French army and the Alps passes leading into Piedmont: the fortified area of the Authion mountains. That was a large and imposing system of ridges and peaks, shaped like a natural fortress, barring the way to Piedmont and an extremely tough nut to crack if strongly defended. The Allies had 24 battalions with 9,200 men altogether over the area. Brunet could concentrate a powerful 20,000 men strike force against the Authion fortress. But he was fully aware that was not enough. The Authion was a formidable barrier bristling with trenches, redoubts and artillery batteries. Brunet's men were tired out after months of fighting on the offensive, and even in case of victory, it still was a long and rugged way to Piedmont. Yet he was pressed into drafting the attack plan and executing it. Paris wanted a victory in Italy, and if he shied away - or if he lose the battle - his own head, very literally, would be in jeopardy. Brunet did his best, but deep down he probably knew he was in for a disaster.
The hard fought battle lasted from June 8th to 12th. French columns stormed up the steep slopes and streambeds of the Authion under a heavy artillery fire and sought to tear open a gash in the Allied line. Despite their repeated efforts and some local successes - the Sardinian Vercelli Provincial Regiment broke and melted away, opening a potentially catastrophic gap in the line - the impetuous but ill-trained and sometimes badly led French were ultimately repulsed, often routed and fleeing, sometimes cracking under the strain and being swept from the field by Allied bayonet charges, sometimes ending up simply massacred on the cliffs. Some routed units got utterly out of control, screaming as they were streaming back in panic that the Piedmontese were coming and Nice was in danger. Brunet retreated to his initial positions.
Official French casualty figures are 282 dead and 1,252 wounded, but they are most likely way too low - later on, Brunet was brought to trial on the charge of having lost probably 3,500 men dead, wounded and captured (possibly over 5,000 since January), his attack force completely spent. The Allies lost about 2,400 men, approximately one fifth of their strength, in a savage struggle where several Sardinian units and even the ordinarily mediocre Austrian Belgioioso regiment fought very well, often heroically. The French called the Acqui Provincial Regiment "the devils' regiment". Authion was a great defensive victory for Piedmont.
Encouraged by the Allied passiveness and lack of reactions, the French government - through the dreaded "representatives at the military HQs", the eyes and ears of the revolutionary government, whose judgment may seal any commander's fate - decided to tackle the main obstacle lying between the French army and the Alps passes leading into Piedmont: the fortified area of the Authion mountains. That was a large and imposing system of ridges and peaks, shaped like a natural fortress, barring the way to Piedmont and an extremely tough nut to crack if strongly defended. The Allies had 24 battalions with 9,200 men altogether over the area. Brunet could concentrate a powerful 20,000 men strike force against the Authion fortress. But he was fully aware that was not enough. The Authion was a formidable barrier bristling with trenches, redoubts and artillery batteries. Brunet's men were tired out after months of fighting on the offensive, and even in case of victory, it still was a long and rugged way to Piedmont. Yet he was pressed into drafting the attack plan and executing it. Paris wanted a victory in Italy, and if he shied away - or if he lose the battle - his own head, very literally, would be in jeopardy. Brunet did his best, but deep down he probably knew he was in for a disaster.
The hard fought battle lasted from June 8th to 12th. French columns stormed up the steep slopes and streambeds of the Authion under a heavy artillery fire and sought to tear open a gash in the Allied line. Despite their repeated efforts and some local successes - the Sardinian Vercelli Provincial Regiment broke and melted away, opening a potentially catastrophic gap in the line - the impetuous but ill-trained and sometimes badly led French were ultimately repulsed, often routed and fleeing, sometimes cracking under the strain and being swept from the field by Allied bayonet charges, sometimes ending up simply massacred on the cliffs. Some routed units got utterly out of control, screaming as they were streaming back in panic that the Piedmontese were coming and Nice was in danger. Brunet retreated to his initial positions.
Official French casualty figures are 282 dead and 1,252 wounded, but they are most likely way too low - later on, Brunet was brought to trial on the charge of having lost probably 3,500 men dead, wounded and captured (possibly over 5,000 since January), his attack force completely spent. The Allies lost about 2,400 men, approximately one fifth of their strength, in a savage struggle where several Sardinian units and even the ordinarily mediocre Austrian Belgioioso regiment fought very well, often heroically. The French called the Acqui Provincial Regiment "the devils' regiment". Authion was a great defensive victory for Piedmont.
Enter the British: The Siege of Toulon
In April 1793, the Pitt government - engaged in forming the First Coalition against France - signed a bilateral alliance with the Kingdom of Sardinia. Under the strategic supervision of Admiral Hood and the Mediterranean Fleet, Spain, Piedmont, the other Italian States and Austria might seriously threaten France's southern "soft belly". Anti-revolutionary revolts broke out in Southern France (Provence and Dauphiné), apparently affording the Allies an excellent opportunity to intervene. The French situation in the South actually looked quite worrisome, but the Allies' power and opportunities were more apparent than real. Spain's and the minor Italian States' support to Pitt were lukewarm at best, as later proved also by the behavior of some of their troops at Toulon. Austria did not take part in the Mediterranean venture and blackmailed Piedmont by claiming back portions of the Piedmontese territory in exchange for more military assistance against the French. On their part, the British were more interested in destroying the French naval power in the Mediterranean than doing anything substantial to remove the French overland threat to Spain and Italy. In short, mutual mistrust reigned supreme among the Allies.
At the end of July, the Mediterranean Fleet occupied the haven and naval base of Toulon, acclaimed by the city royalists and anti-revolutionary bourgeois. The French quickly reacted by laying siege to the rebellious town. Over time, the 2,100 British soldiers and the local French volunteers were joined by thousands of Spaniards and 9,000 Italians, of whom 2,470 Sardinians (28 companies) and 6,500 Neapolitans. The well led Sardinian expeditionary force fights - with one exception - very well, sometimes magnificently, earning the respect and praise of the British (whatever the latter may have said later). Also the Neapolitan grenadiers and the Spanish happened to distinguish themselves. Some Neapolitan and Spanish failures may be explained partly by the misgivings of their respective governments about the whole undertaking, not entirely unfounded as the British were not inclined to do all they could to defend those kingdoms from the French. The Sardinians were truly and sincerely interested in inter-Allied cooperation, but their fixation on recovering Savoy and Nice based on unrealistic and disastrous plans added to the disruption within the alliance.
Until September the abysmal amateurish French leadership and conduct of operations made things relatively easy for the Allies at Toulon and quite bloody for the French. But with the arrival of Bonaparte as commander of the artillery and mainstay of the siege force, and under the skilled professional Dugommier, the French gradually got the upper hand. In December the Allies evacuated Toulon, in some disarray but covered by the Sardinians acting as a rearguard, not without destroying the French ships moored there. The Sardinians at Toulon lost over one third of their expeditionary force (250 dead, 50 prisoners, 600 wounded and sick).
At the end of July, the Mediterranean Fleet occupied the haven and naval base of Toulon, acclaimed by the city royalists and anti-revolutionary bourgeois. The French quickly reacted by laying siege to the rebellious town. Over time, the 2,100 British soldiers and the local French volunteers were joined by thousands of Spaniards and 9,000 Italians, of whom 2,470 Sardinians (28 companies) and 6,500 Neapolitans. The well led Sardinian expeditionary force fights - with one exception - very well, sometimes magnificently, earning the respect and praise of the British (whatever the latter may have said later). Also the Neapolitan grenadiers and the Spanish happened to distinguish themselves. Some Neapolitan and Spanish failures may be explained partly by the misgivings of their respective governments about the whole undertaking, not entirely unfounded as the British were not inclined to do all they could to defend those kingdoms from the French. The Sardinians were truly and sincerely interested in inter-Allied cooperation, but their fixation on recovering Savoy and Nice based on unrealistic and disastrous plans added to the disruption within the alliance.
Until September the abysmal amateurish French leadership and conduct of operations made things relatively easy for the Allies at Toulon and quite bloody for the French. But with the arrival of Bonaparte as commander of the artillery and mainstay of the siege force, and under the skilled professional Dugommier, the French gradually got the upper hand. In December the Allies evacuated Toulon, in some disarray but covered by the Sardinians acting as a rearguard, not without destroying the French ships moored there. The Sardinians at Toulon lost over one third of their expeditionary force (250 dead, 50 prisoners, 600 wounded and sick).
June - December: The Alps
Knowing the situation of the French in Savoy was, to say the least, precarious, and deluding themselves into thinking the Savoyard population is tired of the French rule and ready to rise up - tired the Savoyards were, but not to the point of taking up arms against the occupants - the Sardinian high command planned and executed an offensive into Savoy. The goal of the offensive was more political than strategic: the King aimed at retaking Savoy to show off the success to his allies. However, despite a good start, all went awry. Piedmont squandered on that ill-conceived operation its limited assets. The offensive was spoilt by a whole lot of troubles. Very bad planning (two divisions attacking in three different directions, Maurienne, Tarentaise and Faucigny), the absurd final goals (taking Grenoble and even Lyons!), the inadequate force earmarked for the offensive, the limited support received by the Savoyards - also because it proved impossible to arm and equip any significant numbers of partisans and local militia - , the lethargic, almost self-defeating leadership of tardy general De Vins and some of the most inefficient Sardinian generals, the paralyzing slowness of the advance, the sluggishness of the decision making process, the crippling mistakes made by the Duke of Monferrato. Piedmont's scanty resources and the Authion battle success and any benefits it might generate got squandered on a badly planned and badly led offensive of little strategic consequence, not endorsed by the Allies and carried out for mere political purposes.
Initially the attack progressed satisfactorily and the weak French forces along the Alps - really in bad shape - were easily driven back in some disarray. After recapturing St.-Jean-de-Maurienne, instead of proceeding to deliver the final blow on the desperate French, who were seriously considering the evacuation of Savoy, the Sardinians just stopped - possibly waiting for a Savoyard revolt to break out and finish the French off. The revolt didn't break out and the great French general Kellermann arrived in September, rapidly redressing the situation and taking effective countermeasures. A swift French counterattack, although here and there bumping against rocky Sardinian resistance and suffering setbacks, outmaneuvered the badly deployed and slow-reacting enemy and forced the Sardinians back to the Alpine passes.
To the south, the Duke of Aosta - personally plucky but totally unfit for leading an army - attacked into the County of Nice with 20,000 men. Again the planning work had been poor: several thick columns were to operate in close cooperation over a very rough terrain and along a 60 kilometers wide front, and also due to a number of gross mistakes, cooperation - essential to success - would prove unfeasible. The Duke neglected De Vins' judicious operational directives and stubbornly went his own way, causing the big fiasco of Lantosque (September 6 - 10) where he lost about 600 men for minimal gains. The entire operation was a shameful flop.
Another costly flop befell De Vins in October, when the old Austrian general - after a lot of procrastination, probably to comply with Vienna's orders - leads 3,000 Austrians and 1,600 Sardinians against a French garrison of 150 men, later growing to 400, at the key locale of Gilette. Despite the huge numerical superiority, De Vins, whose mistakes are compounded by the awful performance under fire by the Austrian regiment Caprara, proved unable to overcome the French defense and retreated, after losing a staggering 800 dead and 700 wounded (the French only lost 150 men in all). Brunet, the French commander, then only had 5 battalions of seasoned troops, the remainder of his 15,000 men being all green recruits.
Yet another De Vins flop in October - November. A Sardinian surprise attack took the fortified position of Utelles, but the French ambushed and repulsed them with heavy losses. De Vins was entirely responsible for the fiasco - he had asked Revel to set up and organize an attack on enemy fortified positions barely 24 hours before launching it, and the Austrian troops in the area lent no support to the Sardinians. Revel's hastily assembled assault force, including the 8th Grenadier Battalion with 350 men, did all it could under the circumstances. At the end of November, brigade general Masséna successfully attacked from Utelles to uproot the Sardinians from their last redoubts in the area. Then winter weather conditions put an end to all operations in the Alps for the year 1793.
Throughout the year, and notwithstanding the valor of the troops, the Sardinians shot their bolt, losing about 10,000 men for virtually no gain. The offensives into Savoy and Nice were complete failures. Numerically inferior forces had been broken up into penny packets and led to aimlessly attack this or that position under a faulty and slumbering leadership, lacking even a sufficient knowledge of the terrain the troops would operate over. De Vins's inept (and possibly purposely indecisive) command action, the Duke of Aosta's unfitness and presumption, and some Sardinian commanders' passiveness and unpreparedness, had sorely wasted the outstanding valor of the troops and many junior and medium rank officers. Morale sagged across the kingdom, and even in the Army, where the troops bitterly felt let down by inept leaders, desertion rate seems to have increased. (However, a contemporary Austrian source praises the tenacity of Sardinian troops even under such a disgraceful leadership, and mentions a remarkably low desertion rate).
Initially the attack progressed satisfactorily and the weak French forces along the Alps - really in bad shape - were easily driven back in some disarray. After recapturing St.-Jean-de-Maurienne, instead of proceeding to deliver the final blow on the desperate French, who were seriously considering the evacuation of Savoy, the Sardinians just stopped - possibly waiting for a Savoyard revolt to break out and finish the French off. The revolt didn't break out and the great French general Kellermann arrived in September, rapidly redressing the situation and taking effective countermeasures. A swift French counterattack, although here and there bumping against rocky Sardinian resistance and suffering setbacks, outmaneuvered the badly deployed and slow-reacting enemy and forced the Sardinians back to the Alpine passes.
To the south, the Duke of Aosta - personally plucky but totally unfit for leading an army - attacked into the County of Nice with 20,000 men. Again the planning work had been poor: several thick columns were to operate in close cooperation over a very rough terrain and along a 60 kilometers wide front, and also due to a number of gross mistakes, cooperation - essential to success - would prove unfeasible. The Duke neglected De Vins' judicious operational directives and stubbornly went his own way, causing the big fiasco of Lantosque (September 6 - 10) where he lost about 600 men for minimal gains. The entire operation was a shameful flop.
Another costly flop befell De Vins in October, when the old Austrian general - after a lot of procrastination, probably to comply with Vienna's orders - leads 3,000 Austrians and 1,600 Sardinians against a French garrison of 150 men, later growing to 400, at the key locale of Gilette. Despite the huge numerical superiority, De Vins, whose mistakes are compounded by the awful performance under fire by the Austrian regiment Caprara, proved unable to overcome the French defense and retreated, after losing a staggering 800 dead and 700 wounded (the French only lost 150 men in all). Brunet, the French commander, then only had 5 battalions of seasoned troops, the remainder of his 15,000 men being all green recruits.
Yet another De Vins flop in October - November. A Sardinian surprise attack took the fortified position of Utelles, but the French ambushed and repulsed them with heavy losses. De Vins was entirely responsible for the fiasco - he had asked Revel to set up and organize an attack on enemy fortified positions barely 24 hours before launching it, and the Austrian troops in the area lent no support to the Sardinians. Revel's hastily assembled assault force, including the 8th Grenadier Battalion with 350 men, did all it could under the circumstances. At the end of November, brigade general Masséna successfully attacked from Utelles to uproot the Sardinians from their last redoubts in the area. Then winter weather conditions put an end to all operations in the Alps for the year 1793.
Throughout the year, and notwithstanding the valor of the troops, the Sardinians shot their bolt, losing about 10,000 men for virtually no gain. The offensives into Savoy and Nice were complete failures. Numerically inferior forces had been broken up into penny packets and led to aimlessly attack this or that position under a faulty and slumbering leadership, lacking even a sufficient knowledge of the terrain the troops would operate over. De Vins's inept (and possibly purposely indecisive) command action, the Duke of Aosta's unfitness and presumption, and some Sardinian commanders' passiveness and unpreparedness, had sorely wasted the outstanding valor of the troops and many junior and medium rank officers. Morale sagged across the kingdom, and even in the Army, where the troops bitterly felt let down by inept leaders, desertion rate seems to have increased. (However, a contemporary Austrian source praises the tenacity of Sardinian troops even under such a disgraceful leadership, and mentions a remarkably low desertion rate).
1794
Bankruptcy and Total War
The Kingdom of Sardinia was broke. The strain of war was proving hardly sustainable for the little State. Military expenditures had risen from 11 million in 1790 to 20 in 1792 to 50 in 1794. More and more taxes were levied. Public debt went out of control and inflation ran wild; prices went through the roof. All that for no important military success nor strategic or political gain. Small wonder that in the Crown War Council of January 6th, 1794, a minister proposed to reverse the alliance, drop the First Coalition and side with France. Proposal turned down after a fiery discussion.
To replenish the worn out battalions of the Army, more citizens and subjects of the King were pressed into provincial units, and reserve provincial companies were merged into ordinance and even grenadier battalions. Through an immense effort, front line troops in April 1794 numbered 40,000 men and 5,500 horses. The theoretical total strength of the Army peaked in 1795 with 71,738 men (including the sick, those on leave, and the territorials). 50,000 of them were subjects of the King of Sardinia: 1,7 soldiers every 1,000 inhabitants, that is, the half of the gigantic national mobilization rate of revolutionary France. Even so, the average infantry battalion had a real strength of no more than 400 men.
The army was reorganized as follows:
Army of the Alps (Captain General, Duke of Aosta), along the Alps from Switzerland to Southern Piedmont with 22,000 regulars and plenty of militia
Austro-Sardinian Army (Captain General, De Vins) in Southern Piedmont with a 12,000-strong corps under Colli and Dellera, and a 2,000-strong division under Argenteau
Cavalry Division, with 4,000 Sardinian and Austrian horse, in Piedmont.
All generals except the diligent 74 years old Piedmontese general Dellera spent the winter season comfortably ensconced in Turin and away from the troops, who were freezing in the snow. De Vins was severely ill (like his French counterpart Dumerbion). Some generals even reached their troops at the front no sooner than the end of April, meaning, weeks after the beginning of the French spring offensive.
To replenish the worn out battalions of the Army, more citizens and subjects of the King were pressed into provincial units, and reserve provincial companies were merged into ordinance and even grenadier battalions. Through an immense effort, front line troops in April 1794 numbered 40,000 men and 5,500 horses. The theoretical total strength of the Army peaked in 1795 with 71,738 men (including the sick, those on leave, and the territorials). 50,000 of them were subjects of the King of Sardinia: 1,7 soldiers every 1,000 inhabitants, that is, the half of the gigantic national mobilization rate of revolutionary France. Even so, the average infantry battalion had a real strength of no more than 400 men.
The army was reorganized as follows:
Army of the Alps (Captain General, Duke of Aosta), along the Alps from Switzerland to Southern Piedmont with 22,000 regulars and plenty of militia
Austro-Sardinian Army (Captain General, De Vins) in Southern Piedmont with a 12,000-strong corps under Colli and Dellera, and a 2,000-strong division under Argenteau
Cavalry Division, with 4,000 Sardinian and Austrian horse, in Piedmont.
All generals except the diligent 74 years old Piedmontese general Dellera spent the winter season comfortably ensconced in Turin and away from the troops, who were freezing in the snow. De Vins was severely ill (like his French counterpart Dumerbion). Some generals even reached their troops at the front no sooner than the end of April, meaning, weeks after the beginning of the French spring offensive.
French planning: Bonaparte's Ideas
In 1793, the French realized that the price in men and material for breaking through the robust Alpine defense of Piedmont - centered on the Authion fortress, to the south, and the Alpine range all along the border - would have been very high, probably too high. On the other hand, however, they also realized the deep cleft between the Allies and especially between the Sardinians and the Austrians, the latter unwilling to shore up Piedmont more than the minimum required to keep the Kingdom in existence somehow.
On January 30th, 1794 Carnot issued the fundamental Système général des opérations militaires (General System of Military Operations) whereby a new plan for the defeat of Piedmont was outlined for the first time. It included three simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous operations: 1) in the Alps, the seizing of the two main passes, Saint Bernard and Montcenis, to pose a threat to the town of Aosta and Turin; 2) a renewed offensive on Saorge and Tende, to achieve a breakthrough and take the pivotal city of Coni (Cuneo); 3) the occupation of Oneglia, a relatively large Piedmontese enclave in the Genoa Republic, and the mountain passes between Liguria and Southern Piedmont. The third prong, the Oneglia offensive, was to be the main axis of attack, bringing about manifold benefits such as cutting off Piedmont from the sea and the British fleet, forcing the Allies out of the southern Alps area, and budging the neutral Republic of Genoa into entering the war by France's side. Since Genoa was a neutral State, and Carnot didn't want to encroach upon Genoese territory, a naval operation was planned. A landing force under the famous general Hoche was to land at Oneglia and roll the Allied left flank up.
In the meantime, Carnot tripled the strength of the two French armies on the Piedmont border - respectively, of the Alps and of River Var - raising it to 98,000 men, of whom 70,000 serving at the front versus 36,000 Allies. The biggest was the Army of the Var with 58,000 men. At the same time manpower quality was also improved through Carnot's 1794 "merging" of veterans, volunteers and recruits.
Artullery general Napoleon Bonaparte, in service on the Italian front, drew up and submitted a modified attack plan for the Army of the Var. Legend has it that the whole plan, based on Bonaparte's thorough study of Maillebois's 1744-45 campaign in Piedmont, was entirely his own brainchild. In fact, it's very likely at least two more people contributed their views to it: Masséna, born near Nice as a Sardinian subject; and the then battalion leader Rusca, another ex-subject of the King of Sardinia, native of Dolceacqua in the County of Nice and a staunch republican conspirator who had enlisted in the revolutionary army. Based on Bourcet's essential text on mountain war tactics, also studied by Bonaparte, the plan envisioned well mapped out troop movements in "penny packets" along carefully identified mountain paths which within six days were to climb up the valleys of Roia, Nervia and Taggia rivers to occupy Brigue and cut off Saorgio and the Authion.
On January 30th, 1794 Carnot issued the fundamental Système général des opérations militaires (General System of Military Operations) whereby a new plan for the defeat of Piedmont was outlined for the first time. It included three simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous operations: 1) in the Alps, the seizing of the two main passes, Saint Bernard and Montcenis, to pose a threat to the town of Aosta and Turin; 2) a renewed offensive on Saorge and Tende, to achieve a breakthrough and take the pivotal city of Coni (Cuneo); 3) the occupation of Oneglia, a relatively large Piedmontese enclave in the Genoa Republic, and the mountain passes between Liguria and Southern Piedmont. The third prong, the Oneglia offensive, was to be the main axis of attack, bringing about manifold benefits such as cutting off Piedmont from the sea and the British fleet, forcing the Allies out of the southern Alps area, and budging the neutral Republic of Genoa into entering the war by France's side. Since Genoa was a neutral State, and Carnot didn't want to encroach upon Genoese territory, a naval operation was planned. A landing force under the famous general Hoche was to land at Oneglia and roll the Allied left flank up.
In the meantime, Carnot tripled the strength of the two French armies on the Piedmont border - respectively, of the Alps and of River Var - raising it to 98,000 men, of whom 70,000 serving at the front versus 36,000 Allies. The biggest was the Army of the Var with 58,000 men. At the same time manpower quality was also improved through Carnot's 1794 "merging" of veterans, volunteers and recruits.
Artullery general Napoleon Bonaparte, in service on the Italian front, drew up and submitted a modified attack plan for the Army of the Var. Legend has it that the whole plan, based on Bonaparte's thorough study of Maillebois's 1744-45 campaign in Piedmont, was entirely his own brainchild. In fact, it's very likely at least two more people contributed their views to it: Masséna, born near Nice as a Sardinian subject; and the then battalion leader Rusca, another ex-subject of the King of Sardinia, native of Dolceacqua in the County of Nice and a staunch republican conspirator who had enlisted in the revolutionary army. Based on Bourcet's essential text on mountain war tactics, also studied by Bonaparte, the plan envisioned well mapped out troop movements in "penny packets" along carefully identified mountain paths which within six days were to climb up the valleys of Roia, Nervia and Taggia rivers to occupy Brigue and cut off Saorgio and the Authion.
Foolishness at Work: Dellera's Plan Rejected
The best high rank Sardinian officer in the south, the old but sensible Dellera, saw through French preparations - also aided by the efficient Sardinian intelligence - and submitted to the supreme headquarters a defensive plan that, if adopted, would at least have made life more difficult for the Army of the Var. He proposed to shift and withdraw the Allied force in such a way as to protect Saorge and the passes into Piedmont from an attack coming from the south-southwest, exactly the course of action the Army of the Var would take soon. The proposal was debated in a war council in Turin. The King and several veteran Sardinian generals endorsed it. But Cravanzana, the inept Minister of War, and De Vins rejected it, the latter even insulting Dellera. Crucially, Colli hesitated, and the plan was ultimately rejected. Dellera desperately insisted that the army deployment must be changed and some key localities within the Republic of Genoa occupied before the French could do it. Again De Vins vetoed the plan. He just accepted to reinforce Tende with 10 Sardinian battalions and move 10 Austrian battalions under Argenteau (4,000 men) close to the southern approaches to Piedmont. The mission of these troops was not reinforcing the Sardinians, but merely covering the vanguard of the Austrian army that was forming in Lombardy. Again, the Austrians did not seriously mean to actively employ the bulk of their forces to help Piedmont defend itself.
On April 1st, general Hoche was arrested under charge of betrayal - Robespierre's Terror was raging in France then - and the landing at Oneglia cancelled. Supported by Augustin Robespierre, brother of the dictator and friend of his, Bonaparte, with Masséna, suggested to completely disregard Genoese neutrality and take Oneglia by land, and do it quickly before the Austrian army of Lombardy could intervene.
The plan as accepted by the Convention in Paris contained a major shortcoming, as Bonaparte pointed out. While both French armies - Alps and the Var - would join in the offensive, the decisive right prong (Army of the Var into the Republic of Genoa) needed to be the strongest and the Army of the Alps should assign troops to it. Instead, that didn't happen and Masséna's numerical superiority was not massive. Facing a better organized and more reactive defense, that might have caused serious troubles to the French.
On April 1st, general Hoche was arrested under charge of betrayal - Robespierre's Terror was raging in France then - and the landing at Oneglia cancelled. Supported by Augustin Robespierre, brother of the dictator and friend of his, Bonaparte, with Masséna, suggested to completely disregard Genoese neutrality and take Oneglia by land, and do it quickly before the Austrian army of Lombardy could intervene.
The plan as accepted by the Convention in Paris contained a major shortcoming, as Bonaparte pointed out. While both French armies - Alps and the Var - would join in the offensive, the decisive right prong (Army of the Var into the Republic of Genoa) needed to be the strongest and the Army of the Alps should assign troops to it. Instead, that didn't happen and Masséna's numerical superiority was not massive. Facing a better organized and more reactive defense, that might have caused serious troubles to the French.
April: Battle for Brigue, and the Disgrace of Saorge
Early in the morning of April 6th, while the French center and left pinned the Allies down with local attacks and ejected them from some outposts, Masséna's right wing with its 15,000 men poured into Liguria, flouting Genoese neutrality. In 1793 the Republic of Genoa had formed a 10,000-strong corps of good professional troops, but the French knew those troops would not be used against them. Then Masséna launched three columns up the valleys of as many rivers - Roja, Nervia and Taggia, the latter led personally by Masséna. A fourth army detachment entered the Piedmontese enclave of Oneglia, garrisoned by 3,000 line and 1,500 local militia under major general Montafia. Unable to hold the town of Oneglia, the base of an effective Sardinian privateers' flotilla, and receiving no support from nearby Argenteau's Austrians, Montafia fell back into the mountains.
The Roja column was easily halted by the Saorge fortress and its powerful artillery batteries. Colli rushed to the attacked area and started organizing the defense, displaying a considerable activity. However, in two days of incredibly fast march the French covered 80 kilometers up and down hills and mountains, getting to the vital passes that led to Brigue and to Piedmont, practically in the Allies' rear area and but 10 kms away from the Tende road, the only Allied line of communication and supply in the area. Severing it meant cutting off and bagging the whole Allied force in the County of Nice.
The thunderbolt threw the Allied commanders - except Colli, and Dellera who was expecting something of that sort - into utter dismay and near-panic. Outnumbered and outmaneuvered, confused and taken completely by surprise, it took them a couple days to recover from the shock, while, fortunately for them, Masséna's advance was being considerably slowed down by the snow and the bitter cold of the season. A Sardinian counterattack wiped out the small garrison the French had placed at the Tanarda Pass, a main gate to Brigue.
As the operations stalled for a while (Masséna incurred the wrath of the revolutionary commissars at the army HQ for his half-failure, and his position was saved by Bonaparte's intervention), Colli rushed to the front as many reinforcements from Piedmont as he could - in two weeks the troops facing the French rose from about 5,500 to 10,000 (but only 6,000 on the left, where Masséna was attacking), and the front itself was sort of precariously stabilized through the energetic countermeasures set up by Colli.
As the French were building up for the decisive push, Masséna attacked Argenteau's division on April 16th, positioned at and around the key locale of Ponte di Nava (Nava Bridge) where it dangerously threatened his right flank. Argenteau had not stirred a finger to lend any help to Montafia at Oneglia. Pressed by Masséna, and despite the generous offer on Colli's part to detach troops to support him, Argenteau simply gave way and withdrew, refusing to cooperate with the Sardinians (even disobeying De Vins' orders) and laying the blame on Colli. Argenteau's unbelievable mutiny allowed the French to enter Southern Piedmont for the first time since the beginning of the war.
After removing the Austrians from the picture and taking the important position of Ponte di Nava, the French closed in for the kill. On 19th April a diversionary attack on the Sardinian right by two French brigades ended up in a mini-civil war bloodbath when the attackers clashed with heavily outnumbered elements of the Sardinian Franc Corps including Croatian light infantry and Bonneaud's Royalist French, holding a redoubt. The Republicans jumped into the trenches and the Royalists fought to the last man with savage fury, both sides going berserk in a frenzy of mutual hatred. Bonneaud's company was virtually annihilated, losing 70 men killed in the wild hand-to-hand fighting. Bonneaud himself, his lieutenant Forbin - both heavily wounded - and the few survivors were rescued by the retreating Croatians, who on their part lost 35 men. The Republican French paid a high price for the success with 250 killed in action.
Between 26th and 28th April, Masséna finally cracked the Sardinian defense of Brigue. His 20,000 men attacked the enemy line and its two main fortified areas - Colle Ardente and Felz, and minor redoubts around the main strongholds. The fighting was intense and brutal. The defenders of Colle Ardente and its fortified area, whose mainstay was the Royal Grenadiers regiment with 800 men and a number of excellent officers under colonel de Bellegarde, successfully repulsed all attacks. A brigade force led by general Fiorella was completely smashed, losing 100 dead, 36 prisoners, hundreds of wounded and the remainder routed and fleeing in panic at the sight of the counterattacking grenadiers. Even attacks directed personally by Masséna failed under the Sardinians' steady and deadly volleys, and even boulders thrown down the slopes on the attacking columns.
The Felz area instead collapsed despite a vigorous defense put up especially by the 1st Guards battalion - which lost 210 men out of 300. Unfortunately, an entire battalion of provincial infantry - Pinerolo Regiment - disintegrated and ran away, while its commander, and commander of the Felz area, colonel count Radicati di Marmorito, was killed in action. The Pinerolo rout infected neighboring elements, who also threw down their weapons and fled. Although after the battle many stragglers rejoined their ranks, the collapse allowed the French to penetrate the line and eliminate the last stubborn defenders, and crack the way to Brigue open. The rout may have been caused by physical exhaustion or overwhelming tiredness of the war among provincial troops, but it also seems many officers had very recently been assigned to the battalion - due to the exceedingly rapid officers' turnover in Sardinian operative units - and were practically unknown to their own troops. A leadership crisis under fire might also explain the catastrophic event.
A similar disaster struck the Sardinian right flank when a French attack caused 300 militiamen to panic and flee. Their flight sapped the morale of the Beola fort garrison, who surrendered immediately with 20 officers and 250 men. Thus also the Sardinian right was smashed.
The loss of Felz and Tanarda Pass - retaken by the French - and the lack of any support from Argenteau persuaded Colli that the fall of Brigue was inevitable, so he opted for retreating. The last redoubts still tenaciously defended by the Sardinians held Masséna up long enough for Colli to evacuate the Brigue area and withdraw his troops to Tende. Masséna's troops were simply tired out after days of relentless action and combat and unable to continue the advance. After the taking of Brigue, Masséna's push came to a halt for one week.
In the April 26 - 28 battle, Colli lost 16 guns and 700 men - 350 killed and wounded, the rest prisoners or deserters. French casualties were surely heavier. However, as Colli was reorganizing his troops around Tende, it turned out no fewer than 3,000 Sardinian troops were missing - almost one fourth of the entire corps. Although many of them would turn up and rejoin their ranks in the following days, the very high MIA figure indicates that the morale collapse between Felz and Brigue, and also elsewhere along the front, had been quite bad and alarming. Surely Colli incurred blame, and probably came under De Vins's fire for the defeat. But De Vins was in Turin - over 100 kms to the north, a two-days messenger ride from the front - , didn't know the terrain, and Colli was the man on the spot. And a better tactician than De Vins. As nearly all Sardinian and Austrian commanders, 60 years old Colli had been taken by surprise by the French attack, but he had been the only one to zip to the front and actively try to stem the tide.
Notwithstanding the defeat, Sardinian valor and grit shone again during Colli's retreat in April - May. A detachment of 300 men from the Nice Provincials under Major Luigi Grimaldi di Boglio, covering a retreating column, stood fast for 24 hours against largely superior French forces, losing 100 men but accomplishing its mission. At Salines Pass, Captain Asquer di Flumini (an aristocratic officer from the island of Sardinia) with 80 men of the Sardinia Regiment and a reinforcement of 28 Piedmontese light infantrymen conducted a formidable active defense against 600 French, not only holding the pass but driving the attackers back to their lines.
Unfortunately, the Sardinian retreat allowed the French to cut off the impregnable fortress of Saorge with its artillery batteries. Colli had peremptorily ordered the Saorge commander, colonel Muffat chevalier de Saint-Amour, to hold the fortress for as long as possible before evacuating it. Overriding the vehement protests of his officers, Saint-Amour instead abandoned the fort almost immediately (later on, Bonaparte bragged about having forced the garrison's surrender, but that was untrue). Arrested, Saint -Amour was brought to trial in Turin, summarily judged by the War Council, and shot by a firing squad on June 3rd. In fact, his fault had been minor if compared to those of other Sardinian commanders; Saorge was doomed in any case, and had he delayed the evacuation, the garrison would have been captured for no gain. But his connections at the Court were not solid enough to save his life, and the King's government wanted to "set an example" - on the cheap.
The Roja column was easily halted by the Saorge fortress and its powerful artillery batteries. Colli rushed to the attacked area and started organizing the defense, displaying a considerable activity. However, in two days of incredibly fast march the French covered 80 kilometers up and down hills and mountains, getting to the vital passes that led to Brigue and to Piedmont, practically in the Allies' rear area and but 10 kms away from the Tende road, the only Allied line of communication and supply in the area. Severing it meant cutting off and bagging the whole Allied force in the County of Nice.
The thunderbolt threw the Allied commanders - except Colli, and Dellera who was expecting something of that sort - into utter dismay and near-panic. Outnumbered and outmaneuvered, confused and taken completely by surprise, it took them a couple days to recover from the shock, while, fortunately for them, Masséna's advance was being considerably slowed down by the snow and the bitter cold of the season. A Sardinian counterattack wiped out the small garrison the French had placed at the Tanarda Pass, a main gate to Brigue.
As the operations stalled for a while (Masséna incurred the wrath of the revolutionary commissars at the army HQ for his half-failure, and his position was saved by Bonaparte's intervention), Colli rushed to the front as many reinforcements from Piedmont as he could - in two weeks the troops facing the French rose from about 5,500 to 10,000 (but only 6,000 on the left, where Masséna was attacking), and the front itself was sort of precariously stabilized through the energetic countermeasures set up by Colli.
As the French were building up for the decisive push, Masséna attacked Argenteau's division on April 16th, positioned at and around the key locale of Ponte di Nava (Nava Bridge) where it dangerously threatened his right flank. Argenteau had not stirred a finger to lend any help to Montafia at Oneglia. Pressed by Masséna, and despite the generous offer on Colli's part to detach troops to support him, Argenteau simply gave way and withdrew, refusing to cooperate with the Sardinians (even disobeying De Vins' orders) and laying the blame on Colli. Argenteau's unbelievable mutiny allowed the French to enter Southern Piedmont for the first time since the beginning of the war.
After removing the Austrians from the picture and taking the important position of Ponte di Nava, the French closed in for the kill. On 19th April a diversionary attack on the Sardinian right by two French brigades ended up in a mini-civil war bloodbath when the attackers clashed with heavily outnumbered elements of the Sardinian Franc Corps including Croatian light infantry and Bonneaud's Royalist French, holding a redoubt. The Republicans jumped into the trenches and the Royalists fought to the last man with savage fury, both sides going berserk in a frenzy of mutual hatred. Bonneaud's company was virtually annihilated, losing 70 men killed in the wild hand-to-hand fighting. Bonneaud himself, his lieutenant Forbin - both heavily wounded - and the few survivors were rescued by the retreating Croatians, who on their part lost 35 men. The Republican French paid a high price for the success with 250 killed in action.
Between 26th and 28th April, Masséna finally cracked the Sardinian defense of Brigue. His 20,000 men attacked the enemy line and its two main fortified areas - Colle Ardente and Felz, and minor redoubts around the main strongholds. The fighting was intense and brutal. The defenders of Colle Ardente and its fortified area, whose mainstay was the Royal Grenadiers regiment with 800 men and a number of excellent officers under colonel de Bellegarde, successfully repulsed all attacks. A brigade force led by general Fiorella was completely smashed, losing 100 dead, 36 prisoners, hundreds of wounded and the remainder routed and fleeing in panic at the sight of the counterattacking grenadiers. Even attacks directed personally by Masséna failed under the Sardinians' steady and deadly volleys, and even boulders thrown down the slopes on the attacking columns.
The Felz area instead collapsed despite a vigorous defense put up especially by the 1st Guards battalion - which lost 210 men out of 300. Unfortunately, an entire battalion of provincial infantry - Pinerolo Regiment - disintegrated and ran away, while its commander, and commander of the Felz area, colonel count Radicati di Marmorito, was killed in action. The Pinerolo rout infected neighboring elements, who also threw down their weapons and fled. Although after the battle many stragglers rejoined their ranks, the collapse allowed the French to penetrate the line and eliminate the last stubborn defenders, and crack the way to Brigue open. The rout may have been caused by physical exhaustion or overwhelming tiredness of the war among provincial troops, but it also seems many officers had very recently been assigned to the battalion - due to the exceedingly rapid officers' turnover in Sardinian operative units - and were practically unknown to their own troops. A leadership crisis under fire might also explain the catastrophic event.
A similar disaster struck the Sardinian right flank when a French attack caused 300 militiamen to panic and flee. Their flight sapped the morale of the Beola fort garrison, who surrendered immediately with 20 officers and 250 men. Thus also the Sardinian right was smashed.
The loss of Felz and Tanarda Pass - retaken by the French - and the lack of any support from Argenteau persuaded Colli that the fall of Brigue was inevitable, so he opted for retreating. The last redoubts still tenaciously defended by the Sardinians held Masséna up long enough for Colli to evacuate the Brigue area and withdraw his troops to Tende. Masséna's troops were simply tired out after days of relentless action and combat and unable to continue the advance. After the taking of Brigue, Masséna's push came to a halt for one week.
In the April 26 - 28 battle, Colli lost 16 guns and 700 men - 350 killed and wounded, the rest prisoners or deserters. French casualties were surely heavier. However, as Colli was reorganizing his troops around Tende, it turned out no fewer than 3,000 Sardinian troops were missing - almost one fourth of the entire corps. Although many of them would turn up and rejoin their ranks in the following days, the very high MIA figure indicates that the morale collapse between Felz and Brigue, and also elsewhere along the front, had been quite bad and alarming. Surely Colli incurred blame, and probably came under De Vins's fire for the defeat. But De Vins was in Turin - over 100 kms to the north, a two-days messenger ride from the front - , didn't know the terrain, and Colli was the man on the spot. And a better tactician than De Vins. As nearly all Sardinian and Austrian commanders, 60 years old Colli had been taken by surprise by the French attack, but he had been the only one to zip to the front and actively try to stem the tide.
Notwithstanding the defeat, Sardinian valor and grit shone again during Colli's retreat in April - May. A detachment of 300 men from the Nice Provincials under Major Luigi Grimaldi di Boglio, covering a retreating column, stood fast for 24 hours against largely superior French forces, losing 100 men but accomplishing its mission. At Salines Pass, Captain Asquer di Flumini (an aristocratic officer from the island of Sardinia) with 80 men of the Sardinia Regiment and a reinforcement of 28 Piedmontese light infantrymen conducted a formidable active defense against 600 French, not only holding the pass but driving the attackers back to their lines.
Unfortunately, the Sardinian retreat allowed the French to cut off the impregnable fortress of Saorge with its artillery batteries. Colli had peremptorily ordered the Saorge commander, colonel Muffat chevalier de Saint-Amour, to hold the fortress for as long as possible before evacuating it. Overriding the vehement protests of his officers, Saint-Amour instead abandoned the fort almost immediately (later on, Bonaparte bragged about having forced the garrison's surrender, but that was untrue). Arrested, Saint -Amour was brought to trial in Turin, summarily judged by the War Council, and shot by a firing squad on June 3rd. In fact, his fault had been minor if compared to those of other Sardinian commanders; Saorge was doomed in any case, and had he delayed the evacuation, the garrison would have been captured for no gain. But his connections at the Court were not solid enough to save his life, and the King's government wanted to "set an example" - on the cheap.
May to July: The Mondovì Militia Massacre, and the Thermidore Coup
Until July, the French didn't move any further along the southern sector. They were reorganizing; the Army of the Alps had to transfer 10,000 men to the more important Army of the Moselle (the decisive French victory of Fleurus took place on June 27th, 1794), whereas the Army of the Var had to part with the Mouret Division, earmarked for an (aborted) expedition to Corsica. With a total of 50,000 men, the two armies could not hope to completely crack the Allied defense and invade Italy, but they might at least take a good shot at the Sardinians. The two army commanders, Dumas (later Guillaume) and Dumerbion, agreed on the plan drawn by Bonaparte: gaining a foothold in the Piedmontese plain by unhinging the Allied line in the south, and taking the key fortress-town of Cuneo (Coni).
At the end of June, however, the Sardinian struck first - using the most unlikely of all forces.
The Piedmontese general Dellera, who previously had well led his troops in the southern sector, had been appointed as military commander of the town and province of Mondovì, in southern Piedmont. He had immediately set out on reforming and reorganizing the traditional militia call-up force (Armamento Generale), sort of feudal "ban" draft of all able-bodied local males, peculiar to the Mondovì area (in Italian: Monregalese) and which had already and successfully operated alongside regular troops in both Wars of the Spanish and the Austrian Succession. The Mondovì draft was meant to operate as a territorial defense force in support of the regular army, certainly not as first line or even shock troops. In 1794, and despite Dellera's effort, the militia was a shambles. Nothing more than a peasant mob led by countryside attorneys, parish priests, village justices and other "gentry" devoid of whatever military notions, spirit or training. The chief of the militia was one attorney Robusti, a fanatical Catholic bigot driven by the blindest hatred for the French atheists.
The otherwise sensible and intelligent Colli instead prompted its use just in that role - to frontally attack the French on the far right of their line, to break through and drive them back from Loano. The plan as drafted by the southern front's staff envisioned a regular army operation carried out by 6,000 royal troops supported by secondary attacks. Colli, maybe partly because he knew he could not count on any support on the part of De Vins, altered the plan drastically by replacing the regulars with the Mondovì militia. The result would prove catastrophic.
Robusti launched three attacks between June 30th and July 2nd with 13,000 militia peasants (it seems the French were initially worried by the sheer numbers of the attackers, who threatened to engulf them). The countryfolk, led by their priests and friars, initially marched enthusiastically against the French, but the fire and the bayonets of a few hundred grenadiers and tirailleurs and some artillery cut them to pieces, or they simply dispersed under fire and before even getting in contact with the enemy. The nearby Austrians of Argenteau did not stir a finger to help them, except a half-hearted sally on July 4th, easily repulsed. More militia attacks in the Ormea area were also trounced. The militia massacre may have deeply embittered the locals against the King's government and army - they might realize they had been used as cannon fodder to "soften" the French defense and spare the precious regulars.
On July 26th, the French offensive designed by Bonaparte broke out with three large columns of troops (under generals Chambaud, Vaubois and Gouvion) attacking along the Stura, Maira and Varaita, objective Cuneo, the gate to Piedmont. The 8,000 Allies conducted an orderly retreat into the fortified area of Borgo San Dalmazzo (under Bellegarde), south of Cuneo and the last bulwark before the fortress itself. Borgo Sa. Dalmazzo could also be easily reinforced by 6,000 Austrians under Wallis, the vanguard of the Austrian army now finally moving into Piedmont to back up the Sardinian defense.
Just as the French offensive was in full swing, on July 27h (the month of Thermidore on the French revolutionary calendar) the Robespierre Jacobin regime in Paris was overthrown and Robespierre himself and his closest collaborators arrested, and later executed. Bonaparte, friend of Robespierre's brother Augustine and a distinguished Jacobin so far, was also arrested (but soon released). Minister of War and war organizer Carnot called the offensive off and ordered the troops back to their start lines. Within August 11th, the French were all south of the Tende Pass, their withdrawal not disturbed by the cautiously probing Sardinians, astonished by that French retreat they had no clue about the reasons why.
After reoccuping the positions abandoned by the French, Colli tasked three small reconnaissance forces with pushing forward along the valleys until getting in contact with the French. The latter, however, were by no means passive. Two recon columns were ambushed and driven back, one of them suffering 60 dead and prisoners and 80 wounded. The center column, Colli di Felizzano's crack light infantry battalion with 450 men, stormed a French redoubt, but was quickly counterattacked by 1,500 French troops. Outnumbered three to one, the battalion slowly gave way, fiercely sustaining the assault for three hours. At the center of the short line Felizzano had placed his best company, the elite of the elite, 150 Savoyard chasseurs, and stood there with them. Enemy snipers made him out easily owing to the uniform he was wearing (different from the brown outfits of his light infantry) and opened up on him. Not a few of his chasseurs were killed or wounded as they were shielding him with their own bodies. Sergeant Claude-Francois Carrel, who in 1792 had refused to serve in the French Army as a captain, upon losing his right hand in the fighting said he still had the left hand to serve his King. He was eventually awarded a Silver medal for valor.
At the end of June, however, the Sardinian struck first - using the most unlikely of all forces.
The Piedmontese general Dellera, who previously had well led his troops in the southern sector, had been appointed as military commander of the town and province of Mondovì, in southern Piedmont. He had immediately set out on reforming and reorganizing the traditional militia call-up force (Armamento Generale), sort of feudal "ban" draft of all able-bodied local males, peculiar to the Mondovì area (in Italian: Monregalese) and which had already and successfully operated alongside regular troops in both Wars of the Spanish and the Austrian Succession. The Mondovì draft was meant to operate as a territorial defense force in support of the regular army, certainly not as first line or even shock troops. In 1794, and despite Dellera's effort, the militia was a shambles. Nothing more than a peasant mob led by countryside attorneys, parish priests, village justices and other "gentry" devoid of whatever military notions, spirit or training. The chief of the militia was one attorney Robusti, a fanatical Catholic bigot driven by the blindest hatred for the French atheists.
The otherwise sensible and intelligent Colli instead prompted its use just in that role - to frontally attack the French on the far right of their line, to break through and drive them back from Loano. The plan as drafted by the southern front's staff envisioned a regular army operation carried out by 6,000 royal troops supported by secondary attacks. Colli, maybe partly because he knew he could not count on any support on the part of De Vins, altered the plan drastically by replacing the regulars with the Mondovì militia. The result would prove catastrophic.
Robusti launched three attacks between June 30th and July 2nd with 13,000 militia peasants (it seems the French were initially worried by the sheer numbers of the attackers, who threatened to engulf them). The countryfolk, led by their priests and friars, initially marched enthusiastically against the French, but the fire and the bayonets of a few hundred grenadiers and tirailleurs and some artillery cut them to pieces, or they simply dispersed under fire and before even getting in contact with the enemy. The nearby Austrians of Argenteau did not stir a finger to help them, except a half-hearted sally on July 4th, easily repulsed. More militia attacks in the Ormea area were also trounced. The militia massacre may have deeply embittered the locals against the King's government and army - they might realize they had been used as cannon fodder to "soften" the French defense and spare the precious regulars.
On July 26th, the French offensive designed by Bonaparte broke out with three large columns of troops (under generals Chambaud, Vaubois and Gouvion) attacking along the Stura, Maira and Varaita, objective Cuneo, the gate to Piedmont. The 8,000 Allies conducted an orderly retreat into the fortified area of Borgo San Dalmazzo (under Bellegarde), south of Cuneo and the last bulwark before the fortress itself. Borgo Sa. Dalmazzo could also be easily reinforced by 6,000 Austrians under Wallis, the vanguard of the Austrian army now finally moving into Piedmont to back up the Sardinian defense.
Just as the French offensive was in full swing, on July 27h (the month of Thermidore on the French revolutionary calendar) the Robespierre Jacobin regime in Paris was overthrown and Robespierre himself and his closest collaborators arrested, and later executed. Bonaparte, friend of Robespierre's brother Augustine and a distinguished Jacobin so far, was also arrested (but soon released). Minister of War and war organizer Carnot called the offensive off and ordered the troops back to their start lines. Within August 11th, the French were all south of the Tende Pass, their withdrawal not disturbed by the cautiously probing Sardinians, astonished by that French retreat they had no clue about the reasons why.
After reoccuping the positions abandoned by the French, Colli tasked three small reconnaissance forces with pushing forward along the valleys until getting in contact with the French. The latter, however, were by no means passive. Two recon columns were ambushed and driven back, one of them suffering 60 dead and prisoners and 80 wounded. The center column, Colli di Felizzano's crack light infantry battalion with 450 men, stormed a French redoubt, but was quickly counterattacked by 1,500 French troops. Outnumbered three to one, the battalion slowly gave way, fiercely sustaining the assault for three hours. At the center of the short line Felizzano had placed his best company, the elite of the elite, 150 Savoyard chasseurs, and stood there with them. Enemy snipers made him out easily owing to the uniform he was wearing (different from the brown outfits of his light infantry) and opened up on him. Not a few of his chasseurs were killed or wounded as they were shielding him with their own bodies. Sergeant Claude-Francois Carrel, who in 1792 had refused to serve in the French Army as a captain, upon losing his right hand in the fighting said he still had the left hand to serve his King. He was eventually awarded a Silver medal for valor.
On the Alps: March to July
To coincide with the offensive in the south, French General Dumas threw his 30,000 men at the 12,000 Sardinians under the Duke of Monferrato, standing along the Alpine arc. Their operational goal was the capture of the key Alpine passes into Piedmont, to pave the way for further pushes in that direction; at the same time, their offensive would pin down Sardinian forces which might otherwise be moved away from that front to bolster the defense in the southern sector. The Sardinian HQ and the Duke of Monferrato, who was taking it easy in Turin, were taken by surprise - they weren't expecting a French attack so early into the year, when the thick snow blanket on the mountains severely hampered movement and combat.
Two early probes against the Montcenis Pass defenses on March 24th and April 6th were beaten off by the spirited reaction of the Sardinian garrisons, who held out stoutly in their earthworks and put in bayonet counterattacks, killing 40 French and taking 23 prisoners for a loss of 14 dead and 21 wounded. Even the militia operated effectively in the Lanzo Valleys, stopping a French attack on the Margan and Cortevasio Passes.
However, later into April a renewed French push could not be resisted. On April 20th two French columns attacked the main Sardinian strongpoints at the Little St. Bernard Pass into Aosta Valley. The redoubts were being held by the Rockmondet Regiment of Swiss mercenaries. In all likelihood one of the commanders, Captain Begoz, had been bribed by the French into handing over the fieldworks to the attackers without fighting, which he did. His company meekly surrendered to 2,000 French grenadiers, and the Piedmontese artillerymen included in Begoz's command were slaughtered. The other main St. Bernard redoubt, under Lieutenant-Colonel Stettler, including a powerful 20 cannon grand battery, was then attacked on the ill-defended flank and the Swiss were forced to evacuate and retreat. Sardinian reinforcements swiftly brought up (regiments La Marina, Saluzzo and Vercelli) fell on the advancing French and routed them, but in the pursuit some Saluzzo soldiers found out a stock of barrels of brandy and the regiment stopped to pour the brandy down their throats, deaf to their officers' urging and quickly getting drunk. Taking advantage of that shameful binge the fusiliers had gone on, the French came back in force and overran the Sardinians, who tumbled back down the Dora river valley. The Duke of Monferrato, rushed to Aosta from Turin and arriving there on April 25th, found the Aosta HQ in dismal disarray, with the Piedmontese flinging accusations at the Swiss for Begoz's betrayal and the Swiss angrily rejecting the charge. A defense of Aosta was hastily thrown up, but Dumas's goal had been achieved - the capture of St. Bernard Pass - and the French shut their advance down. The Sardinians lost only 62 dead, 22 wounded and 117 prisoners (almost entirely Begoz's company), but the loss of the Pass was a severe blow on their morale.
May 3rd through 10th the French operated some effective diversions, also employing Dauphine' militia, down other Alpine valleys leading into Piedmont. An attempt to siege the mighty fortress of Exilles was easily thwarted, but elsewhere the Sardinians lost some ground. The most painful loss was that of the small fort of Mirabouc. Held by 70 Swiss of the Zimmermann and Bachmann Regiments, 30 invalid soldiers and 2 guns under Major Messmer, it was captured after a token resistance and Messmer's retreating command bottled up in a nearby gorge. The French advance was eventually checked by militia forces and the Swiss 11th Grenadier Regiment under Major Reding, but Messmer was arrested on the charge of treason and shot by a firing squad.
Further south, in the Tenda area, on May 7th it was Masséna's turn to attack with 10,000 men. The day before Colli, sensing the attack coming, had withdrawn the bulk of his corps to Borgo San Dalmazzo - last bastion between the Alps and the Piedmontese plain with the fortress-town of Cuneo - , leaving in place a strong rearguard of 7 battalions under general Dellera. Masséna was off like a shot, counting on speed and outflanking marches to dislodge the enemy from their positions. Outnumbered and outmaneuvered from the outset, Dellera was steadily rolled back, although on one occasion his fighting retreat caused grievous casualties to the French. The Sardinians managed to get away and rally at Roccavione and other outposts of the Borgo fortified area, which were subsequently lost to a further French assault in June.
Lastly, on May 12th also the key Montcenis Pass fell into French hands. Led into the foggy night by pro-French local guides - upper Susa Valley had been French until early 18th century, locals still spoke French and many were sympathetic towards the French rather than the Allies -. the French assault columns proved unstoppable. Sardinian artillery in the redoubts cut large swaths through the advancing French, but the latter seized the positions by hand-to-hand fighting, outmarched the retreating Sardinians by covering hidden paths across the mountains and cut off and captured a 600-strong rearguard from the Queen's Regiment. General Chino, the Sardinian commander, could only stop the retreat in the vicinity of the massive Brunetta Fortress, near the town of Susa, last bulwark on the way to Turin. Another unmitigated disaster.
The final touch to the extremely bleak picture was given by the Duke of Monferrato in June. A complex counterattack devised to regain the St. Bernard Pass failed abysmally as the multi-pronged attack plan (as too often happened) proved just too complicated, its timing vital yet liable to too many contingencies. The entire 3rd Grenadier Regiment (Monferrato, Piemont and Streng battalions) broke up after their unsupported frontal attack failed. Their commander - Colonel Bertrand de Chamousset, who prior to the attack had expressed his serious misgivings about the attack plan only to be severely ticked off by the Duke - was cut down, and only an emergency charge of the Piedmont Dragoons drove the French back.
By mid-June 1794, after a string of distressing defeats, the Sardinians were thus in dire straits all along the front. The threat was most impending in the south, with the French poised a few miles from Cuneo and the southern plain, but the loss of the Alpine passes had also been a terrible blow. Frustration soared along with the gloomy awareness that stopping the French was seemingly impossible, and the next attacks would finally crack the last crust of resistance and take the French to Turin. In the meantime the financial situation was desperate and knots of revolutionary rebels were plotting against the dynasty within Piedmont itself. As a military historian put it, the Kingdom technically lost the war in 1794, since failing any substantial Austrian help, the country's plight was hopeless.
Yet the war went on. The Sardinians beefed up the battered defenses on the southern Alps in the Cuneo sector (final objective of the French offensive) with more guns to replace those lost to the enemy and 8,500 reinforcements. However, the French offensive to be carried out jointly by both armies marching on the key fortified city of Cuneo was aborted by Carnot, concerned with the more important German front and unwilling to overdo France's engagement on the secondary Italian front. In the wake of this decision, the French contented themselves with improving their line by driving the Sardinians out of outposts in the Limone, Gesso and Stura valleys, and finally from those around Borgo San Dalmazzo, near Cuneo.
Two early probes against the Montcenis Pass defenses on March 24th and April 6th were beaten off by the spirited reaction of the Sardinian garrisons, who held out stoutly in their earthworks and put in bayonet counterattacks, killing 40 French and taking 23 prisoners for a loss of 14 dead and 21 wounded. Even the militia operated effectively in the Lanzo Valleys, stopping a French attack on the Margan and Cortevasio Passes.
However, later into April a renewed French push could not be resisted. On April 20th two French columns attacked the main Sardinian strongpoints at the Little St. Bernard Pass into Aosta Valley. The redoubts were being held by the Rockmondet Regiment of Swiss mercenaries. In all likelihood one of the commanders, Captain Begoz, had been bribed by the French into handing over the fieldworks to the attackers without fighting, which he did. His company meekly surrendered to 2,000 French grenadiers, and the Piedmontese artillerymen included in Begoz's command were slaughtered. The other main St. Bernard redoubt, under Lieutenant-Colonel Stettler, including a powerful 20 cannon grand battery, was then attacked on the ill-defended flank and the Swiss were forced to evacuate and retreat. Sardinian reinforcements swiftly brought up (regiments La Marina, Saluzzo and Vercelli) fell on the advancing French and routed them, but in the pursuit some Saluzzo soldiers found out a stock of barrels of brandy and the regiment stopped to pour the brandy down their throats, deaf to their officers' urging and quickly getting drunk. Taking advantage of that shameful binge the fusiliers had gone on, the French came back in force and overran the Sardinians, who tumbled back down the Dora river valley. The Duke of Monferrato, rushed to Aosta from Turin and arriving there on April 25th, found the Aosta HQ in dismal disarray, with the Piedmontese flinging accusations at the Swiss for Begoz's betrayal and the Swiss angrily rejecting the charge. A defense of Aosta was hastily thrown up, but Dumas's goal had been achieved - the capture of St. Bernard Pass - and the French shut their advance down. The Sardinians lost only 62 dead, 22 wounded and 117 prisoners (almost entirely Begoz's company), but the loss of the Pass was a severe blow on their morale.
May 3rd through 10th the French operated some effective diversions, also employing Dauphine' militia, down other Alpine valleys leading into Piedmont. An attempt to siege the mighty fortress of Exilles was easily thwarted, but elsewhere the Sardinians lost some ground. The most painful loss was that of the small fort of Mirabouc. Held by 70 Swiss of the Zimmermann and Bachmann Regiments, 30 invalid soldiers and 2 guns under Major Messmer, it was captured after a token resistance and Messmer's retreating command bottled up in a nearby gorge. The French advance was eventually checked by militia forces and the Swiss 11th Grenadier Regiment under Major Reding, but Messmer was arrested on the charge of treason and shot by a firing squad.
Further south, in the Tenda area, on May 7th it was Masséna's turn to attack with 10,000 men. The day before Colli, sensing the attack coming, had withdrawn the bulk of his corps to Borgo San Dalmazzo - last bastion between the Alps and the Piedmontese plain with the fortress-town of Cuneo - , leaving in place a strong rearguard of 7 battalions under general Dellera. Masséna was off like a shot, counting on speed and outflanking marches to dislodge the enemy from their positions. Outnumbered and outmaneuvered from the outset, Dellera was steadily rolled back, although on one occasion his fighting retreat caused grievous casualties to the French. The Sardinians managed to get away and rally at Roccavione and other outposts of the Borgo fortified area, which were subsequently lost to a further French assault in June.
Lastly, on May 12th also the key Montcenis Pass fell into French hands. Led into the foggy night by pro-French local guides - upper Susa Valley had been French until early 18th century, locals still spoke French and many were sympathetic towards the French rather than the Allies -. the French assault columns proved unstoppable. Sardinian artillery in the redoubts cut large swaths through the advancing French, but the latter seized the positions by hand-to-hand fighting, outmarched the retreating Sardinians by covering hidden paths across the mountains and cut off and captured a 600-strong rearguard from the Queen's Regiment. General Chino, the Sardinian commander, could only stop the retreat in the vicinity of the massive Brunetta Fortress, near the town of Susa, last bulwark on the way to Turin. Another unmitigated disaster.
The final touch to the extremely bleak picture was given by the Duke of Monferrato in June. A complex counterattack devised to regain the St. Bernard Pass failed abysmally as the multi-pronged attack plan (as too often happened) proved just too complicated, its timing vital yet liable to too many contingencies. The entire 3rd Grenadier Regiment (Monferrato, Piemont and Streng battalions) broke up after their unsupported frontal attack failed. Their commander - Colonel Bertrand de Chamousset, who prior to the attack had expressed his serious misgivings about the attack plan only to be severely ticked off by the Duke - was cut down, and only an emergency charge of the Piedmont Dragoons drove the French back.
By mid-June 1794, after a string of distressing defeats, the Sardinians were thus in dire straits all along the front. The threat was most impending in the south, with the French poised a few miles from Cuneo and the southern plain, but the loss of the Alpine passes had also been a terrible blow. Frustration soared along with the gloomy awareness that stopping the French was seemingly impossible, and the next attacks would finally crack the last crust of resistance and take the French to Turin. In the meantime the financial situation was desperate and knots of revolutionary rebels were plotting against the dynasty within Piedmont itself. As a military historian put it, the Kingdom technically lost the war in 1794, since failing any substantial Austrian help, the country's plight was hopeless.
Yet the war went on. The Sardinians beefed up the battered defenses on the southern Alps in the Cuneo sector (final objective of the French offensive) with more guns to replace those lost to the enemy and 8,500 reinforcements. However, the French offensive to be carried out jointly by both armies marching on the key fortified city of Cuneo was aborted by Carnot, concerned with the more important German front and unwilling to overdo France's engagement on the secondary Italian front. In the wake of this decision, the French contented themselves with improving their line by driving the Sardinians out of outposts in the Limone, Gesso and Stura valleys, and finally from those around Borgo San Dalmazzo, near Cuneo.
The Valenciennes Agreement
The Austrian government, most likely believing the Kingdom of Sardinia would soon be defeated by the revolutionary armies and taking into consideration the eventual partition of the capitulated kingdom between France and Austria, took care not to lend any substantial support to its junior partner. The little expeditionary force serving alongside Sardinian forces was not strengthened. In contrast, starting in the autumn of 1793 the garrison of Lombardy was gradually expanded into a small active army of 25,000 men under artillery general Wallis. Wallis was independent of De Vins's command and the Sardinian supreme HQ. He took orders directly from Vienna. Its unofficial mission, in case of French breakthrough, was invading the Genoa Republic and seizing the pivotal coast town of Savona to bar the way to a French offensive into Lombardy from the south.
Previously, Piedmont had been calling on the other States of Italy to forma military league against France. The invitation had been declined as all other Italian States loathed and feared Piedmont and its military might, far superior to anything they could field except the Kingdom of Naples's army. Not even caring to conceal her hostility towards Piedmont, in 1794 Austria picked up the idea - calling on the Italian States to join in a military alliance to help keep the French out of the peninsula. All States not including the Kingdom of Sardinia, Austria's only fighting ally in Italy!
By keeping Piedmont out of the negotiations, Austria hoped to persuade the States to join in. But partly for fear of the French reaction and of Jacobine conspiracies within, partly not to recognize Austria as their overlord and master, with the exception of Naples the States opted for neutrality, and the Italian League Army did never appear. Only the small duchies of Parma and Modena, Austrian satellites, offered a financial contribution and 1,500 recruits for Austrian regiments.
The King (actually, the Queen - the real driving force in the Kingdom) of Naples instead listened to the Austrian call, and on paper the Neapolitan contribution looked imposing: an army of 18,000 men to be shipped to Tuscany and Liguria and join up with the Austrians (not with the Sardinians). Due to a number of reasons, in fact, the "army" on the ground boiled down to a cavalry force which never fought until after the Sardinian armistice.
As a consequence of the failure of the League undertaking, as well as French successes on the Alps, Austria's stiff stance towards Piedmont softened. On May 23rd, the Sardinina envoy Marquis d'Albaretto and the Austrian strong man, Minister Thugut, signed at Valenciennes (Low Countries) the agreement named after the town.
Under the agreement, Austria was to expand the expeditionary force to Piedmont to 9,000 men - but the increase was to be paid by Piedmont. An Austrian army (Wallis's) was to enter Piedmont, but it would go into action only on the southwestern front and only to counter a French offensive. In return for that, a portion of the Sardinian forces in the southwest was to be transferred to the Austrian command, including one brigade to reinforce Argenteau's division. As an immediate measure to prop up the creaking southwestern front, a 6,000-strong Austrian force under Wallis was sent to the area between Cuneo and Mondovì.
It was quite bad for the Kingdom of Sardinia to be forced to pursue and sign a military pact that marked its total subordination to the senior partner in the alliance. Much worse still, as a "recoupment" for their military effort the Austrians expected that after the final victory, Piedmont would hand them back the provinces and territories it had won 50 and 60 years before as its prize for the victory in the Wars of Polish and Austrian Succession. To compensate for the grievous loss, Piedmont would annex French territories - not specified, of course.
So in the best case - a victory over France - Piedmont would have lost a sizeable and wealthy portion of the Kingdom, in return for an indefinite stretch of French territory which the French, beaten or not, would have been extremely reluctant to yield and would have taken back at the earliest opportunity arising. And that, for a very conditional and limited military aid, partly paid by the Sardinian finances. The Valencienne Agreement was a shameless scam and the seal of Austrian supremacy set on Piedmont. But the Kingdom was not in the position to refuse it, as its very existence was now at stake.
Previously, Piedmont had been calling on the other States of Italy to forma military league against France. The invitation had been declined as all other Italian States loathed and feared Piedmont and its military might, far superior to anything they could field except the Kingdom of Naples's army. Not even caring to conceal her hostility towards Piedmont, in 1794 Austria picked up the idea - calling on the Italian States to join in a military alliance to help keep the French out of the peninsula. All States not including the Kingdom of Sardinia, Austria's only fighting ally in Italy!
By keeping Piedmont out of the negotiations, Austria hoped to persuade the States to join in. But partly for fear of the French reaction and of Jacobine conspiracies within, partly not to recognize Austria as their overlord and master, with the exception of Naples the States opted for neutrality, and the Italian League Army did never appear. Only the small duchies of Parma and Modena, Austrian satellites, offered a financial contribution and 1,500 recruits for Austrian regiments.
The King (actually, the Queen - the real driving force in the Kingdom) of Naples instead listened to the Austrian call, and on paper the Neapolitan contribution looked imposing: an army of 18,000 men to be shipped to Tuscany and Liguria and join up with the Austrians (not with the Sardinians). Due to a number of reasons, in fact, the "army" on the ground boiled down to a cavalry force which never fought until after the Sardinian armistice.
As a consequence of the failure of the League undertaking, as well as French successes on the Alps, Austria's stiff stance towards Piedmont softened. On May 23rd, the Sardinina envoy Marquis d'Albaretto and the Austrian strong man, Minister Thugut, signed at Valenciennes (Low Countries) the agreement named after the town.
Under the agreement, Austria was to expand the expeditionary force to Piedmont to 9,000 men - but the increase was to be paid by Piedmont. An Austrian army (Wallis's) was to enter Piedmont, but it would go into action only on the southwestern front and only to counter a French offensive. In return for that, a portion of the Sardinian forces in the southwest was to be transferred to the Austrian command, including one brigade to reinforce Argenteau's division. As an immediate measure to prop up the creaking southwestern front, a 6,000-strong Austrian force under Wallis was sent to the area between Cuneo and Mondovì.
It was quite bad for the Kingdom of Sardinia to be forced to pursue and sign a military pact that marked its total subordination to the senior partner in the alliance. Much worse still, as a "recoupment" for their military effort the Austrians expected that after the final victory, Piedmont would hand them back the provinces and territories it had won 50 and 60 years before as its prize for the victory in the Wars of Polish and Austrian Succession. To compensate for the grievous loss, Piedmont would annex French territories - not specified, of course.
So in the best case - a victory over France - Piedmont would have lost a sizeable and wealthy portion of the Kingdom, in return for an indefinite stretch of French territory which the French, beaten or not, would have been extremely reluctant to yield and would have taken back at the earliest opportunity arising. And that, for a very conditional and limited military aid, partly paid by the Sardinian finances. The Valencienne Agreement was a shameless scam and the seal of Austrian supremacy set on Piedmont. But the Kingdom was not in the position to refuse it, as its very existence was now at stake.
Dego: July to December
Mid-August, the Austrian general Wallis and Archduke Ferdinand, leading the swelling Austrian expeditionary corps to Piedmont, seeing that the French push on Cuneo was over and the French seemed to be in a state of temporary weakness and passiveness, decided to strike south into Liguria to take the important town of Savona, preliminary move to throwing the French back across Var River. The attack on Savona should have been carried out in conjunction with a British landing of an 8,000-strong infantry force between Oneglia and Loano.
However, everything started going awry from the outset. Wallis, disliked by Thugut, lost the appointment as supreme Allied commander in the field - Colli was appointed instead of him as replacement of the old, worn out and discredited De Vins. Colli was probably a better commander than Wallis, but his power as supreme commander was far from absolute as he had to somehow share it with a "supreme headquarters" with a staff of six Captain Generals: De Vins, Wallis, the Dukes of Aosta, Monferrato and Chablais, and the Prince of Carignano. Colli was better than any other members on his staff, but so many fellow commanders with ill-defined tasks and duties stymied his action and made the already top-heavy command chain even heavier.
To start the offensive on Savona, Wallis concentrated a powerful 30,000-strong Austrian force of 12 battalions, 6 squadrons and heavy artillery under general Colloredo, placing his own HQ at the key location of Carcare, the most important crossroads in Southern Piedmont.
Colloredo trudged south so slowly that his slowness cost the Allies the campaign. Had he moved faster, he might have joined up with Admiral Hood's landing corps, taking back Loano and Oneglia from the French; or he might have made a dash for Tende and Saorge, forcing Masséna to precipitately withdraw towards Nice to avoid encirclement. Instead, by mid-September he was still around Carcare, far away from the coast. He could not join up with Hood, who was incensed at the Austrians' sluggishness.
Colloredo's ponderous advance and its goal did not escape French attention, and the French reacted fast and deadly. Dumerbion sent reinforcements to Masséna posthaste, and the latter could rely on a little but highly aggressive and mobile army of 28 battalions. They would attack into Bormida Valley to stop the Austrian drive on Savona and hopefully drive them back.
Prior to the main offensive, the French launched a few diversionary attacks on the Sardinians, in the Stura, Grana and Varaita Valleys in Southern Piedmont. The Stura and Grana attacks were repulsed. In Stura Valley, a mixed force of Grison Swiss, Monferrato and Asti Regts. infantry and some artillery routed the French inflicting 54 casualties and taking 10 prisoners.
Instead, the Varaita sally proved painful for the Sardinians. The militia and the Franc Corps troops defending the valley were wiped out along with the artillery and the few regular troops manning outposts. 500 infantry of Oneglia and Chablais were rushed up the valley under Provera's command to bolster the thin line of chasseurs left to guard the entry into Piedmont. However, the French did not push the attack any further- having reached their goal, they got back to their starting lines unmolested. The Varaita action cost the Sardinians 120 killed and 100 prisoners.
As the 15,000 men of Masséna's 17 battalions, 600 dragoons, 300 sappers and 8 guns were about to surge forward, Colloredo's right wing - a detachment under Argenteau - broke off and withdrew westward, seeking the protection of the Ceva fortress and entrenchments. Argenteau feared the French would strike in the direction of Ceva, and felt unable to resist an attack. His disastrous mistake opened a gap between Ceva and Carcare - quite like the gap Bonaparte would later exploit to his advantage in 1796.
On September 18th the French attacked, with Laharpe and Cervoni (a Corsican general, friend of the Bonaparte family, who had served in the Sardinian Army and would later be killed in action at Eckmuehl as Lannes's army corps Chief of Staff) storming several outposts and redoubts and bypassing others. Masséna attacked the castle of Cosseria, another "highlight" of the 1796 campaign, then held by local militia. A unit of Croatian light infantry holding Millesimo was driven back notwithstanding their valiant defense. In the meantime, as Argenteau did not move out of Ceva to assist Colloredo, Masséna could concentrate against the latter. The Austrians carried out a fighting retreat towards the Dego entrenchments.
The battlefield of Dego favored the defenders. The terrain was partly suited to cavalry charges, and the Austrians had masterly deployed their powerful artillery - two batteries sited to form a 120 degrees angle crossfire to devastatingly hit an enemy coming up along the most likely approach avenue, a position named Rocchetta di Cairo.
On September 21st battle was joined. Initially the French assault succeeded in seizing some key positions. Rocchetta di Cairo, held by a strong combined force of 1,000 Croats, 2 guns and 600 cavalry, was taken after cavalry charges and countercharges. Masséna's chasseurs expelled from a wood its tough Croatian defenders after a sharp combat, and the Austrian right wing was going to be outflanked by agile and fast French column. At that juncture, and carrying out a pre-planned ruse, the Austrians withdrew from an important position to lure the French into swarming across the artillery field of fire. Suffering heavy casualties under a lethal gunfire they were unable to withstand, the French broke off the engagement and retreated.
Both sides suffered 700 or 800 casualties. Colloredo and Wallis won a tactical victory, but lost at operational and strategic level as Wallis, doubting he could get to Savona breaking such a stiff French resistance, and fearing Masséna would come back with an even more strenuous effort, gave in and ordered a withdrawal towards Acqui, to the northeast.
The Austrian disengagement after the awkward move on Savona and the indecisive battle of Dego enraged both the British and the Sardinians. In November, after flinging bitter accusations at the inept Austrian leadership, Admiral Hood sailed back to England. Wallis shamelessly tried to blame the failure on Colli, but the Piedmontese were furious. Not illogically, they believed the Austrians aimed at letting the French destroy Piedmont's military defense, doing virtually nothing to avert that outcome. The cleft between the Allies grew wider when the King unilaterally appointed the Duke of Aosta as supreme commander of the Sardinian Army with Colli as commander of all Austro-Sardinian forces in Southern Piedmont. The Austrians, as the major partner in the alliance, flouted the King's decision - not only they would not join up with the Sardinians, they also kept issuing direct orders to Colli as an Austrian general in Sardinian service. The Sardinians were perfectly aware that the Austrians were causing their downfall.
Through fall and winter 1794, operations as usual ground to a halt except local skirmishes and small size actions. Overall those actions saw the Sardinians moderately successful, with the exception of a significant setback in Susa Valley when a powerful French assault column under Vaubois overwhelmed an outpost held by the elite 4th Grenadiers near Exilles.
However, everything started going awry from the outset. Wallis, disliked by Thugut, lost the appointment as supreme Allied commander in the field - Colli was appointed instead of him as replacement of the old, worn out and discredited De Vins. Colli was probably a better commander than Wallis, but his power as supreme commander was far from absolute as he had to somehow share it with a "supreme headquarters" with a staff of six Captain Generals: De Vins, Wallis, the Dukes of Aosta, Monferrato and Chablais, and the Prince of Carignano. Colli was better than any other members on his staff, but so many fellow commanders with ill-defined tasks and duties stymied his action and made the already top-heavy command chain even heavier.
To start the offensive on Savona, Wallis concentrated a powerful 30,000-strong Austrian force of 12 battalions, 6 squadrons and heavy artillery under general Colloredo, placing his own HQ at the key location of Carcare, the most important crossroads in Southern Piedmont.
Colloredo trudged south so slowly that his slowness cost the Allies the campaign. Had he moved faster, he might have joined up with Admiral Hood's landing corps, taking back Loano and Oneglia from the French; or he might have made a dash for Tende and Saorge, forcing Masséna to precipitately withdraw towards Nice to avoid encirclement. Instead, by mid-September he was still around Carcare, far away from the coast. He could not join up with Hood, who was incensed at the Austrians' sluggishness.
Colloredo's ponderous advance and its goal did not escape French attention, and the French reacted fast and deadly. Dumerbion sent reinforcements to Masséna posthaste, and the latter could rely on a little but highly aggressive and mobile army of 28 battalions. They would attack into Bormida Valley to stop the Austrian drive on Savona and hopefully drive them back.
Prior to the main offensive, the French launched a few diversionary attacks on the Sardinians, in the Stura, Grana and Varaita Valleys in Southern Piedmont. The Stura and Grana attacks were repulsed. In Stura Valley, a mixed force of Grison Swiss, Monferrato and Asti Regts. infantry and some artillery routed the French inflicting 54 casualties and taking 10 prisoners.
Instead, the Varaita sally proved painful for the Sardinians. The militia and the Franc Corps troops defending the valley were wiped out along with the artillery and the few regular troops manning outposts. 500 infantry of Oneglia and Chablais were rushed up the valley under Provera's command to bolster the thin line of chasseurs left to guard the entry into Piedmont. However, the French did not push the attack any further- having reached their goal, they got back to their starting lines unmolested. The Varaita action cost the Sardinians 120 killed and 100 prisoners.
As the 15,000 men of Masséna's 17 battalions, 600 dragoons, 300 sappers and 8 guns were about to surge forward, Colloredo's right wing - a detachment under Argenteau - broke off and withdrew westward, seeking the protection of the Ceva fortress and entrenchments. Argenteau feared the French would strike in the direction of Ceva, and felt unable to resist an attack. His disastrous mistake opened a gap between Ceva and Carcare - quite like the gap Bonaparte would later exploit to his advantage in 1796.
On September 18th the French attacked, with Laharpe and Cervoni (a Corsican general, friend of the Bonaparte family, who had served in the Sardinian Army and would later be killed in action at Eckmuehl as Lannes's army corps Chief of Staff) storming several outposts and redoubts and bypassing others. Masséna attacked the castle of Cosseria, another "highlight" of the 1796 campaign, then held by local militia. A unit of Croatian light infantry holding Millesimo was driven back notwithstanding their valiant defense. In the meantime, as Argenteau did not move out of Ceva to assist Colloredo, Masséna could concentrate against the latter. The Austrians carried out a fighting retreat towards the Dego entrenchments.
The battlefield of Dego favored the defenders. The terrain was partly suited to cavalry charges, and the Austrians had masterly deployed their powerful artillery - two batteries sited to form a 120 degrees angle crossfire to devastatingly hit an enemy coming up along the most likely approach avenue, a position named Rocchetta di Cairo.
On September 21st battle was joined. Initially the French assault succeeded in seizing some key positions. Rocchetta di Cairo, held by a strong combined force of 1,000 Croats, 2 guns and 600 cavalry, was taken after cavalry charges and countercharges. Masséna's chasseurs expelled from a wood its tough Croatian defenders after a sharp combat, and the Austrian right wing was going to be outflanked by agile and fast French column. At that juncture, and carrying out a pre-planned ruse, the Austrians withdrew from an important position to lure the French into swarming across the artillery field of fire. Suffering heavy casualties under a lethal gunfire they were unable to withstand, the French broke off the engagement and retreated.
Both sides suffered 700 or 800 casualties. Colloredo and Wallis won a tactical victory, but lost at operational and strategic level as Wallis, doubting he could get to Savona breaking such a stiff French resistance, and fearing Masséna would come back with an even more strenuous effort, gave in and ordered a withdrawal towards Acqui, to the northeast.
The Austrian disengagement after the awkward move on Savona and the indecisive battle of Dego enraged both the British and the Sardinians. In November, after flinging bitter accusations at the inept Austrian leadership, Admiral Hood sailed back to England. Wallis shamelessly tried to blame the failure on Colli, but the Piedmontese were furious. Not illogically, they believed the Austrians aimed at letting the French destroy Piedmont's military defense, doing virtually nothing to avert that outcome. The cleft between the Allies grew wider when the King unilaterally appointed the Duke of Aosta as supreme commander of the Sardinian Army with Colli as commander of all Austro-Sardinian forces in Southern Piedmont. The Austrians, as the major partner in the alliance, flouted the King's decision - not only they would not join up with the Sardinians, they also kept issuing direct orders to Colli as an Austrian general in Sardinian service. The Sardinians were perfectly aware that the Austrians were causing their downfall.
Through fall and winter 1794, operations as usual ground to a halt except local skirmishes and small size actions. Overall those actions saw the Sardinians moderately successful, with the exception of a significant setback in Susa Valley when a powerful French assault column under Vaubois overwhelmed an outpost held by the elite 4th Grenadiers near Exilles.
Piedmont's Desperate Plight
By the end of 1794 the Kingdom of Sardinia had already lost the war, whatever its final outcome would be. The Kingdom's human and financial resources had been used up. Militarily, the country depended on Austrian aid; economically, on emergency levies and the British subsidy. Deserters were repeatedly pardoned and pressed back into service. Due to the political requirement to keep in service as many officers as possible, no Army unit was disbanded - in spite of the alarming decrease in recruitment rates and the increase in sickness and desertion rates - a devastating policy that led to field dramatically understrength battalions (battalions with 300, 350 men, companies and squadrons with 80), almost in non-operational state. Sick and AWOL men often halved even those puny theoretical totals. Three line regiments lost one fifth of their total strength due to sickness as they were billeted at the Ceva Fortress. Over two weeks, Aosta Regiment was halved by dysentery and fever.
Aware of its parlous situation, the Kingdom probed once again the French government for negotiations. And once again the French offer - armistice, alliance and annexation of Lombardy in return for the transfer of Nice and Savoy to France - was rejected, subordinating the acceptance of such proposals to the approval of Britain (which was not forthcoming).
The limping Sardinian Army in December 1794 could rely on 36,400 infantry, cavalry, Franc Corps and artillery with 87 battalions, 9 autonomous companies and 6 franc centuries, 32 cavalry squadrons and 30 artillery companies.
The militia had on paper 321 riflemen companies, 90 mountain chasseurs companies, 18 artillery companies. Fortress/static artillery (with 8 and 16 pounder guns and howitzers) lined up 16 gunners companies. Field and mountain artillery: 56 artillery squads, each with 16 men and 2 guns. 52 of those squads manned light 3 or 4-pdr guns detached to infantry battalions; 4 squads served 8-pdr guns assigned to regimental Grenadier battalions.
The "Grande Armée", the army corps in Southern Piedmont facing the major French threat, lined up 17,400 infantry, 1,600 cavalry and 32 guns.
Aware of its parlous situation, the Kingdom probed once again the French government for negotiations. And once again the French offer - armistice, alliance and annexation of Lombardy in return for the transfer of Nice and Savoy to France - was rejected, subordinating the acceptance of such proposals to the approval of Britain (which was not forthcoming).
The limping Sardinian Army in December 1794 could rely on 36,400 infantry, cavalry, Franc Corps and artillery with 87 battalions, 9 autonomous companies and 6 franc centuries, 32 cavalry squadrons and 30 artillery companies.
The militia had on paper 321 riflemen companies, 90 mountain chasseurs companies, 18 artillery companies. Fortress/static artillery (with 8 and 16 pounder guns and howitzers) lined up 16 gunners companies. Field and mountain artillery: 56 artillery squads, each with 16 men and 2 guns. 52 of those squads manned light 3 or 4-pdr guns detached to infantry battalions; 4 squads served 8-pdr guns assigned to regimental Grenadier battalions.
The "Grande Armée", the army corps in Southern Piedmont facing the major French threat, lined up 17,400 infantry, 1,600 cavalry and 32 guns.
Bonaparte's Plan Rejected
While the Sardinians were hitting rock bottom, the French were not much better off. Due to a severe lack of reinforcements and supplies, the Army in Italy was in a parlous state and barely able to operate in the field. Bonaparte produced his famous breakthrough plan, based on the Montenotte-Carcare-Cherasco maneuver - the one he would put into practice in 1796. However, the Directoire rejected, or rather froze it, and replaced Dumerbion (deemed to be politically unreliable) with General Schérer.
1795
Struggle for the Middle Sea
Aware that the Austro-Piedmontese army and the Allied grip on Northern Italy relied heavily on the British naval dominance over the Thyrrenian Sea, the French devised plans to neutralize the wavering Grand Duchy of Tuscany with its important British-controlled port of Leighorn (Livorno) and land an expeditionary corps on Corsica, then occupied by the British with the assistance of anti-French Corsican forces. Bonaparte was to be in command of the corps' artillery.
The British fleet under Admiral Hotham was in trouble. Under French pressure, Spain had withdrawn her ships from Hood's fleet, and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany - never an enthusiastic supporter of the Allies and hostile to the British - was just waiting for the opportunity to declare his State neutral. Which he did in February 1795, signing a peace treaty with France. For the time being, however, nothing was done to eject the British from Leighorn.
Pressured by the British, the King of Naples agreed to send a part of his not negligible battle fleet to join up with Hotham and replace the departed Spanish vessels. Neapolitan naval bases were also open to Hotham's fleet. However, a request for a 12,000-strong Neapolitan army to join the Austro-Sardinian Allies in Piedmont was, for all practical purposes though not on the theory, declined.
Listening to Bonaparte's advice, the French first sent the battle fleet to hopefully get rid of Hotham's fleet before shipping the invasion force to the St. Florent bay in Corsica, where it would land.
Between March 12th and 14th, 1795, the Allied (British-Neapolitan) fleet with 14 ships of the line and the French fleet under Admiral Martin with 13 collided in the Thyrrenian Sea, in the battle of Capo Noli (Noli Cape, off Savona, in Liguria). The outcome was an Allied victory, though not a clear-cut one. The French lost two 74-gun ships of the line and two more were severely damaged. However, four Allied ships also suffered substantial damage, and "Illustrious" was so badly shot up that it had to be demolished eventually. The Neapolitan ships under Admiral Caracciolo (later on hanged by Nelson and the Queen of Naples) fought well, crippling and capturing the French ship "Censeur".
While the battle did not prove an epic success for Hotham, his goal was nevertheless attained - having failed to make a real dent in the British naval superiority, Martin sailed back to France and the Corsican invasion was aborted.
The British fleet under Admiral Hotham was in trouble. Under French pressure, Spain had withdrawn her ships from Hood's fleet, and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany - never an enthusiastic supporter of the Allies and hostile to the British - was just waiting for the opportunity to declare his State neutral. Which he did in February 1795, signing a peace treaty with France. For the time being, however, nothing was done to eject the British from Leighorn.
Pressured by the British, the King of Naples agreed to send a part of his not negligible battle fleet to join up with Hotham and replace the departed Spanish vessels. Neapolitan naval bases were also open to Hotham's fleet. However, a request for a 12,000-strong Neapolitan army to join the Austro-Sardinian Allies in Piedmont was, for all practical purposes though not on the theory, declined.
Listening to Bonaparte's advice, the French first sent the battle fleet to hopefully get rid of Hotham's fleet before shipping the invasion force to the St. Florent bay in Corsica, where it would land.
Between March 12th and 14th, 1795, the Allied (British-Neapolitan) fleet with 14 ships of the line and the French fleet under Admiral Martin with 13 collided in the Thyrrenian Sea, in the battle of Capo Noli (Noli Cape, off Savona, in Liguria). The outcome was an Allied victory, though not a clear-cut one. The French lost two 74-gun ships of the line and two more were severely damaged. However, four Allied ships also suffered substantial damage, and "Illustrious" was so badly shot up that it had to be demolished eventually. The Neapolitan ships under Admiral Caracciolo (later on hanged by Nelson and the Queen of Naples) fought well, crippling and capturing the French ship "Censeur".
While the battle did not prove an epic success for Hotham, his goal was nevertheless attained - having failed to make a real dent in the British naval superiority, Martin sailed back to France and the Corsican invasion was aborted.
January to May: Preparations
January to June 1795, both the French and the Allies were too exhausted to carry out any significant operations. The French in particular were hitting rock bottom. In February, due to very high sickness and desertion rates, the Army of Italy under Schérer could rely on 11,000 active men in all (versus 15,000 sick). From Paris, the Directorate pressed Schérer hard to go on the offensive again, but the French general refused to comply. In March Schérer was sacked. The Army of Italy was reinforced and brought to a nominal strength of 30,000 men. Added to the 15,000 men of the Army of the Alps, that produced a puny total of 45,000 French troops holding the huge and tough Alpine front from Switzerland to the Ligurian Sea.
In May, Kellerman was appointed as new commander of both armies. He reinforced Masséna's right wing, beefed up to 22,000 men, and planned an offensive along Stura River Valley to Ceva and Savona, aimed at breaking the Allied front.
A few actions worth reporting however took place throughout the winter and spring months. The major incident was the French capture of the strategic Col du Mont position, which commanded the important passage across Grisenche Valley from St Bernard Pass to Mont Cenis. An early attempt in April was thwarted, but on May 12th a night surprise attack proved very successful, leading to the capture of the Col du Mont and 200 riflemen of the Vercelli Regiment, with several officers. Sardinian reserves stopped the French push, but several counterattacks to dislodge the French from Col du Mont and St. Bernard all failed. Once again a certain Sardinian proclivity to be surprised and broken by night attacks caused a local disaster, which added to many similar failures which did not uplift Sardinian morale. Vercelli, a provincial regiment, also proved a somewhat weak unit both in defense and when attacking. The Vercelli highest rank at Col du Mont, Major Vialardi, in spite of his thorough war experience, had allowed the battalion sentries to withdraw just when the French attacked. The latter could therefore get to and jump into the Sardinian trenches and redoubts before the Sardinians realized what was going on.
The Sardinians could take a conditional comfort in a few small successes elsewhere along the front. The elite Nice Chasseurs surprised a French outpost at Dovens, taking 20 prisoners without losses to themselves. In high Vesubie Valley, the outstanding French (Royalist) Chasseurs under battleworthy Captain Bonneaud wiped out a French company holding an outpost, killing 3 and capturing 88 soldiers including 2 officers. Finally, the Nice Chasseurs, again, on June 23rd, fought off a French attack on Bagni di Vinadio, where 400 Chasseurs under Captain Baron Galera routed the enemy by a brilliant counterattack.
Just as these skirmishes were taking place, the Allied commanders, like their French counterparts, planned their next moves. In February an inter-Allied conference was held with Colli and general Collier de la Tour for the Sardinians, Wallis and his Chief of Staff Schmitfeld for Austria, and Ambassador (to Turin) Trevor and Admiral Goodall for Britain all participating. De la Tour, in agreement with King Victor Amedeus, had drafted a rather ambitious plan envisioning a massive attack down Stura Valley to recapture Nice County and throw the enemy back into France, cutting off any French units still deployed to Liguria and Southern Piedmont. Unfortunately, the Austrians disagreed and presented their own plan, based on an offensive from Bormida Valley on to Liguria and the seashore at Vado to connect with the British fleet. Additionally, they proposed to re-establish De Vins as supreme commander.
As the British endorsed the Austrian plan, the Sardinians could but grudgingly give up their own plan. However they were fully aware that the Austrian plan was totally inadequate from a Sardinian perspective and would at best grant them some respite instead of a substantial victory. As a sort of sweetener to the Sardinians, the Austrians allowed them to carry out as many minor operations along the rugged Alpine front as they saw fit. (The Austrians basically did not care about Piedmont's mountain war: that was a nasty and entirely Sardinian business they wanted to have to do with as least as possible).
In June 1795 the Allies had 66,000 regular troops (58,200 infantry, 5,600 horse and 1,800 artillery with 140 field guns) plus 13,000 Piedmontese militiamen, of which 6,000 on the western (Alpine) front and 7,000 on the southern front. Colli's and Wallis's armies in the south outnumbered Kellermann's Army of Italy with 40,000 men vs. 25,000.
Allied Order of Battle, June 1795
Army of Lombardy (Wallis)
23 Austrian battalions with 20,700 infantry and 5 Sardinian battalions with 1,750 infantry
2,788 cavalry
772 artillerymen with 38 guns
Winckheim Division (all-Austrian on 4 brigades: Rukawina, Terniczy, Pittony, Liptay)
Turckheim Division (mixed Austro-Sardinian-Neapolitan: Cantu' Brigade with 5 Sardinian battalions and 3 Austrian; Fischer Cavalry Bde. with 6 Dragoon squadrons; Neapolitan Cavalry Brigade with 12 squadrons)
Austro-Sardinian Army (Colli)
30 Sardinian battalions with 9,000 infantry and 5 Austrian battalions with 4,500 infantry
32 guns
Argenteau Division (3 Austrian bns. with 2,700 men and 14 Sardinian bns. with 4,200), at Ceva
Provera Brigade (2 Austrian bns) between Millesimo and Mombarcaro
Colli Division (16 Sardinian battalions with 4,800 infantry) at Mondovì.
Duke of Aosta Army Corps (Southern Alps)
21 Sardinian battalions with 8,200 infantry, 1 Austrian bn. with 800
2,580 cavalry
43 guns
Franc Corps with 1,600 men
Cuneo-Stura-Gesso Division
Maira-Varaita Valleys Brigade
Luserna Valley Brigade
Cavalry Division (1,600 Sardinian horse and 500 Austrian horse) at San Dalmazzo
Duke of Montferrat Army Corps (Northern Alps)
31 Sardinian battalions with 10,675 infantry
520 cavalry
38 guns
Susa Valley Division
Aosta Valley Division
The Allied Offensive and the Taking of Spinarda
On June 20th De Vins launched his offensive on the Ligurian coastal town of Savona and the sea. The outnumbered French under Laharpe fought stoutly, delaying the ponderous Austrian advance. Due to his ineptitude, Argenteau ended up two days behind schedule with the very important attack on the key Mount Settepani redoubts, a pivotal section of the French defensive line. On June 24th, Wallis's attack on the sea locality of Vado, firmly held by Laharpe, failed with Austrian losses twice as heavy as those of the French defenders. Only on June 25th, after a long and tough fighting against a heroically steadfast French defense, Settepani Redoubts could be captured and Joubert, Masséna and Cervoni forced back. Over the next two days Masséna strove hard to reconquer the redoubts, but all French counterattacks were driven off and finally Kellermann ordered the retreat, as those positions could no longer be held. By June 29th the French right wing fell back to the so-called Borghetto Line. Vado, Voltri, Finale and Loano were all evacuated and the French were now confined in the westernmost portion of Liguria.
Meanwhile, no substantial support was coming to De Vins from Colli. As a matter of fact the Sardinians purposely abstained from pushing vigorously along the Tanaro Valley. They had been forced to accept the Austrian plan, which they did not endorse, and now they knowingly acted to let it fail. De Vins bitterly complained about the lack of support from Colli and in that case he was quite right. Having been let down by the Austrians on several occasions, the Sardinians seized the opportunity to pay them back in their own coin. By doing so they decisively contributed to the fiasco.
A badly coordinated Royal Grenadiers attack on Col dell'Inferno (Hell Peak) and Col dei Termini on June 25th went nowhere, despite the attacking troops' valor. Inconsequential skirmishes led to more casualties and no gains. More dramatic affairs such as the attacks on Tenda and Intrappa were all lost by the Sardinians, who were outfought by a reactive and tenacious French defensive system. Savona with its powerful and impressive Priamar Fortress still stood out of Austrian reach.
The only Sardinian success was the bold attack on the Spinarda position.
Worked out by the General Staff captain de Brez, the characteristically complex plan envisioned a coordinated massive assault by five multinational columns with a total of 2.750 men (600 Italians of the Austrian Belgioioso Regiment, 180 Croatians, 400 Swiss of the Sardinian Stettler Regt., 160 Nice troops and 1.410 Piedmontese including the crack Colli di Felizzano Chasseurs), under the command of general Montafia.
The plan, based on an erroneous reckoning of the distances to cover and timings, went completely awry as two columns got lost and one got to the objective far too late. Success was snatched from the jaws of defeat by Felizzano, who impetuously charged the French redoubts from an unexpected direction and stormed them while Stettler's Swiss took other earthworks. The French commander, Gouvion, notwithstanding a desperate resistance was unable to hold on and the garrison broke up and fled to the rear position of Pianetta, strongly held by two reserve battalions under Masséna. Montafia did not press the attack any further.
The Allies lost 107 men vs. 195 French casualties (40 dead or wounded and 155 prisoners). Sergeant Maurice Masséna of the Piedmont Chasseurs, a relative of General Masséna fighting on the other side, , was awarded the Gold Medal for Valor along with two more NCOs.
In fact, the celebrated capture of Spinarda, one of the rare Sardinian mountain assault victories, in itself had little strategic and operational meaning. The Pianetta position was much more critical, but the French hold on it remained uncontested. Further Sardinian attacks in early July (a considerable force of 5,000 men and 10 guns under La Tour) produced an advance of a few miles and some small victories, notably the retaking of Garessio, a locale on the southermost edge of Piedmont where the Sardinian Grenadiers bested their French counterparts in close combat. However, the French retained control of all vital positions in Upper Tanaro Valley and could not be dislodged.
On July 14th Colli's troops settled down on a defensive line facing the French one, and the front went into hibernation. Over the next two months no actions worth noting took place, except a violent clash on August 11th when the French captain Gardanne repulsed an attack by 300 Nice Chasseurs inflicting severe casualties.
Meanwhile, no substantial support was coming to De Vins from Colli. As a matter of fact the Sardinians purposely abstained from pushing vigorously along the Tanaro Valley. They had been forced to accept the Austrian plan, which they did not endorse, and now they knowingly acted to let it fail. De Vins bitterly complained about the lack of support from Colli and in that case he was quite right. Having been let down by the Austrians on several occasions, the Sardinians seized the opportunity to pay them back in their own coin. By doing so they decisively contributed to the fiasco.
A badly coordinated Royal Grenadiers attack on Col dell'Inferno (Hell Peak) and Col dei Termini on June 25th went nowhere, despite the attacking troops' valor. Inconsequential skirmishes led to more casualties and no gains. More dramatic affairs such as the attacks on Tenda and Intrappa were all lost by the Sardinians, who were outfought by a reactive and tenacious French defensive system. Savona with its powerful and impressive Priamar Fortress still stood out of Austrian reach.
The only Sardinian success was the bold attack on the Spinarda position.
Worked out by the General Staff captain de Brez, the characteristically complex plan envisioned a coordinated massive assault by five multinational columns with a total of 2.750 men (600 Italians of the Austrian Belgioioso Regiment, 180 Croatians, 400 Swiss of the Sardinian Stettler Regt., 160 Nice troops and 1.410 Piedmontese including the crack Colli di Felizzano Chasseurs), under the command of general Montafia.
The plan, based on an erroneous reckoning of the distances to cover and timings, went completely awry as two columns got lost and one got to the objective far too late. Success was snatched from the jaws of defeat by Felizzano, who impetuously charged the French redoubts from an unexpected direction and stormed them while Stettler's Swiss took other earthworks. The French commander, Gouvion, notwithstanding a desperate resistance was unable to hold on and the garrison broke up and fled to the rear position of Pianetta, strongly held by two reserve battalions under Masséna. Montafia did not press the attack any further.
The Allies lost 107 men vs. 195 French casualties (40 dead or wounded and 155 prisoners). Sergeant Maurice Masséna of the Piedmont Chasseurs, a relative of General Masséna fighting on the other side, , was awarded the Gold Medal for Valor along with two more NCOs.
In fact, the celebrated capture of Spinarda, one of the rare Sardinian mountain assault victories, in itself had little strategic and operational meaning. The Pianetta position was much more critical, but the French hold on it remained uncontested. Further Sardinian attacks in early July (a considerable force of 5,000 men and 10 guns under La Tour) produced an advance of a few miles and some small victories, notably the retaking of Garessio, a locale on the southermost edge of Piedmont where the Sardinian Grenadiers bested their French counterparts in close combat. However, the French retained control of all vital positions in Upper Tanaro Valley and could not be dislodged.
On July 14th Colli's troops settled down on a defensive line facing the French one, and the front went into hibernation. Over the next two months no actions worth noting took place, except a violent clash on August 11th when the French captain Gardanne repulsed an attack by 300 Nice Chasseurs inflicting severe casualties.
Bitter Alps: More Failures at High Altitude
Between mid-August and early September the Sardinians collected some painful setbacks on the Alps. More attacks on Montgenevre and Tenda were either driven off by the prompt intervention of French reserves, or simply aborted due to disastrous organizational breakdowns.
Worse went the Montgenevre assault of August 30th. Planned by the usually intelligent and efficient Ignazio Thaon de Revel, one of the few really valuable high rank Sardinian commanders, the action was marred by a crippling lack of knowledge of terrain features and of the French positions, poor coordination, command and control, exceeding complexity, poor leadership on the part of some low quality officers, and extremely bad weather. A 3,000-strong assault force was subdivided into three columns. One got lost in the heavy fog. Another, 700 Grenadiers under Colonel D'Allemagne, operating according to schedule, reached its objective and the assault went in, but could not chase the 140 French defenders (Grenadiers, too) out of their redoubts. The third column, 800 riflemen from the Aosta and Genevois Regiments, plodded so slowly towards Montgenevre (slowed down also by the unforeseen death of their commander) that the French had all the time to gather a counterstrike force of 3,000 infantry and march out of Briancon to surround and capture the largest part of the column (which received no support whatsoever from Thaon de Revel, allegedly because of a paralyzing storm). Two battalions were thus written off the Sardinian order of battle, practically without a fight.
To complete the string of Sardinian woes, after a successful raid the Bonneaud (French emigres) company - famous for their ruthless courage and combat proficiency - were destroyed in a savage struggle to the last round in the village of Saint Martin, Vesubie Valley, on the same day August 30th.
Sardinian Pirateering and... Textiles and Freemasons
As ground operations were unfolding between Liguria and Southern Piedmont, a small Sardinian privateering flotilla, led by the Oneglia corsairs, effectively harassed the French coastal shipping between Toulon and Marseille and the Army of Italy. The "flagship" was a 16- or 18-cannon brig, under Commander Mattone di Benevello. The privateering license for the flotilla had been signed by the Austrian commander De Vins in person - and he made a rich profit out of it as a share of the booty was his due. The successful guerrilla waged by the miniature fleet worsened considerably the already parlous supply situation of the French, whose attempts to uproot it all failed (including the landing of a 600-strong raiding party at Voltri, where the flotilla had its depots).
It seems there was more to this story, however. The pirates' activity caused heavy damage not only to the French supply lines but also to the vital and, notwithstanding the war, still flourishing Piedmontese trade with the French textile hub of Lyons. Piedmontese textile firms complained to De Vins and an overland route through Stura Valley to France had to be opened for the business. Some authors maintain that Freemasonry played a crucial role, not only in the textiles trade issue but also in the conduct of the war and its outcome. The powerful Piedmontese Freemasons of Turin, whose political influence the King himself could hardly disregard, were subordinated to the Freemasonry "head office" of Lyons and close ties between French and Piedmontese high rank Freemasons were still fully operational.
It seems there was more to this story, however. The pirates' activity caused heavy damage not only to the French supply lines but also to the vital and, notwithstanding the war, still flourishing Piedmontese trade with the French textile hub of Lyons. Piedmontese textile firms complained to De Vins and an overland route through Stura Valley to France had to be opened for the business. Some authors maintain that Freemasonry played a crucial role, not only in the textiles trade issue but also in the conduct of the war and its outcome. The powerful Piedmontese Freemasons of Turin, whose political influence the King himself could hardly disregard, were subordinated to the Freemasonry "head office" of Lyons and close ties between French and Piedmontese high rank Freemasons were still fully operational.
October to December. Billows Pounding on a Rock: The Sardinians at the Battle of Loano
In 1795, the Bureau Topographique in Paris issued a memo - in collaboration with, among others, Bonaparte - on the Army of Italy and its operational and strategic goals. The memo suggested that Piedmont's key position be the fortress of Ceva, in the south. With Ceva in French hands, the southern front would be broken open and the Kingdom of Sardinia would ask for peace. The war would then continue against Austria with a French invasion of Northern Italy and an offensive on Vienna to link up with the French Army of the Rhine marching across Bavaria. A revised edition of the failed 1703 grand plan of King Louis XIV. Worth noting in the memo is the French stance towards Piedmont. Far from being so harsh as it would become in 1796, in 1795 the notion of swapping Lombardy for Savoy and Nice - allowing the King to annex Lombardy as a recoupment for the loss of the two provinces - and signing a defensive/offensive alliance with him still was the Directorate's official line.
The suggested operational plan entailed an attack on Ceva through the Tanaro River valley. In Italy, however, Kellermann and his chief of staff Berthier begged to differ. They harbored doubts about the feasibility of that plan - taking a powerful and strongly garrisoned fortress with an exhausted, underfed and understrength army, with no siege artillery what's more, looked like a daunting task to say the least - and proposed an alternative approach. The Directorate was in no mood for discussions, however. The Army of Italy was starving and its combat capabilities rapidly deteriorating. Either it took Ceva with its large depots and plenty of supplies, or it would be forced to withdraw from Italy into Southern France, a stinging military failure and a major political disaster.
Kellermann was stripped of his southern command and sent once again to head the Army of the Alps, whereas Schérer was appointed back as commander of the Army of Italy. Instead of bearing the politicians in Paris a grudge for the demotion, loyal Kellermann immediately set about cooperating with Schérer by tying down as many Allied forces in the Alps as he could, by launching frequent raids and spoiling attacks (some successes, some setbacks) until heavy snowfalls brought all military activity in the Alps to a standstill.
In October 1795 the Army of Italy numbered 56,625 men, but only 32,927 would take part in Schérer's offensive.
On their part, the Allies had about 42,000 men on a line of earthworks and redoubts facing the French from St. Bernard (not the more famous St. Bernard in the northern Alps) to the locality of Loano. They were deployed as follows:
Left wing: Wallis Division, 14,000 Austrians
Center: Argenteau Division, 6,000 men of whom 1,200 Sardinians
Austrian reserve: 4,000 men
Right wing: Colli Army Corps (11,500 Sardinians) barring the access to Tanaro River Valley and Ceva
East of the river: Solaro della Chiusa Division, 5,000 men in an in-depth, three-lines defensive system
West of the river: Costa di Montafia Division, 6,500 men on two in-depth lines.
The suggested operational plan entailed an attack on Ceva through the Tanaro River valley. In Italy, however, Kellermann and his chief of staff Berthier begged to differ. They harbored doubts about the feasibility of that plan - taking a powerful and strongly garrisoned fortress with an exhausted, underfed and understrength army, with no siege artillery what's more, looked like a daunting task to say the least - and proposed an alternative approach. The Directorate was in no mood for discussions, however. The Army of Italy was starving and its combat capabilities rapidly deteriorating. Either it took Ceva with its large depots and plenty of supplies, or it would be forced to withdraw from Italy into Southern France, a stinging military failure and a major political disaster.
Kellermann was stripped of his southern command and sent once again to head the Army of the Alps, whereas Schérer was appointed back as commander of the Army of Italy. Instead of bearing the politicians in Paris a grudge for the demotion, loyal Kellermann immediately set about cooperating with Schérer by tying down as many Allied forces in the Alps as he could, by launching frequent raids and spoiling attacks (some successes, some setbacks) until heavy snowfalls brought all military activity in the Alps to a standstill.
In October 1795 the Army of Italy numbered 56,625 men, but only 32,927 would take part in Schérer's offensive.
On their part, the Allies had about 42,000 men on a line of earthworks and redoubts facing the French from St. Bernard (not the more famous St. Bernard in the northern Alps) to the locality of Loano. They were deployed as follows:
Left wing: Wallis Division, 14,000 Austrians
Center: Argenteau Division, 6,000 men of whom 1,200 Sardinians
Austrian reserve: 4,000 men
Right wing: Colli Army Corps (11,500 Sardinians) barring the access to Tanaro River Valley and Ceva
East of the river: Solaro della Chiusa Division, 5,000 men in an in-depth, three-lines defensive system
West of the river: Costa di Montafia Division, 6,500 men on two in-depth lines.
The French plan and the breakthrough in the Austrian sector
The Allies were awaiting a French offensive. However, they were unsure about the direction of it.
The initial French plan - based on Masséna's recommendations to Schérer - called for a decisive attack on the junction between the Sardinians and the Austrians. Everything was ready for the offensive to start off on November 15th, but a very heavy snowstorm disrupted the French preparations and forced them to postpone the assault. In the meantime Colli guessed the French intentions right and substantially reinforced his line, especially on the junction area which was to be Masséna's target.
Colli's reaction drove the French to quickly reconsider the plan. Now the Sardinian defenses looked too strong to be taken on. The decision was thus made of probing the Austrian sector, looking for soft spots to exploit. Two probing attacks were launched. One failed badly as the Croatian garrison of the castle of Balestrino beat it back (the French slaughtered a number of civilians who had actively supported the defenders). The other, instead, was an unconditional success yielding 500 prisoners.
Emboldened by the success, Schérer shifted the axis of the attack from Tanaro Valley - the Sardinian zone - to the Austrian sector. Now the Sardinians would only be engaged by a diversionary attack carried out by Sérurier's Division (7,000 men) towards the Spinarda position. The bulk of the army would smash the Austrian line with Augereau (10,000 men) and Masséna's corps including the Charlet and Laharpe Divisions (15,000). As a deception measure, the rumor was circulated that as winter was coming, all operations were suspended and French troops taking up winter quarters. The Austrian HQ fell for it hook, line and sinker. De Vins returned to Turin and the Neapolitan expeditionary corps also took up winter quarters.
On November 22nd, at 6:00am, Augereau attacked in the area of Loano. After a morning of tough fighting - a French frontal assault failed and they were even counterattacked by Austrian cavalry - the Austrians were forced out of their positions and back. Threatened by rapid French encircling columns, Wallis evacuated Loano and tried to make contact with Argenteau's division on his flank. But Argenteau was no longer there for the rendezvous.
By 3:00pm he had been all but wiped out by Masséna. IR 48 Caprara-Schmidtfeldt, the notoriously bad Italian regiment of the Austrian army (much worse even than the erratic Belgioioso), broke and ran almost without fighting and opening a wide gap in the line that Masséna was quick to pour into. His division swiftly disintegrated. The French onrush was temporarily halted by the Piedmont Brigade manning earthworks and batteries at Malsabocco. There the Sardinians fought stoutly, killing General Charlet and causing disorder among the French. It took Masséna's personal intervention bringing along the French reserve troops to rally the breaking up French and push the stubborn Piedmontese back. The latter regrouped at Bardineto along with the remnants of Argenteau's force, 3,000 bewildered men. As Masséna was directing his attack columns to encircle Argenteau and cut his line of retreat, he also sent Laharpe - curiously, Argenteau's brother-in-law - to the Austrian general to parley with him and hopefully budge him to surrender. Argenteau panicked and fled, losing 1,000 more men but managing to break out with 2,000 - one fifth of his initial strength.
On his part, Wallis - in the dark about Argenteau's rout as any links between his force and the latter's had been broken by the French - enjoyed twelve hours of respite on account of French exhaustion. But the respite did not last long. Cut off from Argenteau and the Sardinians, facing an overwhelmingly mobile enemy outflanking him on all sides, under a pelting rain Wallis finally retreated towards Savona. In the process he catastrophically lost his artillery. The Austrian army was simply dissolving, offering no more resistance to the advancing French. On November 25 Masséna and Augereau entered Vado, just as Wallis was evacuating Savona after setting his depots afire. Marching up the Bormida Valley what was left of the Austrians reached Acqui (the main Austrian operational base) on November 29th.
Schérer, or rather Masséna and Augereau, won a signal victory and the Austrians were completely routed, losing 3,500 dead and wounded, 4,000 prisoners and 65 guns. IR 48, which had shamefully melted away, was disbanded and never formed again. The French lost 523 dead and 1,200 wounded.
The initial French plan - based on Masséna's recommendations to Schérer - called for a decisive attack on the junction between the Sardinians and the Austrians. Everything was ready for the offensive to start off on November 15th, but a very heavy snowstorm disrupted the French preparations and forced them to postpone the assault. In the meantime Colli guessed the French intentions right and substantially reinforced his line, especially on the junction area which was to be Masséna's target.
Colli's reaction drove the French to quickly reconsider the plan. Now the Sardinian defenses looked too strong to be taken on. The decision was thus made of probing the Austrian sector, looking for soft spots to exploit. Two probing attacks were launched. One failed badly as the Croatian garrison of the castle of Balestrino beat it back (the French slaughtered a number of civilians who had actively supported the defenders). The other, instead, was an unconditional success yielding 500 prisoners.
Emboldened by the success, Schérer shifted the axis of the attack from Tanaro Valley - the Sardinian zone - to the Austrian sector. Now the Sardinians would only be engaged by a diversionary attack carried out by Sérurier's Division (7,000 men) towards the Spinarda position. The bulk of the army would smash the Austrian line with Augereau (10,000 men) and Masséna's corps including the Charlet and Laharpe Divisions (15,000). As a deception measure, the rumor was circulated that as winter was coming, all operations were suspended and French troops taking up winter quarters. The Austrian HQ fell for it hook, line and sinker. De Vins returned to Turin and the Neapolitan expeditionary corps also took up winter quarters.
On November 22nd, at 6:00am, Augereau attacked in the area of Loano. After a morning of tough fighting - a French frontal assault failed and they were even counterattacked by Austrian cavalry - the Austrians were forced out of their positions and back. Threatened by rapid French encircling columns, Wallis evacuated Loano and tried to make contact with Argenteau's division on his flank. But Argenteau was no longer there for the rendezvous.
By 3:00pm he had been all but wiped out by Masséna. IR 48 Caprara-Schmidtfeldt, the notoriously bad Italian regiment of the Austrian army (much worse even than the erratic Belgioioso), broke and ran almost without fighting and opening a wide gap in the line that Masséna was quick to pour into. His division swiftly disintegrated. The French onrush was temporarily halted by the Piedmont Brigade manning earthworks and batteries at Malsabocco. There the Sardinians fought stoutly, killing General Charlet and causing disorder among the French. It took Masséna's personal intervention bringing along the French reserve troops to rally the breaking up French and push the stubborn Piedmontese back. The latter regrouped at Bardineto along with the remnants of Argenteau's force, 3,000 bewildered men. As Masséna was directing his attack columns to encircle Argenteau and cut his line of retreat, he also sent Laharpe - curiously, Argenteau's brother-in-law - to the Austrian general to parley with him and hopefully budge him to surrender. Argenteau panicked and fled, losing 1,000 more men but managing to break out with 2,000 - one fifth of his initial strength.
On his part, Wallis - in the dark about Argenteau's rout as any links between his force and the latter's had been broken by the French - enjoyed twelve hours of respite on account of French exhaustion. But the respite did not last long. Cut off from Argenteau and the Sardinians, facing an overwhelmingly mobile enemy outflanking him on all sides, under a pelting rain Wallis finally retreated towards Savona. In the process he catastrophically lost his artillery. The Austrian army was simply dissolving, offering no more resistance to the advancing French. On November 25 Masséna and Augereau entered Vado, just as Wallis was evacuating Savona after setting his depots afire. Marching up the Bormida Valley what was left of the Austrians reached Acqui (the main Austrian operational base) on November 29th.
Schérer, or rather Masséna and Augereau, won a signal victory and the Austrians were completely routed, losing 3,500 dead and wounded, 4,000 prisoners and 65 guns. IR 48, which had shamefully melted away, was disbanded and never formed again. The French lost 523 dead and 1,200 wounded.
The Sardinians Stand Fast
On November 23rd Sérurier began his "diversionary" attack, which however developed into a fiercely fought action as the French did their best, but in vain, to break through.
The Lasalcette Brigade attacked the formidable twin redoubts of St. Bernard. Those were manned by Colli di Felizzano's elite light infantry with 2 guns and 500 men. Despite a herculean effort, the French grenadiers were thrown back with bloody casualties. The Miollis Brigade instead was more successful: the Austrian Belgioioso regiment deployed between St. Bernard and the other key position of Dondella gave way too easily and Dondella was taken without much fighting (its 167 defenders, mostly Acqui Regiment provincials, were overrun). However, past the Dondella redoubt Miollis came under heavy fire from Sardinian artillery batteries. Decimated by devastating gunfire, the French assaulted the batteries, defended to the last round by two heroic Sardinian officers, Lt. Rainaldi - killed in action - and the 17 years old Lt. Boyl di Putifigari, from an aristocratic Sardinian family, who for his deeds was later awarded the Cross of St. Maurice. Just as the French were about to overrun the artillerymen, a violent bayonet charge by Varax and Dichat Grenadiers beat them back in confusion. Dondella Redoubt was subsequently retaken by the Sardinians. According to Colli's after-action report to the King, around St. Bernard the French lost 500 dead and wounded and 600 prisoners.
On the left bank of Tanaro River, the Brigade Pelletier, after an initial success against the Mondovi Regiment, was stopped by the Tortona Provincial infantry supported by reinforcements.
On the two following days Sérurier kept up the pressure on the Sardinians, but achieved nothing in terms of ground gained. All French penetrations and infiltrations were repulsed. During a particularly fierce combat, a company of the Casale Provincial regiment beat off nine consecutive French assaults, with bullets, bayonets and rifle butts. Piedmontese doggedness at its best was not easy meat for the French.
The Lasalcette Brigade attacked the formidable twin redoubts of St. Bernard. Those were manned by Colli di Felizzano's elite light infantry with 2 guns and 500 men. Despite a herculean effort, the French grenadiers were thrown back with bloody casualties. The Miollis Brigade instead was more successful: the Austrian Belgioioso regiment deployed between St. Bernard and the other key position of Dondella gave way too easily and Dondella was taken without much fighting (its 167 defenders, mostly Acqui Regiment provincials, were overrun). However, past the Dondella redoubt Miollis came under heavy fire from Sardinian artillery batteries. Decimated by devastating gunfire, the French assaulted the batteries, defended to the last round by two heroic Sardinian officers, Lt. Rainaldi - killed in action - and the 17 years old Lt. Boyl di Putifigari, from an aristocratic Sardinian family, who for his deeds was later awarded the Cross of St. Maurice. Just as the French were about to overrun the artillerymen, a violent bayonet charge by Varax and Dichat Grenadiers beat them back in confusion. Dondella Redoubt was subsequently retaken by the Sardinians. According to Colli's after-action report to the King, around St. Bernard the French lost 500 dead and wounded and 600 prisoners.
On the left bank of Tanaro River, the Brigade Pelletier, after an initial success against the Mondovi Regiment, was stopped by the Tortona Provincial infantry supported by reinforcements.
On the two following days Sérurier kept up the pressure on the Sardinians, but achieved nothing in terms of ground gained. All French penetrations and infiltrations were repulsed. During a particularly fierce combat, a company of the Casale Provincial regiment beat off nine consecutive French assaults, with bullets, bayonets and rifle butts. Piedmontese doggedness at its best was not easy meat for the French.
Retreat on Ceva
Notwithstanding the defensive success, Colli's position was untenable due to Argenteau's rout. Freely moving around his now exposed left flank, the French could cut him off and cut his supply and retreat line very easily. Indeed Schérer was rapidly shifting the weight of the main attack against the Sardinians, sending 8,000 men under Joubert to reinforce Sérurier. In order to avoid encirclement, Colli ordered a retreat towards the fortress of Ceva.
Despite continued French pressure and some awkward episodes, the Sardinian retreat was orderly and the French got a bloody nose at Pietradegna, where a mixed Croatian-Sardinian rearguard of 550 men (of whom 50 militia) under Major di Castelborgo defeated five assaults by 3,000 French troops. More tough fighting took place elsewhere, around Mombasiglio and Montezemolo. Unfortunately many artillery pieces with their ammunition were lost to the French. On November 28th, Colli's corps was at last safe in and around the Ceva fortifications. Of its 15,000 men, 1,100 had been lost over five days of battle - 500 dead and 600 wounded - serious enough, but most likely lighter casualties than those inflicted on the French despite some claims to the contrary.
At any rate, the Austrian defeat placed Piedmont in a dire situation. Colli had lost his artillery and could no longer count, for the time being, on Austrian support. Wallis was recovering from the defeat at Acqui, out of touch with Colli, and was absolutely not in the position to reestablish contact with the Sardinians. Colli's corps on its own could not hope to survive a French all-out offensive. Once again, in Turin the War Council suggested to the King to reopen negotiations with the Paris government and sue for peace.
And once again French troubles were Piedmont's windfall. Schérer had won the battle of Loano, but he could not seize the well supplied Sardinian Ceva depots and the Army of Italy was frazzled, starving, short of everything and stuck on the snowy mountains at the beginning of the winter season. They were in such a bad shape that Schérer mistook a Sardinian move to prop up a segment of the front for an attack build-up, and that prompted a French withdrawal! Surprised, Colli exploited the French evacuation to regain some lost positions and set up his new defensive line in depth on the left bank of the Tanaro, between Mondovi and Ceva - the one that the next spring would face Bonaparte's onslaught. The Ceva fortified area, including the Pedaggera Pass, and behind it the Corsaglia creek line, connecting Ceva to Mondovi.
The French offensive was over and Schérer took up winter quarters. So did the Allies, amid bitter accusations and recriminations between generals (obviously the Sardinians were very disappointed by the abysmal performance of the Austrians and in particular of Argenteau). Old and crippled De Vins retired, to be replaced by Beaulieu.
But the King of Sardinia at least enjoyed a little Christmas present from the army. On New Year's night, Grenadiers' Lieutenant Colonel count di Santarosa stormed the French outpost of Priola, strongly fortified and held by a robust 200 men garrison. The multi-pronged assault this time worked like clockwork. The Sardinians lost only 4 dead and 11 wounded, the French 17 dead and 75 prisoners. The rest of the garrison fled.
Despite continued French pressure and some awkward episodes, the Sardinian retreat was orderly and the French got a bloody nose at Pietradegna, where a mixed Croatian-Sardinian rearguard of 550 men (of whom 50 militia) under Major di Castelborgo defeated five assaults by 3,000 French troops. More tough fighting took place elsewhere, around Mombasiglio and Montezemolo. Unfortunately many artillery pieces with their ammunition were lost to the French. On November 28th, Colli's corps was at last safe in and around the Ceva fortifications. Of its 15,000 men, 1,100 had been lost over five days of battle - 500 dead and 600 wounded - serious enough, but most likely lighter casualties than those inflicted on the French despite some claims to the contrary.
At any rate, the Austrian defeat placed Piedmont in a dire situation. Colli had lost his artillery and could no longer count, for the time being, on Austrian support. Wallis was recovering from the defeat at Acqui, out of touch with Colli, and was absolutely not in the position to reestablish contact with the Sardinians. Colli's corps on its own could not hope to survive a French all-out offensive. Once again, in Turin the War Council suggested to the King to reopen negotiations with the Paris government and sue for peace.
And once again French troubles were Piedmont's windfall. Schérer had won the battle of Loano, but he could not seize the well supplied Sardinian Ceva depots and the Army of Italy was frazzled, starving, short of everything and stuck on the snowy mountains at the beginning of the winter season. They were in such a bad shape that Schérer mistook a Sardinian move to prop up a segment of the front for an attack build-up, and that prompted a French withdrawal! Surprised, Colli exploited the French evacuation to regain some lost positions and set up his new defensive line in depth on the left bank of the Tanaro, between Mondovi and Ceva - the one that the next spring would face Bonaparte's onslaught. The Ceva fortified area, including the Pedaggera Pass, and behind it the Corsaglia creek line, connecting Ceva to Mondovi.
The French offensive was over and Schérer took up winter quarters. So did the Allies, amid bitter accusations and recriminations between generals (obviously the Sardinians were very disappointed by the abysmal performance of the Austrians and in particular of Argenteau). Old and crippled De Vins retired, to be replaced by Beaulieu.
But the King of Sardinia at least enjoyed a little Christmas present from the army. On New Year's night, Grenadiers' Lieutenant Colonel count di Santarosa stormed the French outpost of Priola, strongly fortified and held by a robust 200 men garrison. The multi-pronged assault this time worked like clockwork. The Sardinians lost only 4 dead and 11 wounded, the French 17 dead and 75 prisoners. The rest of the garrison fled.