"Of all military operations, a successful retreat is the hardest to achieve"
Antoine de Jomini
1796: Enters Bonaparte
Barras's Choice
Early in 1796, the French strategic situation was changing. The British Mediterranean Fleet was less to be feared than before, and Spain, Prussia and Holland had dropped out of the anti-revolutionary alliance. At the same time, an Austrian buildup and signs of increased activity in Italy meant that for the enemy, main war theater was no longer Central Europe, Belgium, or the Atlantic Ocean - but Italy and the Mediterranean. The Directoire thus discarded, for the time being, the traditional "German prong" of French offensive plans and focused on the southern prong - striking at the Austrian Empire via Northern Italy.
The Directoire had been secretly negotiating with the King of Sardinia, but a sweeping Italian offensive now looked like the best way to go. A big military triumph would shore up their regime - which had been just recently saved by Bonaparte, on 8 October, 1795. A successful Italian war would yield heaps of riches and materials (despite all things malicious said outside Italy about Italy's poverty and shortcomings, Northern Italy still was one of Europe's wealthiest lands and the one where foraging was easiest and most plentiful). Lastly, more war would keep a bunch of ambitious generals and a huge army numbering over half a million men away from Paris and out of the Directors' way.
Sensing his time might be coming, Bonaparte ruthlessly attacked Schérer's position as chief of the French Army of Italy. His Italian operations plan, submitted to the government, shot down Schérer as a passive bungler unable to do anything significant, and contained the draft of what would be his actual campaign. A swift attack on the Sardinians was to hopefully crack their lines open in three days, by taking Montezemolo and sieging Ceva while fending off any Austrian attack. To seize the fortress of Ceva a siege artillery of 36 heavy guns was required. After the fall of Ceva, the French were to march on Cuneo and then on Turin.
Schérer's plan was also discussed. True to form, Schérer demolished Bonaparte's plan as "huge chimerical plans touted by overambitious peddlers trying to reach far above their real abilities". Schérer thought his army was still too weak and the enemy too steadfast and solidly entrenched to attack him with any hope of success. Instead, he proposed to easily occupy the pro-French Republic of Genoa and squeeze all of its considerable riches out of it to replenish his stocks and restore the army's full combat power.
The Directors, already annoyed by Schérer's failure in exploiting his great victory at Loano, turned his plan down and decided to replace him with an offensive general. Each Director sponsored his own candidate - Letourneur pushed Bernadotte, Reubell Championnet. Barras instead had Bonaparte, and since Barras was the most powerful and influential among the Directors ... Bonaparte got the job. Carnot, the formidable mastermind of revolutionary France's wars, also supported the choice. On 26 March, together with his chief of staff Berthier and the cavalry squadron leader Joachim Murat, Bonaparte was in Nice, where Schérer handed leadership over to him.
The Directoire had been secretly negotiating with the King of Sardinia, but a sweeping Italian offensive now looked like the best way to go. A big military triumph would shore up their regime - which had been just recently saved by Bonaparte, on 8 October, 1795. A successful Italian war would yield heaps of riches and materials (despite all things malicious said outside Italy about Italy's poverty and shortcomings, Northern Italy still was one of Europe's wealthiest lands and the one where foraging was easiest and most plentiful). Lastly, more war would keep a bunch of ambitious generals and a huge army numbering over half a million men away from Paris and out of the Directors' way.
Sensing his time might be coming, Bonaparte ruthlessly attacked Schérer's position as chief of the French Army of Italy. His Italian operations plan, submitted to the government, shot down Schérer as a passive bungler unable to do anything significant, and contained the draft of what would be his actual campaign. A swift attack on the Sardinians was to hopefully crack their lines open in three days, by taking Montezemolo and sieging Ceva while fending off any Austrian attack. To seize the fortress of Ceva a siege artillery of 36 heavy guns was required. After the fall of Ceva, the French were to march on Cuneo and then on Turin.
Schérer's plan was also discussed. True to form, Schérer demolished Bonaparte's plan as "huge chimerical plans touted by overambitious peddlers trying to reach far above their real abilities". Schérer thought his army was still too weak and the enemy too steadfast and solidly entrenched to attack him with any hope of success. Instead, he proposed to easily occupy the pro-French Republic of Genoa and squeeze all of its considerable riches out of it to replenish his stocks and restore the army's full combat power.
The Directors, already annoyed by Schérer's failure in exploiting his great victory at Loano, turned his plan down and decided to replace him with an offensive general. Each Director sponsored his own candidate - Letourneur pushed Bernadotte, Reubell Championnet. Barras instead had Bonaparte, and since Barras was the most powerful and influential among the Directors ... Bonaparte got the job. Carnot, the formidable mastermind of revolutionary France's wars, also supported the choice. On 26 March, together with his chief of staff Berthier and the cavalry squadron leader Joachim Murat, Bonaparte was in Nice, where Schérer handed leadership over to him.
Was it Bonaparte... or was it Carnot?
Bonaparte's legend portrays him not only as the sole inventor of the 1796 campaign plan, but as the superhuman creator of the invincible Armée d'Italie out of a mob of starving ragamuffins into one of the finest war machines in history.
In fact, although his driving energy and inspirational leadership surely contributed, the army reorganization was largely and successfully carried out by Schérer before Bonaparte's arrival. Sardinian intelligence reports, as mentioned by the Piedmontese general Ignazio Thaon de Revel, bear evidence to it.
Until early in March 1796, Piedmontese intelligence (the Sardinians had their operatives and informers behind the lines, just as the French with Saliceti were organizing their Jacobin clubs and sympathizers' networks in Piedmont) reported that the state of the French Army of Italy was "near collapse". The troops were lacking everything - from food to weapons to clothes to shoes - ; they were receiving no pay, and their money might be stolen by greedy and corrupt commissaries; many officers were inept and unfit for service. Demoralization was spreading among the troops, who sometimes came close to mutiny. The Allies were reveling in the disclosure. Then all of a sudden, things began to rapidly change. Schérer - with the collaboration of Bonaparte's chief commissar, the Corsican Saliceti - tapped the considerable riches of Genoa and funneled a flow of money into the army coffers, and supplies into the army depots. Inept or lazy officers were sacked and replaced by motivated and energetic elements, in particular a number of Italian-speaking officers from the County of Nice (like Masséna) or from Corsica who showed an ardent revolutionary faith. The logistical service was overhauled. Excellent officers and servicemen were assigned to the artillery. Meantime, Saliceti was riling up the Genoese Jacobins and setting up a fifth column of Piedmontese Jacobins, who would turn out to be useful later.
As for Bonaparte's plan, the young general had surely studied in depth the famous precedent - Marshal Maillebois' 1744-45 Piedmont campaign, during the War of the Austrian Succession. On that occasion, a near-run thing, the French had missed by a hairbreadth the opportunity to decisively separate the Sardinian Army from the Austrians, thereby achieving complete victory and the surrender of Piedmont. Although it ultimately had failed, Maillebois' offensive - its concept being basically sound - became Bonaparte's blueprint for his own campaign.
However, on the one hand, Carnot handed to Bonaparte a painstaking set of operational instructions, which Bonaparte closely followed throughout the campaign. Carnot's main goal was the defeat of the Austrian army in Italy and forcing the Austrians into sueing for peace. The elimination of the Kingdom of Sardinia was a secondary aim. Concentrating on Piedmont as the foremost adversary might well have led to a repeat of the 1745 experience - the Austrians would have been allowed to freely regroup and strike back while the French would have been pinned down to sieging and subduing the many Piedmontese fortresses.
On the other hand, the Allies' operational deployment and posture in Southern Piedmont in 1796 was doubly revealing. The Austrians were perfectly poised to act as the hammer, and the Sardinians as the anvil, to nip a French offensive in the bud and squash Bonaparte like an egg. Which can only mean they had seen through the French plan. However, the DISTANCE between them made coordination almost impossible. Between Ceva (Sardinian operational center) and Acqui (Austrian operational center) there are 50 kilometers as the crow flies, and 70 of carriage road. It would have been difficult for either partner to come to the other partner's rescue in time had the French put their army between the two Allied ones. Which can only mean - as some historians and analysts have concluded - that they had no intention to seriously cooperate, and their real, entirely divergent intentions were, respectively, for the Austrians to protect (and if defeated, fall back to) Lombardy, and for the Sardinians to cover the Piedmontese hinterland and Turin. Bottom line, Bonaparte's task would prove substantially easier than Maillebois'.
The Austrians didn't really intend to back the Sardinians up. As long as the French wore down coming to grips with the dogged Sardinians and sieging Turin, all the better for Austria. On their part, the Sardinians - who had good reasons to mistrust the Austrians - were just waiting for a decent opportunity of signing an armistice with the French - to save the kingdom from starvation, Jacobin subversion, or from the Austrians themselves. After all, if they had REALLY wanted to... the Allies might have joined up nearer Turin, and Bonaparte would have been unable to avoid it.
In fact, although his driving energy and inspirational leadership surely contributed, the army reorganization was largely and successfully carried out by Schérer before Bonaparte's arrival. Sardinian intelligence reports, as mentioned by the Piedmontese general Ignazio Thaon de Revel, bear evidence to it.
Until early in March 1796, Piedmontese intelligence (the Sardinians had their operatives and informers behind the lines, just as the French with Saliceti were organizing their Jacobin clubs and sympathizers' networks in Piedmont) reported that the state of the French Army of Italy was "near collapse". The troops were lacking everything - from food to weapons to clothes to shoes - ; they were receiving no pay, and their money might be stolen by greedy and corrupt commissaries; many officers were inept and unfit for service. Demoralization was spreading among the troops, who sometimes came close to mutiny. The Allies were reveling in the disclosure. Then all of a sudden, things began to rapidly change. Schérer - with the collaboration of Bonaparte's chief commissar, the Corsican Saliceti - tapped the considerable riches of Genoa and funneled a flow of money into the army coffers, and supplies into the army depots. Inept or lazy officers were sacked and replaced by motivated and energetic elements, in particular a number of Italian-speaking officers from the County of Nice (like Masséna) or from Corsica who showed an ardent revolutionary faith. The logistical service was overhauled. Excellent officers and servicemen were assigned to the artillery. Meantime, Saliceti was riling up the Genoese Jacobins and setting up a fifth column of Piedmontese Jacobins, who would turn out to be useful later.
As for Bonaparte's plan, the young general had surely studied in depth the famous precedent - Marshal Maillebois' 1744-45 Piedmont campaign, during the War of the Austrian Succession. On that occasion, a near-run thing, the French had missed by a hairbreadth the opportunity to decisively separate the Sardinian Army from the Austrians, thereby achieving complete victory and the surrender of Piedmont. Although it ultimately had failed, Maillebois' offensive - its concept being basically sound - became Bonaparte's blueprint for his own campaign.
However, on the one hand, Carnot handed to Bonaparte a painstaking set of operational instructions, which Bonaparte closely followed throughout the campaign. Carnot's main goal was the defeat of the Austrian army in Italy and forcing the Austrians into sueing for peace. The elimination of the Kingdom of Sardinia was a secondary aim. Concentrating on Piedmont as the foremost adversary might well have led to a repeat of the 1745 experience - the Austrians would have been allowed to freely regroup and strike back while the French would have been pinned down to sieging and subduing the many Piedmontese fortresses.
On the other hand, the Allies' operational deployment and posture in Southern Piedmont in 1796 was doubly revealing. The Austrians were perfectly poised to act as the hammer, and the Sardinians as the anvil, to nip a French offensive in the bud and squash Bonaparte like an egg. Which can only mean they had seen through the French plan. However, the DISTANCE between them made coordination almost impossible. Between Ceva (Sardinian operational center) and Acqui (Austrian operational center) there are 50 kilometers as the crow flies, and 70 of carriage road. It would have been difficult for either partner to come to the other partner's rescue in time had the French put their army between the two Allied ones. Which can only mean - as some historians and analysts have concluded - that they had no intention to seriously cooperate, and their real, entirely divergent intentions were, respectively, for the Austrians to protect (and if defeated, fall back to) Lombardy, and for the Sardinians to cover the Piedmontese hinterland and Turin. Bottom line, Bonaparte's task would prove substantially easier than Maillebois'.
The Austrians didn't really intend to back the Sardinians up. As long as the French wore down coming to grips with the dogged Sardinians and sieging Turin, all the better for Austria. On their part, the Sardinians - who had good reasons to mistrust the Austrians - were just waiting for a decent opportunity of signing an armistice with the French - to save the kingdom from starvation, Jacobin subversion, or from the Austrians themselves. After all, if they had REALLY wanted to... the Allies might have joined up nearer Turin, and Bonaparte would have been unable to avoid it.
Allied Plans
Notwithstanding those unpromising political and operational bases, the ever-professional Colli proposed to the new Austrian commander-in-chief, Feldzeugmeister baron de Beaulieu two plans, one offensive and one defensive. Both rational and logical. The offensive plan entailed a breakthrough attack by 32,000 men on the French center, which would have cleared Piedmont and Liguria. The defensive plan was based on the hammer-and-anvil concept - let the French come on and shoot into the Carcare-Montezemolo corridor, then close in from both sides for the kill.
Beaulieu turned those plans down and came up with a different idea on how to employ his army. Schérer had sent a French vanguard of 4,000 men (Cervoni's brigade) to the Ligurian town of Voltri, threatening an advance on Genoa. Saliceti, who was busy with extracting as much money from the Genoese as he could, endorsed the decision and would have really moved the vanguard into Genoa to scare the Genoese, had not Bonaparte countermanded the order as soon as he took charge of the operations. Beaulieu's plan was simply to attack and cut off the French vanguard at Voltri (or Genoa). Once crushed the van, the British fleet under Nelson was to bombard the retreating French along the coastal road to Savona. Colli's plans were better, but Beaulieu's was not senseless, and with Schérer still in command of the French, it might well have succeeded. As for the Sardinians, there was no mention of them in Beaulieu's plan. As the senior partners in the alliance, and since the Sardinians were not required to take part in the operation, the Austrians had it their way, and Beaulieu's plan was given green light.
Of course, even if with Schérer in command of the French Beaulieu's plan had succeeded, the French would have been badly punched and might have had to evacuate Liguria, putting an end to the 1796 campaign, but nothing else would have happened - certainly not the end of the war. The operational success would have just prolonged the conflict at the expense of the exhausted Piedmont.
Allied Forces
In March 1796, the Austrian Army of Lombardy under Beaulieu numbered 40,000 troops. The Austrians also had 5,000 men fighting under Sardinian command as a part of the Sardinian army.
The King of Naples, a none-too-enthusiastic anti-French coalition member, had earmarked a relatively large force of 13 battalions and 40 guns for service alongside the Austrians. In fact, for a number of reasons only one regiment of cavalry, the Naples Regiment - later dubbed "White Devils" by the French - would be actually sent to Northern Italy, and in any case would not arrive in time to take part in that phase of the campaign.
The Kingdom of Sardinia, through a colossal financial effort, was still able to field a combat force of 50,000 men, many of whom, however, not much reliable militiamen.
The grand total of 95,000 Allied troops was to be split as follows:
Austrian Mantua garrison - 8,000
Piedmontese fortresses garrisons - 10,000
Sardinian Army of the Alps - 20,000
58,000 mobile troops with Colli and Beaulieu: 25,000 in the Austro-Sardinian Army in Piedmont and 33,200 in the Austrian Army of Lombardy. This was, theoretically, the force that would take on Bonaparte's 37,000 men. So Colli and Beaulieu had about twice as many men as Bonaparte. In reality, of Colli's 25,000 only 18,000 - and those, on paper - actually fought. As for Beaulieu, after the failed attack on Mount Negino, the disintegration of Argenteau's division at Montenotte and the defeat of Vukassovic's brigade at Dego on 15 April, his army practically disappeared from the battlefield. Bonaparte was always able to concentrate the bulk of his army against a weaker enemy.
The King of Naples, a none-too-enthusiastic anti-French coalition member, had earmarked a relatively large force of 13 battalions and 40 guns for service alongside the Austrians. In fact, for a number of reasons only one regiment of cavalry, the Naples Regiment - later dubbed "White Devils" by the French - would be actually sent to Northern Italy, and in any case would not arrive in time to take part in that phase of the campaign.
The Kingdom of Sardinia, through a colossal financial effort, was still able to field a combat force of 50,000 men, many of whom, however, not much reliable militiamen.
The grand total of 95,000 Allied troops was to be split as follows:
Austrian Mantua garrison - 8,000
Piedmontese fortresses garrisons - 10,000
Sardinian Army of the Alps - 20,000
58,000 mobile troops with Colli and Beaulieu: 25,000 in the Austro-Sardinian Army in Piedmont and 33,200 in the Austrian Army of Lombardy. This was, theoretically, the force that would take on Bonaparte's 37,000 men. So Colli and Beaulieu had about twice as many men as Bonaparte. In reality, of Colli's 25,000 only 18,000 - and those, on paper - actually fought. As for Beaulieu, after the failed attack on Mount Negino, the disintegration of Argenteau's division at Montenotte and the defeat of Vukassovic's brigade at Dego on 15 April, his army practically disappeared from the battlefield. Bonaparte was always able to concentrate the bulk of his army against a weaker enemy.
Sardinian Plans and the Vital Junction
The Austro-Sardinian Army of Piedmont was deployed for a fighting withdrawal, not for any offensive move. That tells a lot about the real intentions of the Turin Court and government. The army could sustain defensive fighting along five lines, southeast to northwest, anchored to the mountain or hilly terrain stretching between the Ligurian Appennines, the Alps (still impassable due to the snow) and the Po Valley plain. Beyond the fifth and last line, there lay the Piedmont plain with nary a major terrain feature to defensively cling to. And at the northwestern edge of the plain - the capital city, Turin. On his part, Beaulieu had set his retreat line to Milan. The respective retreat lines were as divergent as the stems of a V. An attacker hitting the junction point hard and winning an initial advantage would separate the two armies and would be free to take on either army at his choice.
The catastrophic disagreement between the two Allied armies leaps out when considering the vital junction of Millesimo, where Bonaparte would quite obviously attack, in the Allied forces deployment. Between Millesimo and Dego there only was the Provera Brigade, with fewer than 3,000 men. Of that force, 1,000 Croatians were in the Dego area, and 1,800 Imperials and Croatians at Millesimo. A weak line regiment and a battalion-sized light infantry unit, tenuously connected to the Sardinian left and the Austrian right, was all that stood in Bonaparte's way. Provera's brigade was one half of the Reserve Division - the "missing" half, a Sardinian brigade under the count of Mussano, was at Cherasco, miles to the rear. Why was only 50% of a division deployed to the junction? Either Beaulieu or Colli could easily have reinforced Provera with substantial forces, compelling Bonaparte to change his plans or even defeating them decisively. Why wasn't that done? Since neither Beaulieu nor Colli were stupid, the only viable explanation is that politics dictated that decision.