From the Jaws of Defeat: Corsaglia
"These Piedmontese devils, they're fighting well - so far they haven't given up one inch of ground"
General Stengel, 19 April 1796
After the defensive victory at the Pedaggera, Colli felt he would soon be outflanked by superior and more mobile French columns maneuvering to bypass the Pedaggera line to the north and south of it. Instead of holding the line, he exploited the short pause he had imposed on the French movements to fall back to the next defensive line, on the left bank of River Corsaglia - thus uncovering the pivotal town and fortress of Ceva. (Colli's decision has been criticized by some authors - with some reinforcements, could he have tried to withstand Bonaparte's next assault on the Pedaggera? We shall never know).
At night on 16 April, the Sardinian corps marched back to the stronger Corsaglia line, moderately harassed by the returning French. A pursuing column from Augereau's division was counterattacked and stopped by the Acqui Regiment.
The next night the Fiorella brigade occupied the town of Ceva, but the commander of the citadel, Count Tornaforte, was resolute not to give up.
The siege of Ceva
The citadel was held by 500 men and Count Tornaforte was a tough customer. He bluntly refused to surrender to Sérurier. The impetuous General Rusca, also of the party, launched an unprepared assault on some forward redoubts. The assault was easily beaten back with the loss of 2 French guns. The next day, a more substantial French battery with 6 guns was also taken out by the well led artillery of the fortress.
The furious Rusca intended to attack the citadel once more, but in reality the fortress was impregnable as long as the French did not have any siege artillery with them. Bonaparte, finally arrived on the stage, calmed Rusca down and ordered to wait for the siege artillery before taking any further action.
The furious Rusca intended to attack the citadel once more, but in reality the fortress was impregnable as long as the French did not have any siege artillery with them. Bonaparte, finally arrived on the stage, calmed Rusca down and ordered to wait for the siege artillery before taking any further action.
The Sardinian Corsaglia River Line
The corps of Baron Colli still had 12,000 infantrymen and 2,000 cavalrymen. Some units were in or near the town of Mondovì, some miles to the rear. The Tanaro - Corsaglia Rivers line, like the Pedaggera line, was meant - in the conditions Colli was finding himself in - as a delaying area to slow down the French advance, not to bring them to a standstill. Scholars studying the troops' placement have realized that it had been devised to allow an orderly retreat to the west, not to stand fast.
The core of the line was the fortified hill of la Bicocca di San Giacomo, where a bridge across the Corsaglia lay. The first line, right on the river bank, was made up by two grenadier battalions (8th and 9th, 800 men in all) led by a highly respected fighting man, Marquis Dichat. The bridge was garrisoned by the 2nd Swiss Grenadier company from the Christ Regiment, a light artillery battery with 2 guns and a heavy one with 6 guns. Behind them, on the hill, stood 2,000 men: two Guards battalions, one Savoy battalion, one Maurienne battalion, two grenadier battalions under Varax, a Savoyard officer of proven ability. The force was led by two excellent Piedmontese officers, brigadier Solaro della Chiusa (a veteran grenadier commander) and brigadier Civalieri.
Along the left sector of the line, Colli deployed 10 battalions with 3,400 infantry (of whom, 1,000 Austrians) and 1,500 dragoons, under brigadier Brempt. These troops should also keep the line of retreat of the whole corps safe and open.
On the center, 13 infantry battalions with 4,000 men and 300 cavalrymen of the Royal Piedm0nt Regiment.
On the right, 2,000 men including some Royal Grenadiers, Nice Chasseurs, Light Legion troops. The main stronghold was the Jesus Chapel of San Michele, on a hill, defended by Captain Radicati di Primeglio with Light Legion elements and an artillery battery. The 1st Grenadier battalion from the Chiusano regiment connected the stronghold to the village of San Michele.
All along the line, several very well placed artillery batteries added firepower to the defense. The line, however, had one serious flaw. The Bicocca stronghold formed sort of a bulge towards the French lines, and almost prompted a two-prongs attack from the north and the south to cut it off from the defensive line. Which was exactly what the French planned to do.
The line was garrisoned by 8,000 men in all.
The core of the line was the fortified hill of la Bicocca di San Giacomo, where a bridge across the Corsaglia lay. The first line, right on the river bank, was made up by two grenadier battalions (8th and 9th, 800 men in all) led by a highly respected fighting man, Marquis Dichat. The bridge was garrisoned by the 2nd Swiss Grenadier company from the Christ Regiment, a light artillery battery with 2 guns and a heavy one with 6 guns. Behind them, on the hill, stood 2,000 men: two Guards battalions, one Savoy battalion, one Maurienne battalion, two grenadier battalions under Varax, a Savoyard officer of proven ability. The force was led by two excellent Piedmontese officers, brigadier Solaro della Chiusa (a veteran grenadier commander) and brigadier Civalieri.
Along the left sector of the line, Colli deployed 10 battalions with 3,400 infantry (of whom, 1,000 Austrians) and 1,500 dragoons, under brigadier Brempt. These troops should also keep the line of retreat of the whole corps safe and open.
On the center, 13 infantry battalions with 4,000 men and 300 cavalrymen of the Royal Piedm0nt Regiment.
On the right, 2,000 men including some Royal Grenadiers, Nice Chasseurs, Light Legion troops. The main stronghold was the Jesus Chapel of San Michele, on a hill, defended by Captain Radicati di Primeglio with Light Legion elements and an artillery battery. The 1st Grenadier battalion from the Chiusano regiment connected the stronghold to the village of San Michele.
All along the line, several very well placed artillery batteries added firepower to the defense. The line, however, had one serious flaw. The Bicocca stronghold formed sort of a bulge towards the French lines, and almost prompted a two-prongs attack from the north and the south to cut it off from the defensive line. Which was exactly what the French planned to do.
The line was garrisoned by 8,000 men in all.
Bonaparte's Plan
Bonaparte devised to use two divisions (Augereau and Sérurier), each with 6,000 men, possibly reinforced by a third one (Masséna), to carry out a hammer-and-anvil plan. Sérurier would attack the southern sector of the line, Augereau the center. Once crossed the river and pushed the defenders back, Augereau would play the anvil, and Sérurier - wheeling to his right, to the north - the hammer. After the destruction of the bulk of the enemy corps, its left wing would have been easily disposed of. Sérurier had at his disposal a relatively important cavalry force of 14 squadrons under generals Beaumont and Stengel. Those should be used after Sérurier's breakthrough to cut the Sardinian line of retreat.
The plan looked sound but it would prove too hasty. Bonaparte was in a hurry to close the chapter of the war against Piedmont and a quickly mounted push by two divisions must suffice. Thus he did not listen to the wise advice provided by cavalry general Stengel. Stengel, unlike Bonaparte, had realized the Corsaglia line was a tough nut to crack, and suggested to add Masséna's firepower to Augereau from the word go and to reconnoitre the line more closely and carefully. Both recommendations were turned down. If Bonaparte had been more aware of the difficulty in overcoming a natural bulwark such as the Corsaglia line, probably the French would have been spared the most burning setback of the campaign.
In the night between 18 and 19 April, Bonaparte ordered to attack.
The plan looked sound but it would prove too hasty. Bonaparte was in a hurry to close the chapter of the war against Piedmont and a quickly mounted push by two divisions must suffice. Thus he did not listen to the wise advice provided by cavalry general Stengel. Stengel, unlike Bonaparte, had realized the Corsaglia line was a tough nut to crack, and suggested to add Masséna's firepower to Augereau from the word go and to reconnoitre the line more closely and carefully. Both recommendations were turned down. If Bonaparte had been more aware of the difficulty in overcoming a natural bulwark such as the Corsaglia line, probably the French would have been spared the most burning setback of the campaign.
In the night between 18 and 19 April, Bonaparte ordered to attack.
A Foolish Mistake
In the morning of 19 April, the French could appreciate the value of Stengel's advice. The Corsaglia river was in full spate, the cliff on the far bank looked impassable, and the Sardinian artillery opened up on them with a heavy and well directed fire. Augereau's attack stalled immediately and was called off.
Sérurier had divided his force into two columns, one under Guyeux heading for the southernmost sector of the line, and another under Fiorella a little to the north. Both halted on the right bank of the river, unable to cross it and exposed to the artillery fire which caused some losses. Guyeux caught by surprise elements of Bellegarde's Light Legion still on the eastern bank who were eating their food ration, but those could escape and reach the western bank as a Sardinian artillery battery was holding the French up.
Being unable to cross, Sérurier was seriously wondering about aborting the whole operation, when the French saw some Light Legion soldiers crossing the river to the western bank on a footbridge - actually a wooden aqueduct used as a footbridge. To their surprise, they also saw that the Sardinians did not destroy the bridge after the crossing, leaving it intact. Worse still, the area was left practically unguarded.
The Light Legion commander on the spot, Radicati, had made a foolish twofold mistake leaving the bridge in place and not garrisoning the crossing site. The French weren't snoozing and immediately exploited that mistake. Undetected, Guyeux's brigade crossed the river on the footbridge and swooped on Radicati, whose hasty counterattack was bounced. After brushing the Light Legion aside in disorder, the French used their famous speed to rush to the village of San Michele, overrunning an artillery battery in the process whereas Sérurier from the other bank was keeping the San Michele defenders (mostly Dichat Grenadiers) pinned down.
To counter Guyeux's attack on his right, Dichat had to withdraw the grenadiers blocking the main bridge over the Corsaglia, and Fiorella's brigade was now free to cross it. While Dichat was holding out inside the village with his grenadiers, the remainder of the troops in his sector began to melt away, and the sector crumbled. Fiorella's troops pursued the defenders streaming to the rear and in the meantime they cut Dichat off. A successful attempt by a Grenadier Guards company to retake the artillery battery ended up in disaster when an explosive charge meant to blow up as the French were occupying the site went off instead just amid the Guards, killing 14 and wounding 26 grenadiers and putting the company out of combat.
Surrounded from all sides, facing an enemy six times bigger, Dichat's 600 grenadiers and artillerymen at San Michele had to give up after a desperate house-to-house combat. They were all taken prisoner.
It was 1.30 pm, 19 April. If either Augereau or Masséna had been there to exploit the success, the French victory would have been crushing.
Instead, the victorious French - as had happened more than once to both sides throughout the war - stopped to loot the village (the French logistical chain was virtually non-existent at that stage, and the troops were hungry and in tatters), and cohesion disappeared as hordes of happy soldiers broke into the village houses, pillaging and getting drunk, and raping all women they could lay their hands on.
The Table Is Turned: The Swiss Counterattack
Undetected by the French, a fully operational Sardinian unit still was lying in the village in its hideaway - a house near the bridge. That was Captain Schreiber's Swiss Grenadier company from the Grisons Regiment, with 73 men. Seeing what was happening around him, the pugnacious Schreiber boldly decided to jump into the fray. His little, but high morale unit, sneaking up on the unsuspecting French, first seized a gun the French had left unguarded nearby and turned it against them, then it proceeded to reach the place where Dichat's grenadiers had been penned and set them free. On his part, Dichat had bribed the French sergeant who was keeping a close watch on him to release him. Back in command of his battalion, he rearmed it (their muskets had been stacked nearby) and, along with Schreiber, he attacked the stunned French scattered all over the village, who were scrambling for stopping the Sardinian onrush.
In the meantime, Colli - informed about the San Michele breakthrough - had showed up at the Bicocca area HQ and mounted a quick counterattack with the Grenadier Guards, Varax's Grenadiers and the 1st battalion, Savoy Regiment. The sight of the grenadiers' bayonets coming at them was too much for the shaken French. Sérurier's division simply collapsed. There was a stampede for the bridge and the safety of the opposite river bank - some French officers who were trying to stop the rot were shot at by their own fleeing soldiers. Quite a few French fell into the river and drowned.
One Savoy platoon led by Junior Lieutenant Duchany, flushed with victory, even crossed the river and overran two French guns before wading back across to avoid annihilation.
The battle was over, and it had not been a success for the French. Guyeux could hold a tiny bridgehead on the western bank, but aside from that, Sérurier's division was repulsed altogether. The French lost 600 (or, more likely if we add the drowned to the counting, 700) dead and wounded, 100 prisoners and one flag (46th Demi-Brigade). The Sardinians lost 150 dead and 200 wounded. Schreiber's company alone lost 51 men out of 73. Captain Schreiber was later awarded the Saint Maurice Cross for the dramatic action. A valiant French Royalist officer, Perrin d'Athenaz, who had been serving in the Sardinian Grenadiers since the outbreak of the war, was killed in action against his fellow countrymen.
"A Victory of sorts"
"Colli had thus gained a victory of sorts", as Clausewitz put it in his (posthumously published) work on the 1796 - 1797 Italian campaign. In fact, the dogged Piedmontese had won a clear-cut defensive victory. And in the night, in the wake of the defeat, the French were "rather shaken" - again, Clausewitz's words. He maintains that the after-the-battle discussion at Bonaparte's Lesegno HQ about the next moves to be taken must have been somewhat ridden by tenseness, as the setback had shown that the Sardinians' positions were firmly held and their will to fight still unbroken, and an attack by Beaulieu on the French right flank as they were engaging with Colli - a possibility Bonaparte could not rule out at all - might have brought about disaster. Anyway, Bonaparte could only keep on attacking, relying on his superior numbers and mobility - the troops were tired and to some degree discouraged, and a halt might well have proved a fatal error.