Back to the Wall: Fossano
On the evening of 21 April, Colli reached the town of Fossano, to the northwest of Mondovì. His goal was trying to delay the French advance by deploying the 10,000 men of his corps along the two rivers Stura and Tanaro. On the map, the line looked sound - the rivers were swollen in spring and difficult to cross. However, to effectively man the line Colli needed 30,000 troops... he only had a third of that number. Colli was aware that unless Beaulieu would march to link up with his small corps, Bonaparte could not be stopped.
Just as the fatigued Sardinians under Colli were forming the Fossano defensive line, in Turin the King summoned his closest collaborators and the Allied ambassadors for the last, dramatic Council of the Crown. Final decisions had to be taken as events were coming to a head. What to do next? Fighting on, or asking for an armistice?
The King's only military son, the Duke of Aosta, and - of course - the British and Austrian ambassadors pressed for fighting on. Most fortresses were intact and the French could not siege them as they lacked heavy equipment; the Sardinian army of the Alps was also in full fighting order, and most troops' morale was still high; the Allies could still count in southern Piedmont on a combined army of 45,000 men versus 35,000 French, and the much superior Allied cavalry would have made short work of its French counterpart over the flat Po River Valley. The unwarlike heir to the Crown also joined the war-to-the-finish party.
The armistice party spoke through the Cardinal Archbishop of Turin, Costa. Raising the indignation of the war-to-the-finish party, the Archbishop stated that keeping fighting was pure madness as the army had been defeated, the Kingdom was going bankrupt, people were suffering from hunger and faced starvation, despair was spreading and with it, revolts against the King - and political subversion, ie. Jacobins popping out to greet the French as liberators.
Brigadier-General Ignazio Thaon de Revel, one of the best Sardinian officers of the war and the skilled and charismatic commander of the Sardinian expeditionary corps at Toulon in 1793, was the last to speak. He sadly explained that whichever decision the King would take - war or peace - the old world all of them had been born in was dead, and would not come back. The little kingdom was sinking in the maelstrom of unleashed forces far above its level. He urged a quick choice between keeping fighting with the Austrians to the bitter end, or trying changing sides and fighting alongside the French to save at least something from the wreckage.
The King opted for sending out feelers to Bonaparte. Their mission: starting peace talks, and an armistice negotiation. At the same time, 6,000 troops were deployed around Turin in an anti-insurgency role, to quash hunger riots, attacks on aristocratic families or political insurrections.
Just as the fatigued Sardinians under Colli were forming the Fossano defensive line, in Turin the King summoned his closest collaborators and the Allied ambassadors for the last, dramatic Council of the Crown. Final decisions had to be taken as events were coming to a head. What to do next? Fighting on, or asking for an armistice?
The King's only military son, the Duke of Aosta, and - of course - the British and Austrian ambassadors pressed for fighting on. Most fortresses were intact and the French could not siege them as they lacked heavy equipment; the Sardinian army of the Alps was also in full fighting order, and most troops' morale was still high; the Allies could still count in southern Piedmont on a combined army of 45,000 men versus 35,000 French, and the much superior Allied cavalry would have made short work of its French counterpart over the flat Po River Valley. The unwarlike heir to the Crown also joined the war-to-the-finish party.
The armistice party spoke through the Cardinal Archbishop of Turin, Costa. Raising the indignation of the war-to-the-finish party, the Archbishop stated that keeping fighting was pure madness as the army had been defeated, the Kingdom was going bankrupt, people were suffering from hunger and faced starvation, despair was spreading and with it, revolts against the King - and political subversion, ie. Jacobins popping out to greet the French as liberators.
Brigadier-General Ignazio Thaon de Revel, one of the best Sardinian officers of the war and the skilled and charismatic commander of the Sardinian expeditionary corps at Toulon in 1793, was the last to speak. He sadly explained that whichever decision the King would take - war or peace - the old world all of them had been born in was dead, and would not come back. The little kingdom was sinking in the maelstrom of unleashed forces far above its level. He urged a quick choice between keeping fighting with the Austrians to the bitter end, or trying changing sides and fighting alongside the French to save at least something from the wreckage.
The King opted for sending out feelers to Bonaparte. Their mission: starting peace talks, and an armistice negotiation. At the same time, 6,000 troops were deployed around Turin in an anti-insurgency role, to quash hunger riots, attacks on aristocratic families or political insurrections.
The Stura River front
Knowing the Sardinians were about to give in, Bonaparte was on one hand in a hurry to shut down the Piedmont front and switch his entire firepower against the Austrians in Lombardy, but on the other hand he didn't want to suffer more useless casualties in serious clashes with the retreating Sardinians. Thus all French actions 22 to 26 April were but outflanking movements or probing advances or threatening demonstrations to scare the Turin Court (rather than Colli) and speed the armistice negotiations up. Being severely outnumbered and unable to hold too long a line, Colli was repeatedly forced to fold back portions of his line lest the French encircled them.
Just as the armistice talks were going on, Colli was anxiously awaiting news from Beaulieu - his last chance. Colli had several times accused him of leaving the Sardinians in the lurch - which the Austrians were technically doing, aside from Beaulieu's personal sentiments and opinions, and his friendship with Colli - and to fling the accusation back some way, he ordered a strong vanguard southwest, towards Colli's left flank. However, as the troops were marching Beaulieu was informed that the armistice talks (which the Austrians were fully privy to) were also touching upon a French takeover of several major Sardinian fortresses. In a pre-emptive strike attempt, Beaulieu tried to occupy two of the largest forts, Alessandria and Tortona - failing to do so, as the Sardinians were expecting that move of him. Beaulieu's treacherous attempt did hardly much to improve the very strained Austro-Sardinian relationship.
On 25 April, Sérurier's division - the most dangerous French spearhead - was in front of Fossano, across the Stura River. To oppose the impending French crossing, Colli had detached a tiny ad-hoc brigade under the German (in Sardinian service) Brigadier-General Theodor von Brempt with 2,000 infantrymen, and 400 light infantrymen and a few guns under Colli di Felizzano at the ferry site, under orders to defend it to the last man.
Unable to manage an assault crossing, Sérurier opened up with his guns on the Sardinian positions. As the artillery bombardment made no impression on the seasoned Brempt and the unflinching Felizzano, the French changed their target - now the town of Fossano, still with its civilian population inside. Sérurier added to the weight of his cannon balls the request for 3 civilian hostages and 7,000 bread rations for the troops, otherwise he would turn the town into rubble. The threat produced a result.