"I shall stamp my foot on the ground, and battalions will sprout out of it"
Victor Amadeus II, Duke of Savoy, King of Sardinia (1666 - 1732)
The Sardinian Army in the War of the Alps
When it went to war against revolutionary France, the Sardinian (Piedmontese) Army already had a long and glorious, although not always successful, history. The old army of the Duchy of Savoy had been destroyed through the first decades of the 16th century during the Italian Wars between France and Spain (and the Swiss). Resurrected after 1559 by the Iron Head Duke, Emmanuel Philibert, who organized a little but modern force of 12,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, the army had been led into continuous wars by the warrior Duke, Charles Emmanuel I - achieving some brilliant successes, but ultimately shattered by the confrontation with the two superpowers, France and Spain. Charles Emmanuel's grandson, Charles Emmanuel II, had refounded it again, and his son, Victor Amadeus II, had fought through the Augsburg League War and the War of the Spanish Succession, not only surviving those mammoth clashes but expanding his rule and turning it into a Kingdom (of Sardinia). Under his successor, Charles Emmanuel III, the Sardinian Army had proved one of the finest armies of the Wars of the Austrian and Polish Succession.
King Victor Amadeus III, like most of his forebears and successors, had a special interest in his army (he revered the figure and deeds of Frederick the Great, king of Prussia) and during his reign the victorious army of his father, Charles Emmanuel III, underwent many changes.
However, most of those changes were not necessarily for the better, despite the fact that the earliest set of military reforms was promoted and devised by an important military thinker such as Marquis Emmanuel da Sylva Taroica (1727-1796), an experienced Portuguese military man in Sardinian service. Da Sylva partly based his reform on the work of a Swedish general named Sinclair, whose Réglement pour l'Infanterie stood out for its novelty.
The military budget, amounting to 8,675,000 (Piedmontese) Liras in 1774, rose soon to 10,635,000 and higher and higher through the following years. The burden placed on the country's small economy was tremendous. The army force was established at 35,000 men in peacetime and 45,000 on war footing. Initially, the new model army structure included:
- four Departments (three infantry, one cavalry), or "army corps", each with
- two Wings (Ali), or "divisions", each with
- two Brigades, each with
- one regiment of four battalions plus two grenadier companies.
The cavalry regiment was established on four squadrons, each with two companies. The cavalry Department (staff: Captain General, Cavalry General, Lieutenant-General Inspector, three Major Generals, four Brigadiers) included:
- a Right Wing of Dragoons on two brigades, each with two regiments:
I (His Majesty's Own Dragoons, Queen's Own Dragoons)
II (Piedmont Dragoons, Chablais Dragoons)
- a Left Wing of Cavalry likewise on two brigades:
I (His Majesty's Own Light Cavalry, Savoy Cavalry)
II (Royal Piedmont Cavalry, Aosta Cavalry)
In 1786 a further change brought about the following organization (except cavalry):
- two Lines or Wings, each with
- two Departments, each with
- two Brigades, each with
- two regiments of two battalions.
Each battalion had two "centuries" of two companies each.
The attempt to create complex combat units above regiment level can be clearly seen, but while command levels were vastly expanded - and many more officers commissioned to those posts - that huge head lay on top of a flimsy body, since the number of the troops did not increase. On the average, a peacetime company numbered no more than 70 men. The top-heavy army was resting on a skeleton-thin troop complement.
Apart from acquiring a distinct "Prussian" look, the troops' combat proficiency decreased. The army organization was encumbered by too many command levels; obsession with formal training and fussiness over trifles was pursued to the prejudice of the preparation for real fighting; the officers' corps was almost entirely recruited among the aristocracy (with the exception of the artillery and the engineers), and too many highborn officers, unread and untrained, selected on the basis of class instead of merit, displayed courage under fire but inadequate leadership. Lastly, fifty years of uninterrupted peace softened the army, which would face the French Revolution juggernaut led by men whose last warfare experience dated back to the War of the Austrian Succession (1740 - 1748).
The military outlay was huge, all the harder to sustain for such a small State as the Kingdom of Sardinia. Before the war it amounted to 675,750 livres on a yearly basis. Each infantry regiment cost 587 livres a day; the regiment of the Guards cost 720 livres a day, and each cavalry regiment cost 558 livres a day.
Army Organization
On paper, Victor Amadeus' army was a powerful 50,000-strong (wartime footing, all included) force, possibly the most powerful among those of the lesser European States. Frederick the Great of Prussia is deemed to have said, "Were I the King of Sardinia, the Pope would be my own chaplain".
Through the second half of 18th century, the military men : civilians ratio within the Kingdom was approximately 1 : 75, on a level with that of the major European States except the most militarized ones (in Prussia, the ratio was an amazing 1 : 29). Prussia was known as a fully military State; Piedmont-Sardinia fell within the class of semi-military States, as French historians have put it. In 1786, the army's peacetime strength was 38,997 all ranks.
Between 1792 and 1796 the mobilization ratio (enlisted soldiers : total population) was proportionally the same as that of revolutionary France, which was immense due to Carnot's "Fatherland-in-Danger" mass conscription. That fact alone tells much about the depth and width of Piedmont's commitment to the war. It was "total war" for republican France, but not much less so for royalist Piedmont.
Prior to the war, as sketched above, the King had thoroughly and repeatedly changed and reformed the army structure. After the last changeover and on the eve of the war it looked as follows:
- Two Wings (Army Corps), each with
- Two Departments (Divisions), each with
Two Ordinance Infantry Brigades, each with two regiments
Two Provincial Infantry Brigades, each with two regiments
One Cavalry Brigade, on two regiments
One Encampment Battalion
One Artillery Battalion
Three Light Troops companies
One Logistical Division
One "Flying" Field Hospital.
In wartime this cumbersome organization was practically abandoned, and more flexible, ad-hoc formations were established. At the outbreak of the war the unwieldy 1774 and 1786 reforms were at once abandoned (which caused, in all likelihood, a degree of confusion and turmoil in the strained Army structure) and two traditional 18th century style Army Corps, commanding regiments and battalions without intermediate command levels, were formed:
Savoy Army Corps
Lieutenant General de Lazzary
1st Battalion, Guards Regt.
2nd Bn, Savoy Regt.
Monferrato, Aosta, La Marina, Sardinia, Bernois Regts.
1st and 3rd Bns, Encampment Legion
2nd Bn, Casale Regt.
Genevois, Suse, Maurienne Regts.
5th Company, Light Troops Legion
1st and 3rd Squadrons, Queen's Dragoons
His Majesty's Cavalry Regt
one artillery company
total: about 12,000 men (10,325 infantry, 1,200 horse), 16 guns
Nice Army Corps
Duke of Chablais, Lieutenant General de Courten
Major Generals: Abyberg, Bernezzo, O'Brennan
Brigadiers: Taffini, La Marmora
ADC: Renaud
sub-ADC: Cusano, Alciati, Caraglio
1st Battalion, Piedmont Regt.
2nd Bn, Saluzzo Regt.
Frigates Battalion (Marines)
Valaisan, Queen's, Lombardy Regts.
two companies, Encampment Legion
1st Squadron, Piedmont Dragoons
2nd and 3rd Squadrons, Aosta Cavalry
two artillery companies
total: about 9,000 men (7,900 infantry, 600 horse), 8 guns
The army deployment in the country, except Savoy and Nice, was as follows in 1792:
Province of Saluzzo (southwest)
1st Bn., Saluzzo Regt.
2 Grenadier coys.
1 Chasseurs coy.
Province of Cuneo/Coni (south)
Pinerolo Regt.
Grisons Regt.
1 coy., Lombardy Regt.
2nd Bn., Encampment Legion
150 militiamen
3rd arty battery, Encampment Legion (four 4-pdr light guns)
Province of Susa (west)
Asti Regt.
2nd Bn., Casale Regt.
3rd Bn., Valaisan Regt.
1 reserve coy. from Aosta Regt.
120 militiamen
one Grenadier Bn.
Province of Pinerolo (west, south of Turin)
1st Bn., Turin Regt.
Queen's Dragoons
50 militiamen
The Sardinian Army officially was a bilingual (French / Italian) organization. Orders might be imparted, and papers written, in either language, but French was by all means the primary language (Savoyards and most Nice County inhabitants spoke French; many Piedmontese understood it, and like in Russia, aristocrats spoke French all the time). Only as late as 1815 Italian became the Army's only official language.
Through the second half of 18th century, the military men : civilians ratio within the Kingdom was approximately 1 : 75, on a level with that of the major European States except the most militarized ones (in Prussia, the ratio was an amazing 1 : 29). Prussia was known as a fully military State; Piedmont-Sardinia fell within the class of semi-military States, as French historians have put it. In 1786, the army's peacetime strength was 38,997 all ranks.
Between 1792 and 1796 the mobilization ratio (enlisted soldiers : total population) was proportionally the same as that of revolutionary France, which was immense due to Carnot's "Fatherland-in-Danger" mass conscription. That fact alone tells much about the depth and width of Piedmont's commitment to the war. It was "total war" for republican France, but not much less so for royalist Piedmont.
Prior to the war, as sketched above, the King had thoroughly and repeatedly changed and reformed the army structure. After the last changeover and on the eve of the war it looked as follows:
- Two Wings (Army Corps), each with
- Two Departments (Divisions), each with
Two Ordinance Infantry Brigades, each with two regiments
Two Provincial Infantry Brigades, each with two regiments
One Cavalry Brigade, on two regiments
One Encampment Battalion
One Artillery Battalion
Three Light Troops companies
One Logistical Division
One "Flying" Field Hospital.
In wartime this cumbersome organization was practically abandoned, and more flexible, ad-hoc formations were established. At the outbreak of the war the unwieldy 1774 and 1786 reforms were at once abandoned (which caused, in all likelihood, a degree of confusion and turmoil in the strained Army structure) and two traditional 18th century style Army Corps, commanding regiments and battalions without intermediate command levels, were formed:
Savoy Army Corps
Lieutenant General de Lazzary
1st Battalion, Guards Regt.
2nd Bn, Savoy Regt.
Monferrato, Aosta, La Marina, Sardinia, Bernois Regts.
1st and 3rd Bns, Encampment Legion
2nd Bn, Casale Regt.
Genevois, Suse, Maurienne Regts.
5th Company, Light Troops Legion
1st and 3rd Squadrons, Queen's Dragoons
His Majesty's Cavalry Regt
one artillery company
total: about 12,000 men (10,325 infantry, 1,200 horse), 16 guns
Nice Army Corps
Duke of Chablais, Lieutenant General de Courten
Major Generals: Abyberg, Bernezzo, O'Brennan
Brigadiers: Taffini, La Marmora
ADC: Renaud
sub-ADC: Cusano, Alciati, Caraglio
1st Battalion, Piedmont Regt.
2nd Bn, Saluzzo Regt.
Frigates Battalion (Marines)
Valaisan, Queen's, Lombardy Regts.
two companies, Encampment Legion
1st Squadron, Piedmont Dragoons
2nd and 3rd Squadrons, Aosta Cavalry
two artillery companies
total: about 9,000 men (7,900 infantry, 600 horse), 8 guns
The army deployment in the country, except Savoy and Nice, was as follows in 1792:
Province of Saluzzo (southwest)
1st Bn., Saluzzo Regt.
2 Grenadier coys.
1 Chasseurs coy.
Province of Cuneo/Coni (south)
Pinerolo Regt.
Grisons Regt.
1 coy., Lombardy Regt.
2nd Bn., Encampment Legion
150 militiamen
3rd arty battery, Encampment Legion (four 4-pdr light guns)
Province of Susa (west)
Asti Regt.
2nd Bn., Casale Regt.
3rd Bn., Valaisan Regt.
1 reserve coy. from Aosta Regt.
120 militiamen
one Grenadier Bn.
Province of Pinerolo (west, south of Turin)
1st Bn., Turin Regt.
Queen's Dragoons
50 militiamen
The Sardinian Army officially was a bilingual (French / Italian) organization. Orders might be imparted, and papers written, in either language, but French was by all means the primary language (Savoyards and most Nice County inhabitants spoke French; many Piedmontese understood it, and like in Russia, aristocrats spoke French all the time). Only as late as 1815 Italian became the Army's only official language.
Supreme Headquarters
By the outbreak of the War of the Alps, the supreme Sardinian military leadership was consisting of:
Supreme Commander: His Majesty the King, Victor Amadeus III
Vice-Supreme Commander: the King's eldest son, the Prince of Piedmont
First Aide de Camp: Delfino di Trivié
Chief of Staff: Costa de Beauregard
Commander, First Army Wing: the King's son, the Duke of Aosta (rank: General)
Commander, Second Army Wing: the King's brother, the Duke of Chablais (rank: Captain General)
Cavalry Inspector: Asinari di Bernezzo
Commander of the Cavalry Remounts: Benso di Cavour
General Commander of the Artillery: Saluzzo di Monesiglio
General Commander of the Engineers: Nicolis di Robilant
General Commander of the Navy: Daviet de Foncenex
Minister of War: Fontana di Cravanzana
Grand Master of the Artillery: Gabaleone di Salmour
The Duke of Monferrato, son of the King, and Prince Charles Felix, uncle of the King, were also generals The King's youngest son, the Duke of Maurienne, was Lieutenant General.
107 infantry generals and 30 cavalry generals were on duty, many of whom just honorary offices.
16 Lieutenant Generals
4 Generals, Department First Wing Commanders
4 General Majors, Department Second Wing commanders
5 General Inspectors
16 Brigadier Colonels
4 Colonels Adjutant Generals
8 Lieutenant Colonels
8 Majors Sub-Adjutant Generals
It was an extremely top-heavy structure. The sheer number of handsomely paid high rank officials - many of whom holding only a honorary office and exempt from actual field service - entailed a terrible financial drain for the Kingdom, which was not among the wealthiest European States. Many individuals entitled to wear an officer uniform as a sign of honor but not commanding any troops and having no military training or experience regularly received State salaries corresponding to their military rank. While politically necessary to keep the country's elite loyal and bound to the reigning dynasty's policy, in financial and military terms it was a dramatic waste of valuable resources.
Before the French attack on Savoy and Nice, the army structure had been modified, creating two army corps for the defense of the respective provinces. The Savoy army corps was under Lieutenant-General de Lazzary; the Nice army corps was commanded by Lieutenant-General De Courten.
The Sardinian High Command was one of the two major, and ultimately crippling, problems afflicting the Army throughout the war (the other was the quality of part of the officers' corps). It was by no means up to the task facing it. Entirely composed of noblemen from the finest aristocratic families of the Kingdom, extremely loyal to the monarchy, after 44 years of peace it was absolutely unprepared to go to war against the armies of revolutionary France. Some of them were efficient and competent, but others were simply unfit, and most were old men, way past their prime. At best they had been young officers in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740 - 48) and had not led real troops into battle since. They just had no clue about modern warfare, and were totally outgeneraled by their French counterparts.
On the other hand, it's also worth recalling that - however exceptional that military man may have been - the great Russian general Suvorov was 69 when he set off with his army to Northern Italy to wrest it back from the French. Another Russian general of Suvorov's command, Rehbinder, was 70. The failure of those Piedmontese commanders can't be entirely blamed on their age. The system they belonged to was also flawed.
The overage Lazzary and De Courten (the latter was over 80 years old), appointed as commanders of the two front army corps in 1792, failed disastrously, panicking and fleeing, leaving their troops in the lurch and evacuating those parts of the Kingdom without any fighting.
The King was fond of his army, but he was no military leader, and although he was a good and straightforward person, his intelligence was limited. Of his three sons, only one was warlike (the Duke of Aosta), but a very bad general. The plight of the Sardinian supreme leadership was compounded by the presence of General De Vins (or Devins), the Austrian general imposed by the Emperor as the supreme Allied commander in the Alpine theater of war. The well-intentioned but passive and slack De Vins was another officer of the times of old, perfectly matching with the old Sardinian generals.
Giano (Janus) Gerbaix de Sonnaz d'Haberes, commander, Savoy Regiment (1792 - 1796). The aristocratic Savoyard family of the Gerbaix de Sonnaz faithfully served the Dukes of Savoy and Kings of Sardinia for several centuries, and would keep serving the Kings of Italy after the transfer of Savoy to France in 1860. The Savoy Regiment traditionally was one of the best outfits of the army. It fought with distinction through all Piedmontese Army campaigns.
The King's Government
As Crown Prince, Victor Amadeus had been the pupil of several excellent teachers, but his military mentor - Papacino d'Antoni - while a top theoretician and artillery expert of European stature, was a traditionalist deeply entrenched in outdated tactical and operational concepts. That did not help the Prince, whose intellectual gifts were limited, escape the influence of the most backward-looking elements of the Court. His father raised to the highest administration level men of middle class extraction, which angered the old aristocracy.
When Victor Amadeus ascended to the throne as a mature man of 47, after many years of champing the bit, he quickly removed all of the able and skilled administrators his father had appointed and replaced them with aristocratic mediocrities. First Secretary of State became Count Carron de Aigueblanche, an inept and servile nonentity, who served in that post until 1796. Secretary of War was the Marquis of Cravanzana, another second-rateness with no experience of military affairs. The willing but unprepared Perret de Hauteville was appointed as Secretary of Foreign Affairs. In short, the King's government was largely made up by incompetent or unfit personalities whose action (or lack thereof) compounded the Kingdom's wartime woes and problems.
When Victor Amadeus ascended to the throne as a mature man of 47, after many years of champing the bit, he quickly removed all of the able and skilled administrators his father had appointed and replaced them with aristocratic mediocrities. First Secretary of State became Count Carron de Aigueblanche, an inept and servile nonentity, who served in that post until 1796. Secretary of War was the Marquis of Cravanzana, another second-rateness with no experience of military affairs. The willing but unprepared Perret de Hauteville was appointed as Secretary of Foreign Affairs. In short, the King's government was largely made up by incompetent or unfit personalities whose action (or lack thereof) compounded the Kingdom's wartime woes and problems.
The Garetti di Ferrere Scandal
In 1778, Army Captain Luigi Garetti di Ferrere, from an ancient noble family of Asti, published a pamphlet that stirred up an outcry and cost its author dearly. As Enlightenment ideas were in full swing in neighboring France, progressive Garetti slashed the class-based enlistment of the officers' corps, largely composed of aristocrats regardless of their actual merits, and advocated the unrestricted opening of the officers' career to the members of the non-aristocratic social classes (in particular the bourgeoisie, of course). The Army could not accept such a bold challenge: Garetti was charged with high treason and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment. His fate shook the junior officers of the Army and alienated some of the most progressive-oriented from the royalty and the government. It probably made them more sympathetic towards the Jacobine ideals and the French Revolution.
In fact, while in the infantry and cavalry the percentage of highborn officers was similar to that of the French army - the cavalry in particular was an exclusive aristocratic club: 100% of the King's Dragoons' officers were Savoyard aristocrats - in the artillery 78% of the officers came from middle class families or from impoverished low rank aristocracy, whereas in the French artillery middle class officers were only 40% of the total.
In fact, while in the infantry and cavalry the percentage of highborn officers was similar to that of the French army - the cavalry in particular was an exclusive aristocratic club: 100% of the King's Dragoons' officers were Savoyard aristocrats - in the artillery 78% of the officers came from middle class families or from impoverished low rank aristocracy, whereas in the French artillery middle class officers were only 40% of the total.
Sardinian Manpower in the War of the Alps
In 1792, the Kingdom's population was amounting to two million and a half individuals - about as many as the Americans of the thirteen colonies in 1776. In 1780, Washington was leading an army of 45,000 - slightly smaller than the maximum establishment of the ordinance and provincial Sardinian troops on war footing in 1792. The Kingdom, however, included continental States (Piedmont, Savoy, Nice and Aosta Valley, with a population of 2,000,000) and the island of Sardinia, with a population of 500,000 who were exempt from military service outside the island, except of course the volunteers. Several officers from Sardinia's aristocracy and gentry served in the War of the Alps, but islanders were not many among the troops. So the two million "continentals" bore by far the heaviest weight of the war also in terms of manpower supplied to the Army.
The Sardinian Army at its mobilization peak may have fielded over 110,000 men, a titanic effort for a second- or third-tier European State. Mobile troops - thus ruling out static garrisons and territorial militia - peaked in 1794 with 45,000 - 50,000 men, including the Nice County militia, the best militia force of the Kingdom. However, in 1795 for instance, line troops only were 30,000, that is two thirds of the theoretical Ordinance and Provincial strength on wartime footing. Over time, recruiting and training skilled men for first line duty became increasingly difficult. Losses throughout the war amounted to approximately 40,000 KIA, WIA, sick, and disabled. Militia losses are difficult to reckon.
The one soldier : 25 inhabitants ratio applies also to France: out of her 25 million inhabitants, revolutionary France mobilized one million troops. Desertion rate varied over time, and in some periods and areas deserters were numerous - with regiments shrinking to battalion size. 1794 may have been a particularly bad year, due to the near-collapse of the southern front and the loss of the Alpine passes, which caused a marked drop in morale country-wide. Pressed by the desperate need of troops, the King issued a deserters' pardon twice, in October 1794 and December 1795. Pardoned deserters could rejoin their units escaping any penalties. Many did.
The Sardinian Army at its mobilization peak may have fielded over 110,000 men, a titanic effort for a second- or third-tier European State. Mobile troops - thus ruling out static garrisons and territorial militia - peaked in 1794 with 45,000 - 50,000 men, including the Nice County militia, the best militia force of the Kingdom. However, in 1795 for instance, line troops only were 30,000, that is two thirds of the theoretical Ordinance and Provincial strength on wartime footing. Over time, recruiting and training skilled men for first line duty became increasingly difficult. Losses throughout the war amounted to approximately 40,000 KIA, WIA, sick, and disabled. Militia losses are difficult to reckon.
The one soldier : 25 inhabitants ratio applies also to France: out of her 25 million inhabitants, revolutionary France mobilized one million troops. Desertion rate varied over time, and in some periods and areas deserters were numerous - with regiments shrinking to battalion size. 1794 may have been a particularly bad year, due to the near-collapse of the southern front and the loss of the Alpine passes, which caused a marked drop in morale country-wide. Pressed by the desperate need of troops, the King issued a deserters' pardon twice, in October 1794 and December 1795. Pardoned deserters could rejoin their units escaping any penalties. Many did.
For King and Country: The Officers' Corps
Infantry Regiment Officers ranks:
Colonel
2nd Colonel (Vice-Colonel)
Lieutenant-Colonel
Regiment Major (1st Battalion) (commanding a century, an ad hoc two-companies formation)
Battalion Major (2nd Battalion) (the same as Regiment Major)
Grenadier Captain
Cacciatori (Light Infantry) Captain
Captain
Captain-Lieutenant (c0mmanding the "Colonel Company", that is the company theoretically led by the Colonel)
Grenadier Lieutenant
Cacciatori Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Grenadier Junior Lieutenant
Cacciatori Junior Lieutenant
Junior Lieutenant
Ensign
Quartermaster
Adjutant-Major
Cavalry Regiment ranks:
Colonel
2nd Colonel
Adjutant Major
Lieutenant-Colonel
Regiment Major
Captain
Captain-Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Colonel (squadron) Ensign
Ensign
Ensign at half pay
Standard-bearer
Marshal de logis
Esquire Chief
Quartermaster
As in all Old Regime armies, the colonel was the "owner" of the regiment, but usually he was not the real leader. As a rule, the regiment was under the actual command of the 2nd Colonel.
Within each regiment, officers advanced through the ranks by length of service. There were no age limits. Most Ordinance officers in peacetime were noblemen (in the Ordinance infantry and the cavalry), and rising through the ranks, or being shifted to a more prestigious regiment, by royal favoritism was a rather common practice. In peacetime, careers were very slow, and transfers between regiments rare. Excellent officers who in the revolutionary French army would quickly rise to colonel or general rank in their 20s or 30s were still junior officers or colonels at age 40 in the Sardinian Army. The system was not meant to reward individual skills and capabilities over social standing and Court connections; it was not based on meritocracy. In wartime, things changed as individual merit tended to be more promptly acknowledged and rewarded, and careers grew faster, but not so fast as in the French Army. Also, in wartime many officers started being quickly shifted between regiments and in many cases an officer's posting to a regiment might be very short, even just up to ten days. Clearly under such circumstances the officer was unable to get acquainted with his staff and his men, and the combat proficiency of the unit suffered badly.
Besides, regiments and battalions were dramatically understaffed. In 1774, there were only 2,000 junior officers on active duty (compare this to the huge number of partly useless generals at the top...).
That said, the ratio of aristocratic officers to officers coming from middle or lower classes is not easy to fix, but for a certainty, the number of non-aristocratic officers rose throughout the reign of Victor Amadeus III, not only in the Provincial but also in the Ordinance regiments. In the reign of his father, Charles Emmanuel III, the vast majority of Ordinance infantry officers had been noblemen. Under his son, more and more bourgeois were allowed into the officer corps, although aristocrats always were the majority. In the battle of the Authion, 68 Sardinian officers were killed, wounded, captured or missing. 44 were of high descent, 24 from the middle class (an approximate 2 : 1 ratio). Of the 44 noblemen, 13 were titled gentlemen, and 31 cadets (chevaliers, cavalieri, in French and Italian).
The vast majority of the regular and Provincial officers were absolutely loyal to the King, willing to serve and show courage under fire, but many of them were professionally inadequate for a war against the new French army, lacking in initiative and passively awaiting orders from above. A number of them performed heroically and with good results "for King and country" in a kind of war they had never been seriously trained for, but the new, flexible, proactive and aggressive French leadership often stood a notch above.
Colonel
2nd Colonel (Vice-Colonel)
Lieutenant-Colonel
Regiment Major (1st Battalion) (commanding a century, an ad hoc two-companies formation)
Battalion Major (2nd Battalion) (the same as Regiment Major)
Grenadier Captain
Cacciatori (Light Infantry) Captain
Captain
Captain-Lieutenant (c0mmanding the "Colonel Company", that is the company theoretically led by the Colonel)
Grenadier Lieutenant
Cacciatori Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Grenadier Junior Lieutenant
Cacciatori Junior Lieutenant
Junior Lieutenant
Ensign
Quartermaster
Adjutant-Major
Cavalry Regiment ranks:
Colonel
2nd Colonel
Adjutant Major
Lieutenant-Colonel
Regiment Major
Captain
Captain-Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Colonel (squadron) Ensign
Ensign
Ensign at half pay
Standard-bearer
Marshal de logis
Esquire Chief
Quartermaster
As in all Old Regime armies, the colonel was the "owner" of the regiment, but usually he was not the real leader. As a rule, the regiment was under the actual command of the 2nd Colonel.
Within each regiment, officers advanced through the ranks by length of service. There were no age limits. Most Ordinance officers in peacetime were noblemen (in the Ordinance infantry and the cavalry), and rising through the ranks, or being shifted to a more prestigious regiment, by royal favoritism was a rather common practice. In peacetime, careers were very slow, and transfers between regiments rare. Excellent officers who in the revolutionary French army would quickly rise to colonel or general rank in their 20s or 30s were still junior officers or colonels at age 40 in the Sardinian Army. The system was not meant to reward individual skills and capabilities over social standing and Court connections; it was not based on meritocracy. In wartime, things changed as individual merit tended to be more promptly acknowledged and rewarded, and careers grew faster, but not so fast as in the French Army. Also, in wartime many officers started being quickly shifted between regiments and in many cases an officer's posting to a regiment might be very short, even just up to ten days. Clearly under such circumstances the officer was unable to get acquainted with his staff and his men, and the combat proficiency of the unit suffered badly.
Besides, regiments and battalions were dramatically understaffed. In 1774, there were only 2,000 junior officers on active duty (compare this to the huge number of partly useless generals at the top...).
That said, the ratio of aristocratic officers to officers coming from middle or lower classes is not easy to fix, but for a certainty, the number of non-aristocratic officers rose throughout the reign of Victor Amadeus III, not only in the Provincial but also in the Ordinance regiments. In the reign of his father, Charles Emmanuel III, the vast majority of Ordinance infantry officers had been noblemen. Under his son, more and more bourgeois were allowed into the officer corps, although aristocrats always were the majority. In the battle of the Authion, 68 Sardinian officers were killed, wounded, captured or missing. 44 were of high descent, 24 from the middle class (an approximate 2 : 1 ratio). Of the 44 noblemen, 13 were titled gentlemen, and 31 cadets (chevaliers, cavalieri, in French and Italian).
The vast majority of the regular and Provincial officers were absolutely loyal to the King, willing to serve and show courage under fire, but many of them were professionally inadequate for a war against the new French army, lacking in initiative and passively awaiting orders from above. A number of them performed heroically and with good results "for King and country" in a kind of war they had never been seriously trained for, but the new, flexible, proactive and aggressive French leadership often stood a notch above.
A command chain peculiarity...
Fully aware of the professional unfitness of many junior officers - many of whom entered the Army only by virtue of their high descent, without any serious and thorough military training - the Army devised and implemented a particular command & control system. The company sergeant reported not only to his superior up the command chain, but also, and direct, to the company commander. As the regiment commander was also the commander, and owner, of 1st Company, 1st Battalion, it happened that a 1/1 sergeant reported direct to the regiment commander, skipping all other ranks above his. In all other cases, lieutenants were "jumped over" to report to the captain. The system added to the complexity of the command chain, but it ensured a stiffer control over junior officers by enabling NCOs to report to senior officers about their lieutenants' behavior and proficiency.
On the abysmal ignorance of many officers, a notable personality, the Piedmontese Marquis de Brézé (Chevalier Asinari di Bernezzo), a cavalry officer who also served in the Prussian Army, wrote a book in which he slashed the very poor education and the frightening ignorance of military history affecting so many aristocratic officers of his time.
On the abysmal ignorance of many officers, a notable personality, the Piedmontese Marquis de Brézé (Chevalier Asinari di Bernezzo), a cavalry officer who also served in the Prussian Army, wrote a book in which he slashed the very poor education and the frightening ignorance of military history affecting so many aristocratic officers of his time.
Infantry
During the War of the Alps, the army fielded approximately 41 infantry regiments and a host of minor (battalion- and company-sized) infantry units. The make-up of the infantry force - the backbone and the bulk of the Sardinian Army - changed over time. At the outset of the war the line infantry comprised:
10 National Ordinance Regiments (Guards, Monferrato, Piedmont, Saluzzo, Aosta, La Marina [Nice County], Regina, Lombardy, Savoy, Sardinia)
9 Foreign Ordinance Regiments (Royal Allemand, Chablais, Valaisan, Bernois, Grison, Glaris, Peyer-im-Hoff [Schaffhausen], Bockmann [Sankt Gallen], Zimmermann [Luzern])
15 Provincial Regiments (Genevois, Maurienne, Ivrea, Vercelli, Novara, Susa, Turin, Pinerolo, Casale, Asti, Tortona, Acqui, Mondovì, Nice, Oneglia)
Total: 34 regiments.
Later into the war the army basically lined up:
13 Ordinance Regiments
Light Troops Legion (Legione Truppe Leggiere), on two regiments (counted as Ordinance)
6 Swiss (mercenary) Regiments
2 Foreign Regiments (Royal Allemand, a German regiment owned by Major General Brempt; and Chablais)
Encampment Legion, established in 1774: elite Provincial troops for refitting roads along the marching army's routes and making/protecting army encampments. Later during the war this crack unit generated one Royal Sapper/Pioneer (Guastatori) Grenadiers Regiment.
16 Provincial Regiments
One Franc Corps
One Disabled Soldiers (Invalidi) Battalion
One Garrison Battalion (burnt out / disabled soldiers shifted to static duties)
Many smaller / independent units
Regimental commanders in 1792
Ordinance
Guards - Marquis Cordon [honorary: the King]
Monferrato - Colonel Avogadro [Duke of Monferrato]
Piedmont - Colonel La Marmora [Prince of Piedmont]
Saluzzo - Colonel Ferraris, Lieutenant General
Aosta - Colonel Count Solaro di Villanova, Major General [Duke of Aosta]
La Marina - Major General De Prali [Prince Charles of Carignan]
Regina - Colonel Renaud
Lombardy - Major General Oberman
Savoy - Major General Count de Sonnaz
Sardinia - Colonel Pes di Villamarina
Royal Allemand - Colonel Baron de Brempt, Lieutenant Colonel Prince de Salm-Salm
Chablais - Colonel de Fontagneux [Duke of Chablais]
Valaisan - Chevalier de Courten, owner
Bernois - De Rockmondet, owner
Grison - Baron Christ, owner
[Glaron) - Colonel Schmidt
(Schaffhausen) - Colonel Peyer-im-Hof
(Sankt Gallen) - Colonel Bockmann
(Luzern) - Colonel Zimmermann
Provincial
Genevois - Col. De Chevilles [Duke of Genevois]
Maurienne - [Count of Maurienne]
Ivrea - Colonel Count Bertone di Sambuy, Lieutenant General
Vercelli - Colonel Louis de Osasco
Novara - Chevalier de Signoris
Susa - Marquis of Saliceto
Turin - Count of Morozzo
Pinerolo - Count Radicati
Casale - Major General Baron Chino
Asti - Marquis Molli di Meran, aide-de-camp of the King
Tortona - Major General Chevalier Capra
Acqui - Major General Count Costa di Montafia
Mondovì - Chevalier Priocca di Damiano
Nice - Baron Audifredi
Oneglia- Colonel Brigadier Count Vitali
Cavalry
Royal Piedmont - Chevalier Cinzano [Prince of Piedmont]
Savoy - Colonel Saluzzo di Verzuolo
Aosta - Chevalier Alfieri di Sostegno [Duke of Aosta]
King's - Baron de Latour [the King]
Dragoons
King's - Chevalier Bonport Megeve [the King]
Piedmont - Count de Saint Gilles [Prince of Piedmont]
Queen's - Colonel des Hayes
Chablais - Chevalier Fresia [Duke of Chablais]
Sardinia - Chevalier de Saint Amour
Artillery
Grand Master - General Count de Salmour; Colonel - Count Saluzzo di Monesiglio
Engineers - Colonel Brigadier Chevalier de Robilant, Lieutenant General
Frigate Battalion [Marines] - Chevalier Ricca de Chateauvieux
Garrison Regiment - Marquis of Salice
Light Legion - General Count de Lazzary
Royal Grenadiers - Count de Bellegarde
Franc Companies - Captain Count Radicati di Primeglio
Chasseurs of Canale - Count Malabaila of Canale
Franc Chasseurs - Marquis del Carretto di Camerano
First Battalion - Colonel Chevillard
Second Battalion - Chevalier Garretti di Ferrere
Weapons
The basic infantry weapons were the excellent Mod. 1752 smoothbore, possibly the best musket in Europe when it was issued to the troops, and an updated version thereof, Mod. 1782. 95,000 Mod. 1752 muskets were produced over time. It was at least as good a musket as the British Brown Bess, and the French admired it, too. Instead, Mod. 1782 did not prove tremendously successful. It can be rated as "fairly good", at best. It was comparable to the Austrian Mod. 84 and the Prussian Mod. 82, but it was inferior to the famous French musket Mod. 1777, the British mod. 1792 and the Austrian mod. 1798. As would happen again in 1859, the Sardinian infantry was thus equipped with inferior weapons. Piedmontese weapons factories could not turn out enough muskets for equipping 50,000 men, let alone the militia; therefore the army had to buy stocks of parts or assembled muskets from other countries.
Limited output capability - as in all lesser European powers - had always been a major shortcoming of the Piedmontese war machine, and only rarely throughout its long history the Army received satisfactory amounts of weapons from State factories. In 1792 the State musket factory, the large Valdocco Forge and plant founded in 1715 by the skilled but troublesome engineer Biagio Sclaverano, could still turn out only 3 - 4,000 musket barrels a year, as seventy years earlier. Industrial methods also were outdated, and production suffered badly from contractors' malversations and frauds and lack of raw materials and even water in wartime. The other parts of the weapons were produced in the Turin Arsenal or by private contractors.
In 1790 the Army had 88,600 infantry muskets, 1,700 cavalry muskets, 5,000 dragoons and light troops muskets and over 13,000 pistols.
In 1792, on the eve of the war, all Ordinance regiments except two and the Light Troops Legion had new Mod. 1782 muskets (981 each regiment, more for the foreign ones). Lombardy and Chablais Regiments still had Mod. 1752 weapons, and the Legion had been issued with 1,336 dragoons muskets Mod. 1759. The Provincial infantry used Mod. 1752 muskets (618 each regiment). The militia had 17,522 muskets, all old fashioned and of sundry types. In the Turin Arsenal, there was a supply stock of about 45,000 muskets. That was considered to be altogether insufficient: wartime buildup plans envisioned 20,000 more line infantry muskets and 30-35,000 more of the older types for the militia.
Through a powerful and prolonged resupplying effort - increasing home production somehow, buying important stocks of weapons from private contractors in the Republic of Venice, Austria and Germany, and handing down to the militia weapons still in good working order dropped by line troops receiving newer models - the Army kept the troops acceptably well armed and equipped throughout the war. In 1798, when the King of Sardinia was finally overthrown by the French, the Turin Arsenal was still housing 87,415 muskets, of which about 48,000 brand new.
To enhance infantry firepower, in Victor Amadeus III's army even the officers (traditionally bearing the sword, and often a pistol, and a short pike on parades, but never muskets) were equipped with a musket, the fine but delicate Mod. 1774 for officers. However, during the war it became clear that turning the officers into riflemen had not been a good idea. They could not effectively lead their troops as they were loading and firing their musket. In June 1793, an order issued by the Duke of Chablais's HQ recommended to all officers not to fire their muskets and lead instead their units into combat with the sword only.
Also, 4-pounder regimental guns were issued to the infantry regiments. Those guns, designed by the Grand Master of the Artillery, Casimiro Gabaleone di Salmour, boasted the amazing (theoretical) rate of fire of 10 rounds per minute as they were supposed to use a rapid reloading system. In reality, on the battlefield the system did not work like clockwork and the guns had to be loaded the old, much slower way. Some authors explain this stress on infantry firepower by c0nnecting it to the pre-war Sardinian strategic and operational plans.
Another infantry weapon was the sabro (sabre, sword). It was a rather impressive piece of cold steel, a sabre 62 centimeters long, deadly in close combat if in the hand of a skilled soldier. However, it was heavy and unwieldy to carry and use in the rugged Alps, and many a soldier tended to get rid of it, especially in the late war period.
Rifled muskets were only issued to one privately recruited and equipped light infantry company, the Canale Light Infantry, levied by a local lord for his King's war. They proved so disappointing that the company discarded them shortly after. During the War of Austrian Succession (1740 - 1748), the Sardinian light infantry had been largely equipped with rifles, but tactical misuse and mistakes led to disastrous results, with entire light infantry units wiped out. Sardinian light infantry, outclassed by its French and especially Spanish counterparts, found its rifles too slow to reload in actual combat situations, and their superior range and accuracy were of little use because of the bad, inadequate tactical employment. As a result, rifles were eventually dismissed and the light infantry fought throughout the War of the Alps with smoothbore muskets, although the thorough training made them much better marksmen than the line infantry. Piedmontese rifles were in any case qualitatively poor - the army didn't have anything like the excellent Austrian Mod. 1759 rifle, used to great effect by the Austrian Jaegers. However, during the War of Alps the Austrian light infantry in Italy did not include Jaeger units, but only Frei-Corps, and those had no rifles. The French also made a very sparing use of rifles, therefore the lack of rifles in the Sardinian Army was not a crippling shortcoming.
Troops
Line infantry regiments could be Ordinance or Provincial.
Provincial regiments were made up of trained militia, but the men were considered as regular soldiers with their own uniforms, rather than militiamen, and employed as line infantry on a regular basis.
Each community, centered around a hamlet, village or small or large town, must provide a given number of able-bodied men. For instance, in the area in Piedmont known as Canavese, 20 small communities owed a total of 77 men to the provincial regiment. Oddly, larger communities might be requested to provide just a few men, even fewer than the contingent of little villages: the town of Aosta only owed 4 men. The reason why, probably, was that peasants were preferably recruited, whereas townspeople with their urban jobs were considered as more vital for the economy and less spendable in war.
After receiving infantry training, provincial troops were sent back home but they were liable to duty for 20 years. For one month every year they must rejoin their regiment and exercise. Three times a year they were reviewed by an Administrative Corps officer. There were no press gangs roaming the country: recruitment committees formed by government officials and local community representatives did their best to ensure an equitable deal, although, as everywhere in Europe, local communities tried to get rid of the least integrated elements in the population (rebellious types, mavericks, bums, petty criminals, etc.) by selecting them for enlistment.
In peacetime, the provincial company numbered 60 men, to increase to 72 on wartime footing. The provincial battalion included six companies: Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, First Captain, Second Captain, Grenadier, Volunteers. The following is the structure of the Colonel Company of a battalion of the Ivrea Provincial Regiment. The names are those of the actual commissioned officers:
-1 Colonel (Bertone di Sambuy)
-1 Captain Lieutenant (count Palma)
-1 Lieutenant (Pastoris)
-1 Junior Lieutenant (count of Mombello, then Vassallo, then chevalier [cadet] di San Martino)
-1 trabant [NCO attached to the company staff]
-3 quartermasters
-1 company sergeant
-1 squad sergeant
-1 drummer
-1 fifer
-1 squad corporal
-3 first "camerata" corporals [camerata - from the French "chambree", in Piedmontese language "ciambrea" - was the smallest administrative unit of the Army]
-3 second camerata corporals
-3 lance corporals (appointees)
-60 privates, plus 12 in wartime.
Note that in this company, four officers were noblemen and two middle class - the 2 : 1 ratio pattern.
The six companies of the battalion numbered a total of 528 men in peacetime and 588 in wartime (on paper). So a battalion had a theoretical strength of about 600 men. In reality, battalions would seldom achieve that strength level, especially towards the end of the war.
Men from well-off families could avoid recruitment by buying it out, as in all European States of the time. Therefore, military duty mainly fell on lower urban classes and the peasantry.
Ordinance (regular, professional) infantry, the fighting core of the army, was instead composed of volunteers serving for 6 - 8 years. Each Ordinance regiment usually had two active battalions; Provincial regiments only had one active battalion in peacetime. Each battalion had five companies, one of grenadiers and four of regular infantry, named after their respective commanders. The regiment should also have one light infantry company (trained to fight in loose order in front of the ranged regimental line, in the classic field battle that never occurred against the French) and a reserve (depot) company. The reserve company, in which personnel temporarily unfit for line duty (sick, wounded and convalescing, back from enemy captivity) served, carried out tasks such as recruitment, training and local policing.
The regiment thus numbered 10 line companies (two of which Grenadier), one Chasseurs company, and the reserve company. One company was owned and theoretically led by the regiment commander; one by the lieutenant colonel; and two by the majors. In fact, in battle they were actually led by the lieutenant-captains, as higher rank officers should direct and coordinate the action at battalion level or tactical groups of companies rather than the single companies they owned.
In some regiments, the owner and theoretical commander was a member of the Royalty (eg. the King was the commander of the Guards). In that case, the actual commander was the 2nd Colonel, and the owner's company was called Chief Company, under the command of a captain.
Company staff varied over the years. In 1775, a company organization chart included 68 soldiers and 24 NCOs. In 1782, the total was brought down to 85. In 1784, it was raised back to 92.
Battalion Staff relied on:
-3 Captains
-1 Adjutant Captain
-2 Adjutant Lieutenants
-1 First Ensign
-3 Ensigns
-1 chaplain
-1 surgeon
-3 Staff/Master Sergeants
-3 Corporals
-1 regimental Provost
-1 major drummer
-3 gunsmiths
-4 bowmen [military policemen]
-9 trabanti
-2 quartermasters
Regiment Staff:
-1 Deputy Commanding Colonel
-2 Lieutenant Colonels
-1 Brigade Major [taking charge of the regiment on the battlefield during action]
-2 Majors
-1 Quartermaster Captain [administrative office]
The theoretical strength of the Ordinance regiment was 1,249 men. Regiments were almost invariably never employed as such, with the two battalions fighting together as a single force: they were just administrative bodies. The real fighting unit was the battalion. In combat, the battalion could be split into "centuries", or more flexible tactical units composed of two companies (called "divisions" in other armies). Centuries were typically used as reinforcements to defensive positions or to launch counterattacks. They were placed under the command of, in the 1st battalion, the major or a senior captain, and in the 2nd battalion, a lieutenant colonel or a major.
The regiments recruited troops substantially on a territorial basis. For instance, men from Savoy, Val d'Aosta (Vallée d'Aoste) and Alpine districts were allowed into the Savoy Regiment; Sardinians in the Sardinia Regiment; men from anywhere in the Kingdom barring Savoy and Val d'Aosta in the other regiments. Two regiments, along with the German Royal Allemand, were exceptions: the Oneglia Regiment accepted also Germans, Swiss, Italians, Corsicans and Spaniards; and anybody from any nation could serve in the Chablais Regiment. Many French expats served in the Chablais.
Elite Troops
Each line regiment had one light infantry (Chasseurs, Cacciatori = "Hunters") company (as in the pre-revolutionary French Army, where since 1766 each line regiment had one light infantry company as well). Many companies were taken away from their respective regiments and merged to form two light infantry battalions. These were elite outfits, carefully trained and instructed to fight in loose order over any type of terrain. During the war their training partly changed to emphasize commando capabilities. They specialized in surprise attacks and fast and furious shock actions, also at night; however, quite a few Ranger-style attacks failed because the planning was complicated, too many units were involved and coordination proved impervious (aside from bad luck, planning and leadership mistakes, they didn't have radios...).
Like the Grenadiers, light infantry often received the best, ablest-bodied and most skilled men and officers available. Colli di Felizzano, one of the best Piedmontese officers of the war, was the commander of the crack 2nd Cacciatori Battalion.
Likewise, the regiments' grenadier companies merged to form 5 Grenadier Regiments with 12 battalions, the Sardinian Army shock troops: the cream of the crop. Some authors argue that stripping the line regiments of their grenadiers, the regiment's spearhead, affected the efficiency of the regiments during the war, especially when attacking. Some of the Sardinian Army's best commanders - Carretto, Dichat, Varax, and others - led grenadiers into battle.
The Encampment Legion was created in 1774 by the brilliant Benedetto Nicolis di Robilant, a high rank officer. It was a 1,500-strong body of high quality troops drawn from the Provincial regiments: 12 contingents of 120 men each, including 20 grenadiers, based at Chieri (HQ and depots), Chivasso (1st Battalion), Rumilly (2nd Bn) and Cherasco (3rd Bn). Their task - a mix of pioneers', garrison's and scouts' - was setting up and guarding the army encampments during a campaign. There was also a Cavalry Encampment Regiment, on four mixed squadrons. The Legion was disbanded in January 1793. Legion troops formed then a Sapper/Pioneer Grenadiers Regiment for the defense of Turin's fortifications.
Elite troops were better paid. As an example:
Cacciatori captain ------------------- 1,283 Piedmontese Liras per year
Grenadier captain ------------------- 1,394
Ordinance Infantry captain ------1,172
Provincial Infantry captain ---------383
Miscellaneous units
The Franc Corps included a number of French expatriates (also deserters from the Republic's army) who wanted to fight against their revolutionary fellow countrymen. For that reason the Corps was also unofficially called "Foreign Legion". Other Franc Corps troops were Sardinian Army deserters, anti-French partisans from the County of Nice and even officers previously sacked for breach of discipline. The French expats, led by their daring Captain, then Major Bonneaud, proved particularly skilled and aggressive - motivated as they were not only by the hatred against the Revolution but also by the certainty that in case of capture, the French would shoot or hang them as traitors. As a matter of fact, when disaster befell his company during a difficult mountain attack, Bonneaud killed himself rather than being taken prisoner.
The Light Troops Legion was created in 1774 by the Swiss officer in Sardinian service, Gabriel Pictet, to patrol the Alpine borders and stamp out the smuggling activity thriving across the border on France (cross-border smugglers actually still were in full activity as late as the early 1950s...). In 1795 it was reorganized on two regiments with 1,389 men. It fought with distinction at the St. Bernard Pass, Montcenis, at the battle of the Authion in 1793, and at Mondovì in 1796, where it covered the retreat of the beaten army suffering heavy casualties in the process.
A number of independent light infantry companies were also created, by enterprising officers gathering volunteers (including pardoned deserters and jailbirds) and leading them to operate as guerrillas, also behind enemy lines. Such independent formations lined up a maximum of about 2,000 men. Some were effective, as for instance the companies of the Chasseurs of Nice (Cacciatori del Nizzardo, Contea di Nizza). It is supposed that the officers who created their own light infantry units had been inspired by the British and French light infantry in North America about 1750, and perhaps also by the "guerrilla" successes of the American militia sharpshooters in the Independence War.
Hundreds of territorial militia companies (riflemen, artillery and Alpine Light Infantry) were raised all over the kingdom (Armamento Generale, or General Conscription). Countryside volunteers aged 16 to 60 formed small companies (platoon sized formations in fact, by modern standards) around kind of "National Guard" improvised officers: local aristocrats, attorneys, physicians, small landowners. Theoretically, local militia units were to be supported by garrison battalions each comprising 740 overaged veterans, unfit for front line duty. Territorial Militia rosters listed 32,628 musketeers, 5,418 chasseurs and 512 gunners, forming 429 companies.
A peculiar local militia unit was the Chasseurs de Chamois ("chamois hunters"), volunteers of the Valgrisenche, a strategically valuable passage between Vallée d'Aoste and Savoy. The key position in Valgrisenche was Col du Mont, occupied by a strong body of Sardinian troops barring the way into Vallée d'Aoste. In spring 1794, in the wake of the fall of St. Bernard's Pass into French hands, the regulars withdrew, but the Chasseurs de Chamois - led by the capable Captain Jean-François Chamonin - stayed. They spent the entire year 1794 and the harsh winter of 1795 on Col du Mont, at 2780 meters altitude, using the foodstuffs and material previously stockpiled for the regular garrison, stoutly guarding the valley. Driven back in spring 1795, in the following summer they managed to recapture Col du Mont, which they held until the Cherasco Armistice.
Major towns had their own civic guard, urban militia under elderly veteran officers who had long left active duty. The capital city, Turin, had 2,500 urban guards, by far the largest urban guard unit in the country.
On paper the militia might count on a respectable total (including the Alpine companies) of about 50,000 men, to be added to the field force. In fact they were largely unserviceable as active front units, despite some botched attempts to use them as cannon fodder. Their weekend officers were - with some notable exceptions - a dismal failure; the badly led, badly equipped and untrained peasants usually broke and ran under French fire. In 1794, a report of the militia high command described them as utterly useless and uselessly expensive. However, as internal security and garrison units they did a reasonably good job.
A different, and much more prized, type of militia were the Alpine Chasseur and Gunner companies, composed of warlike mountaineers traditionally hostile to the French. The Alpine Militia Gunners (mountain artillery, extremely loyal to the King) especially provided an excellent service. Likewise, the Alpine Guides (a few companies in the Nice Alps) proved invaluable. Chasseur and gunner militia companies were in fact platoon-sized, 60-62 men each. There were 90 Chasseur companies with about 6,000 men. The gunners formed 18 - 21 companies.
The Monferrato General Conscription (Armamento Generale), organized by General Dellera in 1794 in the Southern Piedmont region of Mondovì, collected several thousand badly armed peasants. They were badly mauled and swept from the field, but not all of them melted away since 50 Monferrato militia companies (perhaps 3,000 men approximately) took part in the last battle in April 1796, and some authors maintain militia elements were in the castle of Cosseria alongside the Grenadiers and the Croats of Provera.
Lastly, partisan bands are worth mentioning. Both along the Alpine border and in the French-occupied County of Nice, anti-French volunteers, Sardinian Army stragglers, smugglers and even road robbers and bandits spontaneously coalesced into partisan formations. They would then carry out a bloody guerrilla of ambushes and surprise attacks on rear area convoys and garrisons - drawing upon their villages and their families the wrath of the French, who had no scruples in razing hamlets to the ground and exterminating civilians suspected of supporting the partisans. The partisans could not stop the French Army, of course, but their number was by no means small. Over the mountains of the County of Nice about 2,000 partisans were operational, not a negligible amount: the County had 150,000 inhabitants in all.
10 National Ordinance Regiments (Guards, Monferrato, Piedmont, Saluzzo, Aosta, La Marina [Nice County], Regina, Lombardy, Savoy, Sardinia)
9 Foreign Ordinance Regiments (Royal Allemand, Chablais, Valaisan, Bernois, Grison, Glaris, Peyer-im-Hoff [Schaffhausen], Bockmann [Sankt Gallen], Zimmermann [Luzern])
15 Provincial Regiments (Genevois, Maurienne, Ivrea, Vercelli, Novara, Susa, Turin, Pinerolo, Casale, Asti, Tortona, Acqui, Mondovì, Nice, Oneglia)
Total: 34 regiments.
Later into the war the army basically lined up:
13 Ordinance Regiments
Light Troops Legion (Legione Truppe Leggiere), on two regiments (counted as Ordinance)
6 Swiss (mercenary) Regiments
2 Foreign Regiments (Royal Allemand, a German regiment owned by Major General Brempt; and Chablais)
Encampment Legion, established in 1774: elite Provincial troops for refitting roads along the marching army's routes and making/protecting army encampments. Later during the war this crack unit generated one Royal Sapper/Pioneer (Guastatori) Grenadiers Regiment.
16 Provincial Regiments
One Franc Corps
One Disabled Soldiers (Invalidi) Battalion
One Garrison Battalion (burnt out / disabled soldiers shifted to static duties)
Many smaller / independent units
Regimental commanders in 1792
Ordinance
Guards - Marquis Cordon [honorary: the King]
Monferrato - Colonel Avogadro [Duke of Monferrato]
Piedmont - Colonel La Marmora [Prince of Piedmont]
Saluzzo - Colonel Ferraris, Lieutenant General
Aosta - Colonel Count Solaro di Villanova, Major General [Duke of Aosta]
La Marina - Major General De Prali [Prince Charles of Carignan]
Regina - Colonel Renaud
Lombardy - Major General Oberman
Savoy - Major General Count de Sonnaz
Sardinia - Colonel Pes di Villamarina
Royal Allemand - Colonel Baron de Brempt, Lieutenant Colonel Prince de Salm-Salm
Chablais - Colonel de Fontagneux [Duke of Chablais]
Valaisan - Chevalier de Courten, owner
Bernois - De Rockmondet, owner
Grison - Baron Christ, owner
[Glaron) - Colonel Schmidt
(Schaffhausen) - Colonel Peyer-im-Hof
(Sankt Gallen) - Colonel Bockmann
(Luzern) - Colonel Zimmermann
Provincial
Genevois - Col. De Chevilles [Duke of Genevois]
Maurienne - [Count of Maurienne]
Ivrea - Colonel Count Bertone di Sambuy, Lieutenant General
Vercelli - Colonel Louis de Osasco
Novara - Chevalier de Signoris
Susa - Marquis of Saliceto
Turin - Count of Morozzo
Pinerolo - Count Radicati
Casale - Major General Baron Chino
Asti - Marquis Molli di Meran, aide-de-camp of the King
Tortona - Major General Chevalier Capra
Acqui - Major General Count Costa di Montafia
Mondovì - Chevalier Priocca di Damiano
Nice - Baron Audifredi
Oneglia- Colonel Brigadier Count Vitali
Cavalry
Royal Piedmont - Chevalier Cinzano [Prince of Piedmont]
Savoy - Colonel Saluzzo di Verzuolo
Aosta - Chevalier Alfieri di Sostegno [Duke of Aosta]
King's - Baron de Latour [the King]
Dragoons
King's - Chevalier Bonport Megeve [the King]
Piedmont - Count de Saint Gilles [Prince of Piedmont]
Queen's - Colonel des Hayes
Chablais - Chevalier Fresia [Duke of Chablais]
Sardinia - Chevalier de Saint Amour
Artillery
Grand Master - General Count de Salmour; Colonel - Count Saluzzo di Monesiglio
Engineers - Colonel Brigadier Chevalier de Robilant, Lieutenant General
Frigate Battalion [Marines] - Chevalier Ricca de Chateauvieux
Garrison Regiment - Marquis of Salice
Light Legion - General Count de Lazzary
Royal Grenadiers - Count de Bellegarde
Franc Companies - Captain Count Radicati di Primeglio
Chasseurs of Canale - Count Malabaila of Canale
Franc Chasseurs - Marquis del Carretto di Camerano
First Battalion - Colonel Chevillard
Second Battalion - Chevalier Garretti di Ferrere
Weapons
The basic infantry weapons were the excellent Mod. 1752 smoothbore, possibly the best musket in Europe when it was issued to the troops, and an updated version thereof, Mod. 1782. 95,000 Mod. 1752 muskets were produced over time. It was at least as good a musket as the British Brown Bess, and the French admired it, too. Instead, Mod. 1782 did not prove tremendously successful. It can be rated as "fairly good", at best. It was comparable to the Austrian Mod. 84 and the Prussian Mod. 82, but it was inferior to the famous French musket Mod. 1777, the British mod. 1792 and the Austrian mod. 1798. As would happen again in 1859, the Sardinian infantry was thus equipped with inferior weapons. Piedmontese weapons factories could not turn out enough muskets for equipping 50,000 men, let alone the militia; therefore the army had to buy stocks of parts or assembled muskets from other countries.
Limited output capability - as in all lesser European powers - had always been a major shortcoming of the Piedmontese war machine, and only rarely throughout its long history the Army received satisfactory amounts of weapons from State factories. In 1792 the State musket factory, the large Valdocco Forge and plant founded in 1715 by the skilled but troublesome engineer Biagio Sclaverano, could still turn out only 3 - 4,000 musket barrels a year, as seventy years earlier. Industrial methods also were outdated, and production suffered badly from contractors' malversations and frauds and lack of raw materials and even water in wartime. The other parts of the weapons were produced in the Turin Arsenal or by private contractors.
In 1790 the Army had 88,600 infantry muskets, 1,700 cavalry muskets, 5,000 dragoons and light troops muskets and over 13,000 pistols.
In 1792, on the eve of the war, all Ordinance regiments except two and the Light Troops Legion had new Mod. 1782 muskets (981 each regiment, more for the foreign ones). Lombardy and Chablais Regiments still had Mod. 1752 weapons, and the Legion had been issued with 1,336 dragoons muskets Mod. 1759. The Provincial infantry used Mod. 1752 muskets (618 each regiment). The militia had 17,522 muskets, all old fashioned and of sundry types. In the Turin Arsenal, there was a supply stock of about 45,000 muskets. That was considered to be altogether insufficient: wartime buildup plans envisioned 20,000 more line infantry muskets and 30-35,000 more of the older types for the militia.
Through a powerful and prolonged resupplying effort - increasing home production somehow, buying important stocks of weapons from private contractors in the Republic of Venice, Austria and Germany, and handing down to the militia weapons still in good working order dropped by line troops receiving newer models - the Army kept the troops acceptably well armed and equipped throughout the war. In 1798, when the King of Sardinia was finally overthrown by the French, the Turin Arsenal was still housing 87,415 muskets, of which about 48,000 brand new.
To enhance infantry firepower, in Victor Amadeus III's army even the officers (traditionally bearing the sword, and often a pistol, and a short pike on parades, but never muskets) were equipped with a musket, the fine but delicate Mod. 1774 for officers. However, during the war it became clear that turning the officers into riflemen had not been a good idea. They could not effectively lead their troops as they were loading and firing their musket. In June 1793, an order issued by the Duke of Chablais's HQ recommended to all officers not to fire their muskets and lead instead their units into combat with the sword only.
Also, 4-pounder regimental guns were issued to the infantry regiments. Those guns, designed by the Grand Master of the Artillery, Casimiro Gabaleone di Salmour, boasted the amazing (theoretical) rate of fire of 10 rounds per minute as they were supposed to use a rapid reloading system. In reality, on the battlefield the system did not work like clockwork and the guns had to be loaded the old, much slower way. Some authors explain this stress on infantry firepower by c0nnecting it to the pre-war Sardinian strategic and operational plans.
Another infantry weapon was the sabro (sabre, sword). It was a rather impressive piece of cold steel, a sabre 62 centimeters long, deadly in close combat if in the hand of a skilled soldier. However, it was heavy and unwieldy to carry and use in the rugged Alps, and many a soldier tended to get rid of it, especially in the late war period.
Rifled muskets were only issued to one privately recruited and equipped light infantry company, the Canale Light Infantry, levied by a local lord for his King's war. They proved so disappointing that the company discarded them shortly after. During the War of Austrian Succession (1740 - 1748), the Sardinian light infantry had been largely equipped with rifles, but tactical misuse and mistakes led to disastrous results, with entire light infantry units wiped out. Sardinian light infantry, outclassed by its French and especially Spanish counterparts, found its rifles too slow to reload in actual combat situations, and their superior range and accuracy were of little use because of the bad, inadequate tactical employment. As a result, rifles were eventually dismissed and the light infantry fought throughout the War of the Alps with smoothbore muskets, although the thorough training made them much better marksmen than the line infantry. Piedmontese rifles were in any case qualitatively poor - the army didn't have anything like the excellent Austrian Mod. 1759 rifle, used to great effect by the Austrian Jaegers. However, during the War of Alps the Austrian light infantry in Italy did not include Jaeger units, but only Frei-Corps, and those had no rifles. The French also made a very sparing use of rifles, therefore the lack of rifles in the Sardinian Army was not a crippling shortcoming.
Troops
Line infantry regiments could be Ordinance or Provincial.
Provincial regiments were made up of trained militia, but the men were considered as regular soldiers with their own uniforms, rather than militiamen, and employed as line infantry on a regular basis.
Each community, centered around a hamlet, village or small or large town, must provide a given number of able-bodied men. For instance, in the area in Piedmont known as Canavese, 20 small communities owed a total of 77 men to the provincial regiment. Oddly, larger communities might be requested to provide just a few men, even fewer than the contingent of little villages: the town of Aosta only owed 4 men. The reason why, probably, was that peasants were preferably recruited, whereas townspeople with their urban jobs were considered as more vital for the economy and less spendable in war.
After receiving infantry training, provincial troops were sent back home but they were liable to duty for 20 years. For one month every year they must rejoin their regiment and exercise. Three times a year they were reviewed by an Administrative Corps officer. There were no press gangs roaming the country: recruitment committees formed by government officials and local community representatives did their best to ensure an equitable deal, although, as everywhere in Europe, local communities tried to get rid of the least integrated elements in the population (rebellious types, mavericks, bums, petty criminals, etc.) by selecting them for enlistment.
In peacetime, the provincial company numbered 60 men, to increase to 72 on wartime footing. The provincial battalion included six companies: Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, First Captain, Second Captain, Grenadier, Volunteers. The following is the structure of the Colonel Company of a battalion of the Ivrea Provincial Regiment. The names are those of the actual commissioned officers:
-1 Colonel (Bertone di Sambuy)
-1 Captain Lieutenant (count Palma)
-1 Lieutenant (Pastoris)
-1 Junior Lieutenant (count of Mombello, then Vassallo, then chevalier [cadet] di San Martino)
-1 trabant [NCO attached to the company staff]
-3 quartermasters
-1 company sergeant
-1 squad sergeant
-1 drummer
-1 fifer
-1 squad corporal
-3 first "camerata" corporals [camerata - from the French "chambree", in Piedmontese language "ciambrea" - was the smallest administrative unit of the Army]
-3 second camerata corporals
-3 lance corporals (appointees)
-60 privates, plus 12 in wartime.
Note that in this company, four officers were noblemen and two middle class - the 2 : 1 ratio pattern.
The six companies of the battalion numbered a total of 528 men in peacetime and 588 in wartime (on paper). So a battalion had a theoretical strength of about 600 men. In reality, battalions would seldom achieve that strength level, especially towards the end of the war.
Men from well-off families could avoid recruitment by buying it out, as in all European States of the time. Therefore, military duty mainly fell on lower urban classes and the peasantry.
Ordinance (regular, professional) infantry, the fighting core of the army, was instead composed of volunteers serving for 6 - 8 years. Each Ordinance regiment usually had two active battalions; Provincial regiments only had one active battalion in peacetime. Each battalion had five companies, one of grenadiers and four of regular infantry, named after their respective commanders. The regiment should also have one light infantry company (trained to fight in loose order in front of the ranged regimental line, in the classic field battle that never occurred against the French) and a reserve (depot) company. The reserve company, in which personnel temporarily unfit for line duty (sick, wounded and convalescing, back from enemy captivity) served, carried out tasks such as recruitment, training and local policing.
The regiment thus numbered 10 line companies (two of which Grenadier), one Chasseurs company, and the reserve company. One company was owned and theoretically led by the regiment commander; one by the lieutenant colonel; and two by the majors. In fact, in battle they were actually led by the lieutenant-captains, as higher rank officers should direct and coordinate the action at battalion level or tactical groups of companies rather than the single companies they owned.
In some regiments, the owner and theoretical commander was a member of the Royalty (eg. the King was the commander of the Guards). In that case, the actual commander was the 2nd Colonel, and the owner's company was called Chief Company, under the command of a captain.
Company staff varied over the years. In 1775, a company organization chart included 68 soldiers and 24 NCOs. In 1782, the total was brought down to 85. In 1784, it was raised back to 92.
Battalion Staff relied on:
-3 Captains
-1 Adjutant Captain
-2 Adjutant Lieutenants
-1 First Ensign
-3 Ensigns
-1 chaplain
-1 surgeon
-3 Staff/Master Sergeants
-3 Corporals
-1 regimental Provost
-1 major drummer
-3 gunsmiths
-4 bowmen [military policemen]
-9 trabanti
-2 quartermasters
Regiment Staff:
-1 Deputy Commanding Colonel
-2 Lieutenant Colonels
-1 Brigade Major [taking charge of the regiment on the battlefield during action]
-2 Majors
-1 Quartermaster Captain [administrative office]
The theoretical strength of the Ordinance regiment was 1,249 men. Regiments were almost invariably never employed as such, with the two battalions fighting together as a single force: they were just administrative bodies. The real fighting unit was the battalion. In combat, the battalion could be split into "centuries", or more flexible tactical units composed of two companies (called "divisions" in other armies). Centuries were typically used as reinforcements to defensive positions or to launch counterattacks. They were placed under the command of, in the 1st battalion, the major or a senior captain, and in the 2nd battalion, a lieutenant colonel or a major.
The regiments recruited troops substantially on a territorial basis. For instance, men from Savoy, Val d'Aosta (Vallée d'Aoste) and Alpine districts were allowed into the Savoy Regiment; Sardinians in the Sardinia Regiment; men from anywhere in the Kingdom barring Savoy and Val d'Aosta in the other regiments. Two regiments, along with the German Royal Allemand, were exceptions: the Oneglia Regiment accepted also Germans, Swiss, Italians, Corsicans and Spaniards; and anybody from any nation could serve in the Chablais Regiment. Many French expats served in the Chablais.
Elite Troops
Each line regiment had one light infantry (Chasseurs, Cacciatori = "Hunters") company (as in the pre-revolutionary French Army, where since 1766 each line regiment had one light infantry company as well). Many companies were taken away from their respective regiments and merged to form two light infantry battalions. These were elite outfits, carefully trained and instructed to fight in loose order over any type of terrain. During the war their training partly changed to emphasize commando capabilities. They specialized in surprise attacks and fast and furious shock actions, also at night; however, quite a few Ranger-style attacks failed because the planning was complicated, too many units were involved and coordination proved impervious (aside from bad luck, planning and leadership mistakes, they didn't have radios...).
Like the Grenadiers, light infantry often received the best, ablest-bodied and most skilled men and officers available. Colli di Felizzano, one of the best Piedmontese officers of the war, was the commander of the crack 2nd Cacciatori Battalion.
Likewise, the regiments' grenadier companies merged to form 5 Grenadier Regiments with 12 battalions, the Sardinian Army shock troops: the cream of the crop. Some authors argue that stripping the line regiments of their grenadiers, the regiment's spearhead, affected the efficiency of the regiments during the war, especially when attacking. Some of the Sardinian Army's best commanders - Carretto, Dichat, Varax, and others - led grenadiers into battle.
The Encampment Legion was created in 1774 by the brilliant Benedetto Nicolis di Robilant, a high rank officer. It was a 1,500-strong body of high quality troops drawn from the Provincial regiments: 12 contingents of 120 men each, including 20 grenadiers, based at Chieri (HQ and depots), Chivasso (1st Battalion), Rumilly (2nd Bn) and Cherasco (3rd Bn). Their task - a mix of pioneers', garrison's and scouts' - was setting up and guarding the army encampments during a campaign. There was also a Cavalry Encampment Regiment, on four mixed squadrons. The Legion was disbanded in January 1793. Legion troops formed then a Sapper/Pioneer Grenadiers Regiment for the defense of Turin's fortifications.
Elite troops were better paid. As an example:
Cacciatori captain ------------------- 1,283 Piedmontese Liras per year
Grenadier captain ------------------- 1,394
Ordinance Infantry captain ------1,172
Provincial Infantry captain ---------383
Miscellaneous units
The Franc Corps included a number of French expatriates (also deserters from the Republic's army) who wanted to fight against their revolutionary fellow countrymen. For that reason the Corps was also unofficially called "Foreign Legion". Other Franc Corps troops were Sardinian Army deserters, anti-French partisans from the County of Nice and even officers previously sacked for breach of discipline. The French expats, led by their daring Captain, then Major Bonneaud, proved particularly skilled and aggressive - motivated as they were not only by the hatred against the Revolution but also by the certainty that in case of capture, the French would shoot or hang them as traitors. As a matter of fact, when disaster befell his company during a difficult mountain attack, Bonneaud killed himself rather than being taken prisoner.
The Light Troops Legion was created in 1774 by the Swiss officer in Sardinian service, Gabriel Pictet, to patrol the Alpine borders and stamp out the smuggling activity thriving across the border on France (cross-border smugglers actually still were in full activity as late as the early 1950s...). In 1795 it was reorganized on two regiments with 1,389 men. It fought with distinction at the St. Bernard Pass, Montcenis, at the battle of the Authion in 1793, and at Mondovì in 1796, where it covered the retreat of the beaten army suffering heavy casualties in the process.
A number of independent light infantry companies were also created, by enterprising officers gathering volunteers (including pardoned deserters and jailbirds) and leading them to operate as guerrillas, also behind enemy lines. Such independent formations lined up a maximum of about 2,000 men. Some were effective, as for instance the companies of the Chasseurs of Nice (Cacciatori del Nizzardo, Contea di Nizza). It is supposed that the officers who created their own light infantry units had been inspired by the British and French light infantry in North America about 1750, and perhaps also by the "guerrilla" successes of the American militia sharpshooters in the Independence War.
Hundreds of territorial militia companies (riflemen, artillery and Alpine Light Infantry) were raised all over the kingdom (Armamento Generale, or General Conscription). Countryside volunteers aged 16 to 60 formed small companies (platoon sized formations in fact, by modern standards) around kind of "National Guard" improvised officers: local aristocrats, attorneys, physicians, small landowners. Theoretically, local militia units were to be supported by garrison battalions each comprising 740 overaged veterans, unfit for front line duty. Territorial Militia rosters listed 32,628 musketeers, 5,418 chasseurs and 512 gunners, forming 429 companies.
A peculiar local militia unit was the Chasseurs de Chamois ("chamois hunters"), volunteers of the Valgrisenche, a strategically valuable passage between Vallée d'Aoste and Savoy. The key position in Valgrisenche was Col du Mont, occupied by a strong body of Sardinian troops barring the way into Vallée d'Aoste. In spring 1794, in the wake of the fall of St. Bernard's Pass into French hands, the regulars withdrew, but the Chasseurs de Chamois - led by the capable Captain Jean-François Chamonin - stayed. They spent the entire year 1794 and the harsh winter of 1795 on Col du Mont, at 2780 meters altitude, using the foodstuffs and material previously stockpiled for the regular garrison, stoutly guarding the valley. Driven back in spring 1795, in the following summer they managed to recapture Col du Mont, which they held until the Cherasco Armistice.
Major towns had their own civic guard, urban militia under elderly veteran officers who had long left active duty. The capital city, Turin, had 2,500 urban guards, by far the largest urban guard unit in the country.
On paper the militia might count on a respectable total (including the Alpine companies) of about 50,000 men, to be added to the field force. In fact they were largely unserviceable as active front units, despite some botched attempts to use them as cannon fodder. Their weekend officers were - with some notable exceptions - a dismal failure; the badly led, badly equipped and untrained peasants usually broke and ran under French fire. In 1794, a report of the militia high command described them as utterly useless and uselessly expensive. However, as internal security and garrison units they did a reasonably good job.
A different, and much more prized, type of militia were the Alpine Chasseur and Gunner companies, composed of warlike mountaineers traditionally hostile to the French. The Alpine Militia Gunners (mountain artillery, extremely loyal to the King) especially provided an excellent service. Likewise, the Alpine Guides (a few companies in the Nice Alps) proved invaluable. Chasseur and gunner militia companies were in fact platoon-sized, 60-62 men each. There were 90 Chasseur companies with about 6,000 men. The gunners formed 18 - 21 companies.
The Monferrato General Conscription (Armamento Generale), organized by General Dellera in 1794 in the Southern Piedmont region of Mondovì, collected several thousand badly armed peasants. They were badly mauled and swept from the field, but not all of them melted away since 50 Monferrato militia companies (perhaps 3,000 men approximately) took part in the last battle in April 1796, and some authors maintain militia elements were in the castle of Cosseria alongside the Grenadiers and the Croats of Provera.
Lastly, partisan bands are worth mentioning. Both along the Alpine border and in the French-occupied County of Nice, anti-French volunteers, Sardinian Army stragglers, smugglers and even road robbers and bandits spontaneously coalesced into partisan formations. They would then carry out a bloody guerrilla of ambushes and surprise attacks on rear area convoys and garrisons - drawing upon their villages and their families the wrath of the French, who had no scruples in razing hamlets to the ground and exterminating civilians suspected of supporting the partisans. The partisans could not stop the French Army, of course, but their number was by no means small. Over the mountains of the County of Nice about 2,000 partisans were operational, not a negligible amount: the County had 150,000 inhabitants in all.
Cavalry
The cavalry arm also underwent important changes under King Victor Amadeus III. Companies in each regiment shrunk from ten to eight, forming four squadrons. Two new regiments were formed with the companies "removed" from the old regiments; the new regiments had three squadrons, each with two companies. Each squadron was composed of 5 officers, 87 troopers and 75 horses.
In 1737, Charles Emmanuel III had created two elite specialities within the cavalry - carbineers for the cavalry, grenadiers for the dragoons. Each company had five carbineers or grenadiers (respectively in the cavalry and in the dragoons), who might be drawn out of their companies and form an elite company of 50 men. Under Victor Amadeus III, the establishment of a special cavalry corps composed of all mounted carbineers and grenadiers was also envisioned in wartime.
Prior to 1774, companies had been both administrative and tactical units. From that year onwards, while they kept being the basic administrative units, squadrons gradually emerged as the tactical elements of the regiment.
Service in the cavalry lasted 8 years in 1792 and throughout the war, but it was raised to 10 years in 1796. Cavalry was a very expensive arm. About mid-century, one regiment cost over 200,000 Liras. Recruiting a cavalryman cost the State revenue (ie. the taxpayer) 50 Liras for his engagement fee, and 127 Liras for his uniform and equipment.
The regiment staff was: colonel or 2nd colonel, adjutant-major, lieutenant-colonel, major, squadron captain, four company captains, lieutenan-captain, seven lieutenants, colonel ensign, five ensigns. 22 officers total.
Troop duties included a bugler, a sutler, a harness maker, a blacksmith and an under-squire.
The horses were mostly purchased abroad (especially from Germany) as the small kingdom had never been able to produce a sufficient number of good horses. However, in 1768 a growingly efficient remount service was instituted in Piedmont under the Inspector General of the Cavalry, and more and more indigenous horses were bred for the cavalry since.
At the outbreak of the war, the cavalry was composed of:
5 Dragoons Regiments (King's, Queen's, Piedmont, Chablais, Sardinia Light)
4 Cavalry Regiments (King's, Royal Piedmont, Savoy, Aosta).
Total: 32 squadrons with 1,600 cavalrymen and 1,600 dragoons over the mainland, and 200 dragoons in Sardinia.
The cavalry, unable to effectively operate in the Alps, "sat out" the entire time of the war within Piedmont as a reserve force. The only action it took part in (with a little fraction of the force) was the battle of Mondovì. Qualitatively on a par with the cavalry of any major European State, and better than the 1792-96 French cavalry, the Sardinian cavalry could not be expanded to larger numbers because of the relatively few good battle horses available in little Piedmont - many horses had to be purchased abroad, especially imported from Austria - and because of its cost, a major financial burden. In any case, its value in a war fought essentially on and across mountains would be limited.
The main dragoons weapon was the very good, reliable and powerful Dragoons Musket Mod. 1759, the only shortcoming of which was the not well designed bayonet. New and better Mod. 1791 bayonets were distributed to the cavalry during the war, but there were never enough Mod. 1791 available for all muskets.
The cavalry had muskets (moschettoni) specifically designed for cavalrymen, both of new model (Mod. 1774) and older types, and of course pistols.
In 1737, Charles Emmanuel III had created two elite specialities within the cavalry - carbineers for the cavalry, grenadiers for the dragoons. Each company had five carbineers or grenadiers (respectively in the cavalry and in the dragoons), who might be drawn out of their companies and form an elite company of 50 men. Under Victor Amadeus III, the establishment of a special cavalry corps composed of all mounted carbineers and grenadiers was also envisioned in wartime.
Prior to 1774, companies had been both administrative and tactical units. From that year onwards, while they kept being the basic administrative units, squadrons gradually emerged as the tactical elements of the regiment.
Service in the cavalry lasted 8 years in 1792 and throughout the war, but it was raised to 10 years in 1796. Cavalry was a very expensive arm. About mid-century, one regiment cost over 200,000 Liras. Recruiting a cavalryman cost the State revenue (ie. the taxpayer) 50 Liras for his engagement fee, and 127 Liras for his uniform and equipment.
The regiment staff was: colonel or 2nd colonel, adjutant-major, lieutenant-colonel, major, squadron captain, four company captains, lieutenan-captain, seven lieutenants, colonel ensign, five ensigns. 22 officers total.
Troop duties included a bugler, a sutler, a harness maker, a blacksmith and an under-squire.
The horses were mostly purchased abroad (especially from Germany) as the small kingdom had never been able to produce a sufficient number of good horses. However, in 1768 a growingly efficient remount service was instituted in Piedmont under the Inspector General of the Cavalry, and more and more indigenous horses were bred for the cavalry since.
At the outbreak of the war, the cavalry was composed of:
5 Dragoons Regiments (King's, Queen's, Piedmont, Chablais, Sardinia Light)
4 Cavalry Regiments (King's, Royal Piedmont, Savoy, Aosta).
Total: 32 squadrons with 1,600 cavalrymen and 1,600 dragoons over the mainland, and 200 dragoons in Sardinia.
The cavalry, unable to effectively operate in the Alps, "sat out" the entire time of the war within Piedmont as a reserve force. The only action it took part in (with a little fraction of the force) was the battle of Mondovì. Qualitatively on a par with the cavalry of any major European State, and better than the 1792-96 French cavalry, the Sardinian cavalry could not be expanded to larger numbers because of the relatively few good battle horses available in little Piedmont - many horses had to be purchased abroad, especially imported from Austria - and because of its cost, a major financial burden. In any case, its value in a war fought essentially on and across mountains would be limited.
The main dragoons weapon was the very good, reliable and powerful Dragoons Musket Mod. 1759, the only shortcoming of which was the not well designed bayonet. New and better Mod. 1791 bayonets were distributed to the cavalry during the war, but there were never enough Mod. 1791 available for all muskets.
The cavalry had muskets (moschettoni) specifically designed for cavalrymen, both of new model (Mod. 1774) and older types, and of course pistols.
Garrison of Sardinia
The island of Sardinia had its own garrison, which had the opportunity to take part in the war as the French attacked it twice - both attacks ended up with failures, to the chagrin of Bonaparte who was involved in one of them. However, more serious offensives probably would have overrun the puny defensive system.
3 Ordinance infantry battalions
2 Sardinia Dragoon squadrons
Some independent companies (militia, pardoned deserters, artillery)
42 coastal towers (for watching the coastline and opposing small enemy landings) with their crews
Total: 1,500 regular infantry, 200 regular cavalry, 1,000 standing local militia.
The Sardinian Navy also held some key sites with coastal artillery batteries, as in the Maddalena Islands archipelago where some Navy batteries effectively helped thwart the French raid.
The Parliaments of Sardinia (Stamenti) could decree a General Conscription in case of invasion, and they did it when the French attacked the island. Tens of thousands of armed militiamen, both foot and cavalry, in their picturesque local costumes were then liable to be called up. Their value facing a modern European invasion force however would have been decidedly low.
3 Ordinance infantry battalions
2 Sardinia Dragoon squadrons
Some independent companies (militia, pardoned deserters, artillery)
42 coastal towers (for watching the coastline and opposing small enemy landings) with their crews
Total: 1,500 regular infantry, 200 regular cavalry, 1,000 standing local militia.
The Sardinian Navy also held some key sites with coastal artillery batteries, as in the Maddalena Islands archipelago where some Navy batteries effectively helped thwart the French raid.
The Parliaments of Sardinia (Stamenti) could decree a General Conscription in case of invasion, and they did it when the French attacked the island. Tens of thousands of armed militiamen, both foot and cavalry, in their picturesque local costumes were then liable to be called up. Their value facing a modern European invasion force however would have been decidedly low.
Royal Artillery Corps
It was composed of a General Staff and one Brigade, divided into two half-brigades: the Right Half-Brigade (Mezza Brigata di Destra) and the Left Half-Brigade (Mezza Brigata di Sinistra).
Right Half-Brigade: HQ, 2 battalions, each with 4 Gunner companies, one Mortar Bomb (Bombisti) Specialist company (1st Bn.) and one Specialized Workers company (2nd Bn.).
Left Half-Brigade: HQ, 2 battalions, each with 4 Gunner companies, one Sapper company (3rd Bn.) and one Miner company (4th Bn.).
Total strength: about 3,000 men including 855 artillerymen on the island of Sardinia. Throughout the war the strength rose to a total of 4,657 men as several militia artillery companies were merged into the Corps.
The Sardinian artillery was an excellent corps, very well trained and resting on a longstanding tradition of advanced theoretical studies and technical proficiency. However, like all other branches of the armed forces, it had been lagging behind for decades as France was thoroughly revamping her military after the defeats suffered in the Seven Years' War, and during the War of the Alps the ordnance was technologically inferior to its French counterpart.
Piedmontese artillerymen were possibly the best elements of the Army; their skill, valor, unflinching courage under fire, and technical competence were held in high esteem across Europe. In 1799, Marshal Suvorov's Austrian Chief of Staff, Chasteler, recommended to recruit into the Allied army fighting over Northern Italy as many former artillerymen of the old Sardinian Army as possible, on account of their widely established and acknowledged value. Piedmontese military histories carry references to stirring "against all odds" artillery stories, such as the feat of arms of Captain Vayra, Sergeant Chiodo and five grenadiers serving their section of two guns, that at the battle of the Authion, 1793, defeated an entire French assault column by taking it under murderously rapid fire; or that of Captain Zino at the battle of Brouys in 1793; or the battery of Lieutenant Filippi, destroyed to the last man in desperate close combat at the Tanarda, 1793.
Right Half-Brigade: HQ, 2 battalions, each with 4 Gunner companies, one Mortar Bomb (Bombisti) Specialist company (1st Bn.) and one Specialized Workers company (2nd Bn.).
Left Half-Brigade: HQ, 2 battalions, each with 4 Gunner companies, one Sapper company (3rd Bn.) and one Miner company (4th Bn.).
Total strength: about 3,000 men including 855 artillerymen on the island of Sardinia. Throughout the war the strength rose to a total of 4,657 men as several militia artillery companies were merged into the Corps.
The Sardinian artillery was an excellent corps, very well trained and resting on a longstanding tradition of advanced theoretical studies and technical proficiency. However, like all other branches of the armed forces, it had been lagging behind for decades as France was thoroughly revamping her military after the defeats suffered in the Seven Years' War, and during the War of the Alps the ordnance was technologically inferior to its French counterpart.
Piedmontese artillerymen were possibly the best elements of the Army; their skill, valor, unflinching courage under fire, and technical competence were held in high esteem across Europe. In 1799, Marshal Suvorov's Austrian Chief of Staff, Chasteler, recommended to recruit into the Allied army fighting over Northern Italy as many former artillerymen of the old Sardinian Army as possible, on account of their widely established and acknowledged value. Piedmontese military histories carry references to stirring "against all odds" artillery stories, such as the feat of arms of Captain Vayra, Sergeant Chiodo and five grenadiers serving their section of two guns, that at the battle of the Authion, 1793, defeated an entire French assault column by taking it under murderously rapid fire; or that of Captain Zino at the battle of Brouys in 1793; or the battery of Lieutenant Filippi, destroyed to the last man in desperate close combat at the Tanarda, 1793.
The "Cannone alla Sassone" (Saxon model gun), 4-pdr Model 1751
In the 1720s the Saxon general Karl Obmaus had designed a technically advanced gun elevating system to dramatically increase the canister round rate of fire, later evolving into the 1734 3-pdr Geschwindstueck (quick firing artillery piece). The model and its 6-pdr version proved devastatingly effective against massed enemy infantry; in 1745 at the battle of Kesselsdorf their canister fire almost caused the collapse of the Prussian infantry attack on the Saxon center. While the loading and firing of the regular shot did not differ from those of all other guns, when firing canister the gunner would remove the wedge to allow the breech to drop to about 45 degrees. The canister round was then placed into the cannon without employing the rammer. The breech was lifted back and locked into its previous firing position before being fired. This "semi-automatic" reloading system allowed the gunners to load and fire canister rounds at a considerably faster rate.
In 1751 Captain Casimiro Gabaleone di Salmour, later Master General of Ordnance of the King of Sardinia, designed a gun based on the Saxon Geschwindstueck - a 4 pounder Model 1751, to be assigned to infantry regiments. By 1759, 89 regimental guns had been cast. It would prove so good in action (although artillery didn't play a major role during the War of the Alps, nor it had many opportunities of opening up on the enemy with canister rounds) that not only the Sardinians, but also the Austrians, the French, even the Russians in Italy, and the Napoleonic Italian Army used it as a mountain gun throughout the Napoleonic era and until the demise of the Empire and its satellite Italian State, the Kingdom of Italy.
Royal Engineers Corps
Founded in 1775, it was composed of a specialized officers' cadre. Sappers / pioneers and miners were detached from the Artillery and the Pioneers Regiment and placed under their orders when needed. Along with any numbers of local civilians volunteering or forced to work for the army.
Fortress Garrisons
Over nearly two centuries and a half of painstaking and hugely expensive defensive work, Piedmont had built up one of Europe's most powerful fortified systems, consisting of a vast network of forts, fortresses and fieldworks protecting the western (Alpine) and eastern (Lombardy) approaches to the country. Some of the major fortresses, such as the Brunetta Fort near Susa or the Fenestrelle Fortress in the Alps, or the Citadel of Alexandria near the eastern border on Austrian Lombardy, were colossal masterworks of military architecture and engineering, admired by statesmen and military men across Europe and sometimes even visited by foreign princes.
The extensive fortified system - which Bonaparte did not even seriously try to take on during his campaign, utterly lacking the means to cope with it - was to be almost entirely destroyed between 1796 and 1798, after the defeat of the Kingdom and as a consequence of the armistice and eventual peace with France. It obviously required to be manned by substantial garrisons. In addition to field units detached to garrison duties, the army employed the Invalids corps - soldiers too old or too worn out to keep serving in the active regiments, but still valuable on static duty - and a specific Fortress Garrison corps of officers and non-commissioned officers tasked with the organization of the defense and the troops within the fortress perimeter.
The extensive fortified system - which Bonaparte did not even seriously try to take on during his campaign, utterly lacking the means to cope with it - was to be almost entirely destroyed between 1796 and 1798, after the defeat of the Kingdom and as a consequence of the armistice and eventual peace with France. It obviously required to be manned by substantial garrisons. In addition to field units detached to garrison duties, the army employed the Invalids corps - soldiers too old or too worn out to keep serving in the active regiments, but still valuable on static duty - and a specific Fortress Garrison corps of officers and non-commissioned officers tasked with the organization of the defense and the troops within the fortress perimeter.
The Austrian Corps
The Austrian Empire was an unreliable, dangerous, though indispensable bedfellow for the Kingdom of Sardinia. Austria was stiff and unfriendly towards a State it deeply mistrusted and despised; Austrian strategy in Italy differed dramatically from that of their Sardinian allies, and the Austrians had no intention to engage an army for the direct defense of Piedmont.
In 1792, with the Milan Convention of September 22nd, they agreed to send to Piedmont a little expeditionary corps, partly made up by Italian troops recruited in the Italian districts of the Empire. The Austrian force integrated in the Sardinian Army command chain and operational structure, although it retained its own commander. The corps kept fighting alongside Sardinian troops until the end of the war. As a sort of exchange, the Austrians incorporated a few Sardinian infantry battalions in their larger units when Beaulieu's army came on the stage (they fought under Argenteau at Montenotte and Dego).
Imperial Commander-in-chief: Lieutenant-Marshal Count Leop0ldo Strassoldo (Italian)
HQ: Baron Michelangelo Alessandro Colli Marchini (Italian)
Marquis Giovanni Provera (Italian)
Count Eugène Guillaume Alexis Argenteau (Belgian). (Curiously, Argenteau was the brother-in-law of the French general Laharpe. The latter defeated the former twice, in 1795 and, most famously, in 1796 at Montenotte).
Strassoldo didn't play any major role. Provera was a solid commander, but his role was also limited. Colli Marchini would later be appointed as commander of the Sardinian southern front, and as such would a worthy opponent for Bonaparte, but unable to avert the final defeat. Argenteau was the worst of the lot: he owed his posting, also later as subordinate of Beaulieu, to his Imperial Court connections much more than to his military skills, and was soundly beaten by Bonaparte at Montenotte.
Austrian corps order of battle, mid-1793:
Garrison IR (Infanterie-Regiment) 6 with 2 battalions
IR 44 Belgioioso (Italian) with 2 battalions
IR 48 Caprara - Schmidtfeld (Italian) with 2 battalions
1st Wollust (then Strassoldo) Grenadier Battalion (Italian)
Four squadrons [two "divisions"] of Dragoon Regiment Laudon (800 cavalrymen)
Franc Corps Gyulai (815 Croatian light infantry - four companies, or two "divisions" - under Major Brentano, and French expats fighting for the Allies)
22 artillery pieces of various calibers [in reality, never arrived to Piedmont].
Total: about 6,000 troops (and no guns).
Until 1795, this small force would be the only real Austrian contribution to the defense of Piedmont.
Austrian battalions should have been twice as big as Sardinian battalions, but in all likelihood they were severely understrength. The grenadiers were excellent, as they would also prove at Marengo in June 1800. The dragoons and the fierce Croatians were all good troops. The line infantry instead was on the average of indifferent quality. The Garrison Regiment - one battalion of which was at the front whereas the other was a part of the Turin garrison) was good, although most men were overaged and not really fit for first line duty - the French sarcastically called them "Reverend Fathers". Instead, IR 44 and 48 were filled with ex-prison inmates and deserters from all Europe. Some officers were fine, though. IR 44 had had several ups and downs in its history, its performance varying from fairly good or even heroic to very poor - true to form, during the 1796 campaign it fought sometimes decently, sometimes awfully. IR 48 was one of the worst regiments of the Austrian Army. The Imperial high command wasn't too generous when it came to help Piedmont...
Storming a French redoubt in the Alps. The attacking force, spearheaded by light infantry and grenadiers, split into several columns exploiting any terrain cover features such as woods or ridges to get close to the target undetected. Then the colums would proceed to launch simultaneous attacks from different directions. The plan required a high degree of coordination and perfect timing, and the slightest hitch in the execution - facing usually highly reactive troops like the French - might mar the whole operation (as happened more than once). (Drawing by G. Cerino Badone)
Sardinian Ordinance infantry battalion deployed for battle, as per textbook rules. Note the grenadier company to the right; drummers and fifers behind the line; officers and NCOs between and in front ot the line companies; and the light infantry screen in loose order in front of the line infantry. (Drawing by G. Cerino Badone)
Sardinian Army Supply System
As all 18th century armies, the Sardinian Army relied on a supply service known as "treno di provianda" or "provvisionata" (victuals train). In 1745 the treno di provianda was completely militarized, becoming a branch of the army (it had been a civilian business previously). Operating out of a network of logistical bases, 6 brigades of 60 horse-drawn wagons each followed the army as it moved during a campaign. The treno di provianda's establishment was 360 wagon drivers, 24 "supernumeraries" and 36 brigadiers, plus blacksmiths and horseshoers. The 5,000 horses of the treno were organized into 105 squads of 50 horses each. They were entitled to receive larger food rations than cavalry horses. According to the 1775 regulations, each infantry company was assigned 2 provianda wagons. Over rugged or mountain terrain, donkeys were also used.
For administrative and lodging purposes, the troops were grouped into "camerate" (the word literally means dormitory, but a more appropriate tramslation might be "roommateship" or something like that). Each camerata included four cavalrymen or eight infantrymen. Each camerata received, on the theory, all food and drinks they needed from the Army. However, only the bread was furnished by the Army administration which let the service out on contract to civilian suppliers. For other food and wine to complement the bread ration, each camerata was entitled to get four "sous", "soldi" (cash) for purchasing it themselves. Theoretically the troops were free to purchase food and wine wherever they found it. In reality, often they were forced to get it from the company food and wine store, run by private contractors to whom the company commander had granted (after payment) a license. So a part of the food cash paid by the Army to the soldiers ended up in the captain's pocket at the end of the day.
Sardinian Troops Quality
Regular Ordinance troops were on the average good and firmly loyal to the King's cause. They might be stout on the defensive, although they - understandably - with some exceptions, did not display the same degree of highly motivated aggressiveness on the offensive as the French line infantry. The Grenadier companies and battalions, and the light infantry, formed the elite. The grenadiers were excellent in defensive roles and counterattacks; light infantry units were mobile and aggressive, very useful in mountain warfare. Among line troops, the best were deemed to be the Savoyards - the Savoy Regiment had the honor of being "the second best regiment in the army" after the Guards. Unfortunately, while some Sardinian officers proved every bit as good as their French counterparts, others did not, and troops performance suffered. Generally speaking the Sardinian Army, like all Allied armies, was slower, less effectively led, and less flexible than its French enemies, despite the fine qualities of the troops - recognized by the French themselves.
The mercenary regiments, in sharp contrast with the War of the Austrian Succession where they had performed magnificently throughout, turned out to be a disappointment, except the Christ Grison (Swiss) Regiment: see the bold counterattack by Schreiber's 2nd Grenadier Company at San Michele.
Provincial regiments' performance, as usual throughout Piedmontese history, was erratic. Some regiments fought well on several occasions, others less so, and in two major cases - one occurring at a critical point in the battle of the Authion - they failed completely, melting away under fire, cracking up or literally refusing to fight (whether as a protest against the commander's brutality, or because the regiment had been infiltrated by French revolutionary ideals, or for other reasons, is still unclear).
The artillery traditionally enjoyed a high repute and was one of the best in Europe. The technical corps - engineers - was also highly professional.
The cavalry likewise was very fine, but in a war mostly fought on rugged terrain, it did not have many opportunities to shine.
A comparison with the French Army
The military historian Giovanni Cerino Badone wrote that the Sardinian Army in the War of the Alps was completely outclassed by the French in terms of tactics, equipment and morale. The judgment is basically correct but too sharp.
The French Republican army was tactically superior to all contemporary Allied armies, and the Sardinian Army was no exception. Moreover, while the terrain favored the defenders, the army was not prepared to fight a mountain war; one might say the French were not prepared for that either, but their superior mobility and their loose order formations usually - though not always - offset the only trump card an old style army could count on, fire discipline and rate of fire (especially from trenches or improved positions), a traditional strong point of the Piedmontese soldiers.
French technological superiority - important, but not overwhelming - was also a fact, but on the one hand, however technically superior, the French basic weapon was a smoothbore musket, not an automatic assault rifle; on the other hand, on the Piedmontese front the French "Gribeauval" artillery was too limited to make any real difference.
As for the morale, undoubtedly some Sardinian units failed badly under fire and at critical moments; not only the less reliable Provincials but sometimes also theoretically sturdier Ordinance battalions. Surely there was a motivational problem in not a few Sardinian regiments. On the average the French could boast a higher troops' morale. However, the super-motivated French were not exempt from morale breakdowns either (see the botched attack and subsequent breakdown and rout at one point of the Authion battles; or the panicky retreat of Joubert's column at the Pedaggera, and the stampeding rout at San Michele). Even more importantly, a low morale army would hardly have stood its ground, despite mistakes and failures, for four years and a half as the Sardinian Army instead did.
It is probably fairer to the Sardinians to state that the French victories were mainly caused by better, more dynamic (also because younger) leadership at all levels of command; Sardinian passiveness and slackness, connected to bad leadership; the Austrian takeover of key strategic and operational planning and its execution from 1793 to the end of the war, which sometimes stymied and paralyzed efforts and led to miss precious opportunities; the not frequently underscored fact that often, at the decisive point of the battle the French were numerically superior, or their superior mobility allowed them to concentrate superior numbers where the outcome of the battle was decided or quickly exploit gaps in the enemy line. Bonaparte's army in 1796 was numerically superior to Colli's corps all the time, even when detaching portions of the force to keep the Austrians at bay. Colli fought at Mondovì with 9,000 men versus 25,000 French and after a string of inevitably demoralizing retreats, forsaken by his ally and forced back to the wall just as the country behind him was falling apart. Under such circumstances it is remarkable that only 800 men were captured or surrendered and the remainder of the corps did not.
The French Republican army was tactically superior to all contemporary Allied armies, and the Sardinian Army was no exception. Moreover, while the terrain favored the defenders, the army was not prepared to fight a mountain war; one might say the French were not prepared for that either, but their superior mobility and their loose order formations usually - though not always - offset the only trump card an old style army could count on, fire discipline and rate of fire (especially from trenches or improved positions), a traditional strong point of the Piedmontese soldiers.
French technological superiority - important, but not overwhelming - was also a fact, but on the one hand, however technically superior, the French basic weapon was a smoothbore musket, not an automatic assault rifle; on the other hand, on the Piedmontese front the French "Gribeauval" artillery was too limited to make any real difference.
As for the morale, undoubtedly some Sardinian units failed badly under fire and at critical moments; not only the less reliable Provincials but sometimes also theoretically sturdier Ordinance battalions. Surely there was a motivational problem in not a few Sardinian regiments. On the average the French could boast a higher troops' morale. However, the super-motivated French were not exempt from morale breakdowns either (see the botched attack and subsequent breakdown and rout at one point of the Authion battles; or the panicky retreat of Joubert's column at the Pedaggera, and the stampeding rout at San Michele). Even more importantly, a low morale army would hardly have stood its ground, despite mistakes and failures, for four years and a half as the Sardinian Army instead did.
It is probably fairer to the Sardinians to state that the French victories were mainly caused by better, more dynamic (also because younger) leadership at all levels of command; Sardinian passiveness and slackness, connected to bad leadership; the Austrian takeover of key strategic and operational planning and its execution from 1793 to the end of the war, which sometimes stymied and paralyzed efforts and led to miss precious opportunities; the not frequently underscored fact that often, at the decisive point of the battle the French were numerically superior, or their superior mobility allowed them to concentrate superior numbers where the outcome of the battle was decided or quickly exploit gaps in the enemy line. Bonaparte's army in 1796 was numerically superior to Colli's corps all the time, even when detaching portions of the force to keep the Austrians at bay. Colli fought at Mondovì with 9,000 men versus 25,000 French and after a string of inevitably demoralizing retreats, forsaken by his ally and forced back to the wall just as the country behind him was falling apart. Under such circumstances it is remarkable that only 800 men were captured or surrendered and the remainder of the corps did not.
The True Story of the Maurienne / Tarentaise Regiment
When in 1792 the French invaded and occupied Savoy, annexing it to France - Savoy was considered to be a fully French region, and culturally and linguistically it certainly was - the Savoy infantry regiment of Maurienne / Tarentaise was disbanded. The commander the most officers joined the French Army, and the troops were sent to their homes. However, a number of privates and non-commissioned officers, still loyal to their King despite the French revolutionary propaganda in their own language, promised that they would meet again and re-form the regiment on New Year's [1793] Day.
On New Year's Day a new colonel appointed by the King arrived to Susa (a town in the Alps) with some soldiers, set up an improvised encampment and began to quietly wait. At ten o' clock the first ex-soldier of the regiment showed up, one whose name was Grillet, from Lanslevillard, in the Savoy Alps. Then following Grillet, one, two, three at a time the soldiers trickled to the encampment. In five days the regiment was back to two thirds of its pristine strength. The colonel reviewed his regiment, hoisted its flag and shouted "Long Life the King!", which the troops enthusiastically echoed.
In his excellent 1899 work on Bonaparte in Italy, Felix Bouvier - who with great honesty doesn't have scruples about calling the Ceva lines battles "signal setbacks" for the French - writes that, while the Savoy troops mostly stuck to their royalist allegiance, they did not receive any replacements from their native land throughout the war (which is true) because "the immense majority of the Savoyards had enthusiastically espoused the cause of revolutionary France". There's more than a bit of French nationalism in that assertion - in fact, most Savoyards were not at all so enthusiastic. Their cautious attitude is best described as "wait and see" - who wins in the end, and challenging the French army occupying their region would not have been a good idea, as they would receive scanty or no support from the Allies. Some anti-French revolts broken out in parts of Savoy were crushed in cold blood. On the other hand, it is a fact that a number of Savoyard soldiers changed side and fought, very well as usual, alongside the French.
On New Year's Day a new colonel appointed by the King arrived to Susa (a town in the Alps) with some soldiers, set up an improvised encampment and began to quietly wait. At ten o' clock the first ex-soldier of the regiment showed up, one whose name was Grillet, from Lanslevillard, in the Savoy Alps. Then following Grillet, one, two, three at a time the soldiers trickled to the encampment. In five days the regiment was back to two thirds of its pristine strength. The colonel reviewed his regiment, hoisted its flag and shouted "Long Life the King!", which the troops enthusiastically echoed.
In his excellent 1899 work on Bonaparte in Italy, Felix Bouvier - who with great honesty doesn't have scruples about calling the Ceva lines battles "signal setbacks" for the French - writes that, while the Savoy troops mostly stuck to their royalist allegiance, they did not receive any replacements from their native land throughout the war (which is true) because "the immense majority of the Savoyards had enthusiastically espoused the cause of revolutionary France". There's more than a bit of French nationalism in that assertion - in fact, most Savoyards were not at all so enthusiastic. Their cautious attitude is best described as "wait and see" - who wins in the end, and challenging the French army occupying their region would not have been a good idea, as they would receive scanty or no support from the Allies. Some anti-French revolts broken out in parts of Savoy were crushed in cold blood. On the other hand, it is a fact that a number of Savoyard soldiers changed side and fought, very well as usual, alongside the French.