The Rock: Cosseria
"Piedmontese Grenadiers Never Surrender"
Lt. Col. Filippo del Carretto
"Damned castle - it will have us turn about and march back to the Riviera!"
General Augereau
Argenteau's division has been smashed and Beaulieu (top right) is retreating towards his bases. Bonaparte now shifts his offensive axis to take on the Sardinians, unsupported by the Austrians. The first classic Napoleonic maneuver is under way. Note the change of center and line of operations (changement de centre et de lignes d'operations): Bonaparte quickly switches his line of operations and logistical base from Savona to Ormea, adjusting to the sudden operational swing. A key feature of Napoleonic operational art.
Provera's Desperate Plight
In the wake of the destruction of Argenteau's division at Montenotte, Provera and his brigade now stood alone in the path of Bonaparte. The brigade had already lost two of its battalions (from the Gyulai Franc Corps), one captured near Negino and the other added to Beaulieu's forces at Dego. All Provera was left with were the 1,200 line infantry of IR Belgioioso and 500 Croatian light infantry. Meanwhile the French were quickly pouring into the area, threatening to surround and annihilate him.
Provera was made of a sterner stuff than Argenteau's, and in spite of the impossible plight he was finding himself in, he tried to effect some diversionary moves with his slim brigade to deceive the French. Realizing all odds were against him, however, he pulled back to the north of the road to Ceva, redeploying around Millesimo and Cosseria.
Colli was aware of Provera's dangerous situation, but instead of exploiting it offensively - marching his army corps towards Dego not only to rescue Provera, but also to join up with Beaulieu and set up the anvil for Beaulieu's hammer to crush Bonaparte - he did not move. Colli's only activity in the evening of 12 April was covering the towns of Montezemolo and Millesimo with 1,000 Provincial infantry under brigadier Vitali and 3,000 elite infantry with Bellegarde, and an artillery battery. To help Provera, Colli merely detached the crack 3rd Grenadier Battalion - one of the best units of the Sardinian Army, under Lieutenant Colonel Filippo del Carretto. Carretto must get to Cosseria and defend it at all costs.
Colli's and Beaulieu's passiveness at this stage is usually deemed to be one of the turning points of the campaign. Bonaparte was shooting into the narrow, thinly held junction area between the Sardinians and the Austrians, which gave them an excellent opportunity to cut him up and squash the Armée d'Italie - had they cooperated as cooperating generals of the same army. With his 1,000 men, cut off and isolated atop a hill in a hopeless situation, Provera managed to hamper the execution of Bonaparte's plan and significantly delay his moves for over 24 hours. The potential for a smashing Allied offensive was there. Their failure to aggressively cooperate ensured Bonaparte's final victory.
To some degree the tactical inferiority of the Allied infantry, of which the Allied commanders had become painfully aware - their stiff close order formations, trained to fight conventional pitched battles, could not match the Republican nimbleness and initiative especially over broken terrain - helps explain their idleness. But the main reason of it is the huge gap between the Austrian and the Sardinian interests and strategic / operational designs. The Austrians didn't care much about Piedmont's survival; they despised and mistrusted the little kingdom, and they would not risk an army to defend Turin. Their real goal in the alliance was protecting their Lombardy base, and that was Beaulieu's mission. On his part, Colli had to cover the kingdom's capital, and in order to do so, his army corps - not receiving reinforcements from the hinterland and the Alpine front, probably for political reasons - had to stay in existence. A large scale field battle against the French could only be fought in cooperation with the Austrians, and if the Austrians were not in the position or unwilling to cooperate... Colli could not risk his corps for the sake of his mistrustful allies.
The Siege Begins
Early on the morning of 13 April, Augereau attacked Provera's positions at Millesimo. The Austrians, especially the Caprara Regiment elements, caved in at once, retreating in disorder and leaving 100 prisoners in French hands. From their positions nearby, Sardinian light infantry elements (apparently the La Rocca chasseurs) launched a half-hearted counterattack, easily repulsed by Beyrand's 39th Demi-Brigade. Their intervention however allowed a part of the Belgioioso Regiment to escape. Then the light infantry retreated via Roccavignale to Colli's positions. As the French were taking Millesimo and the Austro-Sardinians were pulling back, the 3rd Grenadier Battalion arrived and found the place swarming with French troops. Unable to go any further forward or back, Carretto headed for the natural stronghold of Cosseria, where Provera was also regrouping his 500 survivors. In getting to the hill and up its slopes to the castle on the top, Carretto had to break through a ring of French troops. In the process one of Carretto's six companies got enmeshed in superior French numbers and was ovewhelmed, but the remaining five made it to the top.
The following is the order of battle of the 3rd Grenadier Battalion:
Commander: Lt. Col. Filippo del Carretto di Camerano
Vice-commander: Staff Captain, chevalier Rubin
(from Monferrato Regiment)
1st Grenadier Company
commander: capt. A. Alberione
two officers
4 sergeants
10 corporals
75 grenadiers
2nd Gren. Company
commander: capt. Corte
two officers
3 sergeants
4 corporals
76 grenadiers
(from the Marines Regiment)
1st Gren. Company
commander: capt. G. Tibaldé
2 officers
5 sergeants
9 corporals
77 grenadiers
2nd Gren. Company
commander: capt. Lomellini
2 officers
5 sergeants
10 corporals
80 grenadiers
(from Susa Regiment)
1st Gren. Company
commander: capt. G. Calleri
2 officers
4 sergeants
12 corporals
81 grenadiers
2nd Gren. Company
commander (absent): capt. Morozzo di Bianzè
substitute commander: Lt. F. Neraud
one officer
3 sergeants
8 corporals
77 grenadiers
Total: 19 officers (13 noblemen, 6 middle class bourgeois), 548 other ranks.
On the hilltop stood the stone mass of a dilapidated medieval castle, built as a bulwark against Arab inroads and partly demolished in 1536. Its thick stone walls offered an excellent cover to the well trained Allied fusiliers, as the French would experience shortly after. Provera and Carretto set about organizing the defense. In a few hours of hard work, the 988 defenders, half Sardinian and half Croatians with some French Royalist expats among the latter, led by the Austrian engineer captain Martonitz, substantially improved the defensive power of the ancient walls. The castle was a very tough defensive position, with only one weak spot - a section of the wall had crumbled, making of it the ideal breakthrough point for the attacker. Martonitz did his best to secure it. From that sector, 100 men firing and reloading their muskets in 40 seconds, and firing "by platoons", could keep the attackers under a steady barrage of leaden balls, taking a heavy toll of them.
The real problem of Provera was that his men were entirely unsupplied. There was no water in and around the castle (except a rivulet out of the defenders' reach), and the Piedmontese grenadiers - better equipped than the Croatians - had about 40-50 musket rounds, 2 bread loaves and one canteen full of water each. Under those circumstances, any resistance at Cosseria could not last for long in any case, unless Colli attacked and forced the French to raise the siege.
At 9:00 am, 13 April, Cosseria was already surrounded by four French demi-brigades with 8,000 or 9,000 men (some authors maintain the French only had a half of that number around the hill). The tempo of Bonaparte's operations required to quickly remove that obstacle to clear the path to Montezemolo. Brigade general Banel of Augereau's division summoned the Allies to surrender. Carretto's reply was his famous sentence, "You are dealing with Piedmontese Grenadiers, and Piedmontese Grenadiers never surrender".
At 10:00 am Bonaparte ordered Banel to attack. Joubert's demi-brigade climbed up the steep hill, but Allied fire threw it back. It was clear Provera and Carretto would not give up easily. For a while Bonaparte thought about simply bypassing the strongpoint to keep the momentum of his advance - it made little operational sense to engage a division and suffer presumably high losses for clearing that hilltop, and the delay could grow quite dangerous had Colli and Beaulieu swung into offensive mode - as they should have done indeed.
At that juncture, battle sounds reached him from his left. Colli had ordered an offensive reconnaissance to probe the French positions around Millesimo. Sardinian light infantry and 900 men of the reorganized Belgioioso Regiment, backed up by Varax's Grenadiers, were skirmishing along the front of Menard's brigade. Fearing an all-out Sardinian attack in conjunction with Beaulieu's offensive - which would have stood good chances of annihilating him - Bonaparte rushed to Millesimo, not before ordering Augereau to take the castle at any cost. Realizing that Menard had no troubles in checking the Sardinian probe, he then went back to his Carcare HQ, to keep a watchful eye on Beaulieu's moves.
The following is the order of battle of the 3rd Grenadier Battalion:
Commander: Lt. Col. Filippo del Carretto di Camerano
Vice-commander: Staff Captain, chevalier Rubin
(from Monferrato Regiment)
1st Grenadier Company
commander: capt. A. Alberione
two officers
4 sergeants
10 corporals
75 grenadiers
2nd Gren. Company
commander: capt. Corte
two officers
3 sergeants
4 corporals
76 grenadiers
(from the Marines Regiment)
1st Gren. Company
commander: capt. G. Tibaldé
2 officers
5 sergeants
9 corporals
77 grenadiers
2nd Gren. Company
commander: capt. Lomellini
2 officers
5 sergeants
10 corporals
80 grenadiers
(from Susa Regiment)
1st Gren. Company
commander: capt. G. Calleri
2 officers
4 sergeants
12 corporals
81 grenadiers
2nd Gren. Company
commander (absent): capt. Morozzo di Bianzè
substitute commander: Lt. F. Neraud
one officer
3 sergeants
8 corporals
77 grenadiers
Total: 19 officers (13 noblemen, 6 middle class bourgeois), 548 other ranks.
On the hilltop stood the stone mass of a dilapidated medieval castle, built as a bulwark against Arab inroads and partly demolished in 1536. Its thick stone walls offered an excellent cover to the well trained Allied fusiliers, as the French would experience shortly after. Provera and Carretto set about organizing the defense. In a few hours of hard work, the 988 defenders, half Sardinian and half Croatians with some French Royalist expats among the latter, led by the Austrian engineer captain Martonitz, substantially improved the defensive power of the ancient walls. The castle was a very tough defensive position, with only one weak spot - a section of the wall had crumbled, making of it the ideal breakthrough point for the attacker. Martonitz did his best to secure it. From that sector, 100 men firing and reloading their muskets in 40 seconds, and firing "by platoons", could keep the attackers under a steady barrage of leaden balls, taking a heavy toll of them.
The real problem of Provera was that his men were entirely unsupplied. There was no water in and around the castle (except a rivulet out of the defenders' reach), and the Piedmontese grenadiers - better equipped than the Croatians - had about 40-50 musket rounds, 2 bread loaves and one canteen full of water each. Under those circumstances, any resistance at Cosseria could not last for long in any case, unless Colli attacked and forced the French to raise the siege.
At 9:00 am, 13 April, Cosseria was already surrounded by four French demi-brigades with 8,000 or 9,000 men (some authors maintain the French only had a half of that number around the hill). The tempo of Bonaparte's operations required to quickly remove that obstacle to clear the path to Montezemolo. Brigade general Banel of Augereau's division summoned the Allies to surrender. Carretto's reply was his famous sentence, "You are dealing with Piedmontese Grenadiers, and Piedmontese Grenadiers never surrender".
At 10:00 am Bonaparte ordered Banel to attack. Joubert's demi-brigade climbed up the steep hill, but Allied fire threw it back. It was clear Provera and Carretto would not give up easily. For a while Bonaparte thought about simply bypassing the strongpoint to keep the momentum of his advance - it made little operational sense to engage a division and suffer presumably high losses for clearing that hilltop, and the delay could grow quite dangerous had Colli and Beaulieu swung into offensive mode - as they should have done indeed.
At that juncture, battle sounds reached him from his left. Colli had ordered an offensive reconnaissance to probe the French positions around Millesimo. Sardinian light infantry and 900 men of the reorganized Belgioioso Regiment, backed up by Varax's Grenadiers, were skirmishing along the front of Menard's brigade. Fearing an all-out Sardinian attack in conjunction with Beaulieu's offensive - which would have stood good chances of annihilating him - Bonaparte rushed to Millesimo, not before ordering Augereau to take the castle at any cost. Realizing that Menard had no troubles in checking the Sardinian probe, he then went back to his Carcare HQ, to keep a watchful eye on Beaulieu's moves.
Old map of the area between Millesimo and Carcare (underlined in blue) where Bonaparte broke through in 1796, thrusting a wedge between the Austrians and the Sardinians. The castle of Cosseria is underlined in red. The two little black-and-white rectangles adjacent to it are the French troops engaged in the siege.
A Darn Bloody Hill
Facing a tough nut to crack, Augereau again summoned Provera to surrender. The latter was a brave soldier, but not a madman, and knew his men could not survive the assault of an entire French division. He proposed to Augereau what he had already proposed to Bonaparte, to no avail - to be allowed to withdraw his force to the Allied lines unmolested and with military honors. Augereau politely refused. His weak artillery being unable to do any harm to the powerful stone walls, he was compelled to carry out an infantry assault up the steep slopes and under the murderous fire of dug in infantry able to develop a superior firepower and rate of fire. It has been stated that the defenders could fire about 2,000 rounds in 40 seconds - a rate of well aimed fire even the best infantry in the world could hardly withstand.
At 4:00 pm three brigades - led from the front by Joubert, Banel and Quénin - began climbing up the hill, towards the castle gate and the more vulnerable northern sector. As soon as the French assault columns entered the range of the Allied musketry, a hail of leaden balls started mowing them down. Quénin and one of his battalion leaders were shot dead, other two battalion commanders wounded. Joubert was also wounded in the head. His column was swept away by relentless musketry volleys losing 116 dead and 206 wounded in a matter of minutes. Of Quénin and Banel's columns, only 7 men managed to get to the gate alive - to be killed or taken prisoner.
Undaunted, with boundless courage the French attacked again shortly after. That repeat lasted only a quarter of an hour - they left 300 dead in the killing zone, also had 600 wounded, and pulled back in disarray under the cover of Suchet's battalion (later Marshal of France). Some "Furia Francese" groups, however, made it to the wall, where they engaged the defenders in hand-to-hand combat to the death. Eventually they were massacred, but Carretto was also killed in the thick of close fighting, after hacking down two Frenchmen with his sword.
The Allies were badly hurt, too. They lost about 150 men, including the mainstay of the garrison's will to fight, Carretto, and Captain Martonitz, wounded. The attack was followed by lively exchanges of fusillades that lasted until dusk. A two-hours truce was granted for recovering the wounded. Impressed by the enemy's stalwartness and terrifying rate of fire, the French offered to tend the Allied wounded - a highly unusual fact at that time - and some French soldiers even gave their opponents some water and biscuit.
A Night of Vain Hopes
Of the two beleaguered Allied commanders, the younger Carretto had been the most determined to refuse surrender and fight to the finish. But old Provera was unwilling to give up as long as there was even just a slim hope of receiving help from Colli's lines.
Actually, Colli had been doing something - too little, in retrospect at least - to help Provera. He had about 2,000 Sardinians with him, including some of his finest troops - Bellegarde's Royal Grenadiers, the 1st Grenadier battalion, light infantry units. He had witnessed the French attack on Cosseria from his positions around Montezemolo and the grenadiers he had at hand there had assailed the French outposts in front of them, making however little headway. At night, back at his Ceva HQ, Colli sent the Austrian Strassoldo battalion to support Varax's grenadiers at Montezemolo. He also wrote to Beaulieu about the situation of Provera and how the Sardinians would carry out another, more serious attack the next day, with more troops.
However, the French were getting ready to push back Colli's relief force and resume their sweep on and past Montezemolo. At 6:00 am, 14 April, just as the Sardinian Vercelli (Provincial) Regiment was receiving the order to march on Cosseria as a prelude to the larger - but not that much - scale operation planned by Colli, Menard set off on an offensive move to drive back the Sardinians around Montezemolo. The same morning, also Sérurier and Rusca set their troops in motion, the former along the Tanaro River valley, the latter against a line of Sardinian outposts between Tanaro and Bormida rivers.
As those events were taking place, Augereau was negotiating Provera's surrender. The old Italian officer realized his depleted and unsupplied soldiers - who were running out of ammunition, food and water - couldn't hold out for much longer, and the next French attack would be met with bayonets, swords and stones. As hope is the last to die, however, he managed to drag the negotiation out for an hour, until Augereau got to know that the Sardinian forces in the Montezemolo area were pulling back. All hopes of rescue vanished, and Provera signed the conditional surrender. The garrison would receive military honors and the Allied officers plus a few picked non-commissioned officers and the battalion physicians would be released, but all other ranks would be taken prisoner. Displaying old style chivalry, Augereau signed the surrender paper on the left of the sheet, leaving the right side - the side of the winner - to Provera's signature.
As they were filing past French soldiers presenting their arms to them, Carretto's grenadiers saluted the tomb of their fallen commander and many laid on it their grenadier badges. The Sardinian and Austrian officers were then invited to dine with Bonaparte - who berated them for killing him two generals and hundreds of troops for the sake of a rash act of hopeless bravery. A few days later they were finally released.
Actually, Colli had been doing something - too little, in retrospect at least - to help Provera. He had about 2,000 Sardinians with him, including some of his finest troops - Bellegarde's Royal Grenadiers, the 1st Grenadier battalion, light infantry units. He had witnessed the French attack on Cosseria from his positions around Montezemolo and the grenadiers he had at hand there had assailed the French outposts in front of them, making however little headway. At night, back at his Ceva HQ, Colli sent the Austrian Strassoldo battalion to support Varax's grenadiers at Montezemolo. He also wrote to Beaulieu about the situation of Provera and how the Sardinians would carry out another, more serious attack the next day, with more troops.
However, the French were getting ready to push back Colli's relief force and resume their sweep on and past Montezemolo. At 6:00 am, 14 April, just as the Sardinian Vercelli (Provincial) Regiment was receiving the order to march on Cosseria as a prelude to the larger - but not that much - scale operation planned by Colli, Menard set off on an offensive move to drive back the Sardinians around Montezemolo. The same morning, also Sérurier and Rusca set their troops in motion, the former along the Tanaro River valley, the latter against a line of Sardinian outposts between Tanaro and Bormida rivers.
As those events were taking place, Augereau was negotiating Provera's surrender. The old Italian officer realized his depleted and unsupplied soldiers - who were running out of ammunition, food and water - couldn't hold out for much longer, and the next French attack would be met with bayonets, swords and stones. As hope is the last to die, however, he managed to drag the negotiation out for an hour, until Augereau got to know that the Sardinian forces in the Montezemolo area were pulling back. All hopes of rescue vanished, and Provera signed the conditional surrender. The garrison would receive military honors and the Allied officers plus a few picked non-commissioned officers and the battalion physicians would be released, but all other ranks would be taken prisoner. Displaying old style chivalry, Augereau signed the surrender paper on the left of the sheet, leaving the right side - the side of the winner - to Provera's signature.
As they were filing past French soldiers presenting their arms to them, Carretto's grenadiers saluted the tomb of their fallen commander and many laid on it their grenadier badges. The Sardinian and Austrian officers were then invited to dine with Bonaparte - who berated them for killing him two generals and hundreds of troops for the sake of a rash act of hopeless bravery. A few days later they were finally released.
Colli Calls the Attack Off
At the news of Provera's surrenders, Colli - whose forward detachments were already pressed by the French - called the attack off and ordered to evacuate the Montezemolo area. This phase of the Sardinian operations, however, proved quite unfortunate as two of the outposts manned by provincial infantry and tasked with slowing the French advance down to cover the retreat fell in French hands almost without fighting, yielding about 160 prisoners and 2 guns to the attackers. Another painful case of Provincial troops failing to put up any meaningful resistance? In any case, their failure had dire consequences. It allowed the French to cut the line of retreat of the most precious Sardinian troops in the Montezemolo area - the 3 elite grenadier battalions of Bellegarde's division. They were bagged notwithstanding a desperate bayonet attack to run the blockade. It was a grievous loss. At the end of the day, of the 2,000 Sardinians around Montezemolo, only a part - and not the most valuable one - managed to extricate themselves from the French encirclement. It was not a happy end to Colli's abortive, and totally unsuccessful, relief attempt.
By taking Montezemolo, Bonaparte secured the southern access to Piedmont. It wouldn't take him long to unhinge the door to the Piedmontese heartland.
By taking Montezemolo, Bonaparte secured the southern access to Piedmont. It wouldn't take him long to unhinge the door to the Piedmontese heartland.
Hinge of Fate
Cosseria was a thorn in the side of Bonaparte just as he was carrying out the decisive breakthrough at Millesimo and Montezemolo, and had to be removed at all costs before either Colli or Beauliue or both could take advantage of it. The cost was not negligible. The French lost approximately 1,200 men on Cosseria hill, a heavy butcher's bill for Augereau's division. In return for that, however, they smashed Provera's brigade and put out of combat a number of Sardinian battalions (the three battalions with Argenteau, Carretto's at Cosseria and the bulk of the three de la Tour Grenadiers' at Montezemolo), and inflicted other losses on Colli's troops. More importantly, they secured the springboard for any further offensive on either Austrian Lombardy or Piedmont. With the Millesimo hinge in his hands, Bonaparte thrust a wedge between Colli and Beaulieu and was able to pound away at either Allied force. He pulled off his plan very successfully.
Allied passiveness guaranteed his success. Colli did try to support Provera some way, but his effort lacked vigor and urgency. Probing, tentative, apparently half-hearted sallies made no impression on the French and in any case the attack force was numerically insufficient. Had he brought the entire mobile elements of his corps (even better if reinforced by units lying idle back in the heartland) to bear on Augereau, things might have gone differently. Even if Augereau, reinforced by Sérurier, had stood up to the attack, Colli's offensive might well have created the conditions for a sortie allowing Provera to break out through French siege lines and join up with Colli. Bonaparte would have been forced to alter his plan and back Augereau up substantially, thereby offering Beaulieu a great opportunity for jumping in and cracking the weakened French left flank open, pushing the (panicking) Armée d'Italie towards Colli's bayonets or the Ligurian Sea. That would have been Bonaparte's undoing. His plan, his army command and, possibly, his life were saved by Allied unwillingness to actively cooperate, the effects of Allied internecine rivalry and mistrust, and in all likelihood, top level political decisions being taken far away from the battlefield.
Allied passiveness guaranteed his success. Colli did try to support Provera some way, but his effort lacked vigor and urgency. Probing, tentative, apparently half-hearted sallies made no impression on the French and in any case the attack force was numerically insufficient. Had he brought the entire mobile elements of his corps (even better if reinforced by units lying idle back in the heartland) to bear on Augereau, things might have gone differently. Even if Augereau, reinforced by Sérurier, had stood up to the attack, Colli's offensive might well have created the conditions for a sortie allowing Provera to break out through French siege lines and join up with Colli. Bonaparte would have been forced to alter his plan and back Augereau up substantially, thereby offering Beaulieu a great opportunity for jumping in and cracking the weakened French left flank open, pushing the (panicking) Armée d'Italie towards Colli's bayonets or the Ligurian Sea. That would have been Bonaparte's undoing. His plan, his army command and, possibly, his life were saved by Allied unwillingness to actively cooperate, the effects of Allied internecine rivalry and mistrust, and in all likelihood, top level political decisions being taken far away from the battlefield.