A Hard Place: The Battle of the Pedaggera
On 16 April Augereau's three brigades (Joubert's 11th, Beyrand's 4th and Rusca) attacked the naturally strong position of the Pedaggera Pass. Augereau had 10,000 men, only a part of whom actually took part in the battle.
This was Bonaparte's hasty attempt to defeat the Sardinians using only one fourth of his total force, while the bulk of his army was facing Beaulieu. The attempt would fail, and the next one - Corsaglia, where Bonaparte raised the size of his attack force to roughly one half of the Armée d'Italie's operational strength - would fail as well. The twin setbacks, caused by Colli's clever choice of positions and by the Sardinians' tough stand, marred Bonaparte's plan to quickly dispose of Colli's corps. As a consequence, he was forced to rapidly reverse the deployment balance, shifting the largest portion of the Army against Colli and leaving only a screen to face a potential Austrian move - which would have put him into a lot of trouble, and his army squeezed between the Austrian hammer and the Sardinian anvil.
16 to 18 April 1796 are hazy days in Napoleon's military career. It was clear to military analysts such as Clausewitz that on those days Bonaparte hesitated, seemingly puzzled about which course of action to take and perhaps even anxious and worried. Later in his life he certainly did not dwell much on his activity in that period, and his contemporary reports to the Directoire look purposely mystifying and distorting - claiming successes and overlooking the "bloody noses" at the hands of the Sardinians. Of course this does not fit in well with the legend of Napoleon the Supreme Victor and was practically erased from history books since.
In fact, it is possible to detect traces of a c0nsiderable diplomatic and political activity going on beneath and behind the military action between Turin, Paris, Vienna and the brother of the guillotined King of France, the man who would later become King Louis XVIII. Those covered up traffics may help provide a more in-depth, if partly hypothetical and tentative, explanation of the 1796 events and the ambiguous role played by Britain. See the "Just Genius: An Alternative View of Bonaparte's Campaign" page for a discussion of the topic. In any case it is very likely that there was much more to the campaign than battles and marches.
The Bovino Line, part of the Ceva fortified area, ran mostly along the turbulent Bovino stream and stretched over 9 kilometers of mountains to the north of Ceva. It was manned (on April 14 - 15) by the rearguard of the Ceva Army Corps (in the meantime withdrawing towards Mondovì, to the west of Ceva). The 6,000 men of the rearguard, elements of 21 battalions and 6 companies, were under the command of Major General Vitali.
The southern sector (6 infantry battalions of which 1 Austrian) included portions of the powerful Ceva fortifications and was indeed placed under the command of the Governor of Ceva, Count Francesco Bruno di Tornaforte.
General Vitali was directly in command over the central sector of the line, with 5 battalions and 4 companies.
The northern sector's nut to crack was the large fortified area of the Pedaggera, with its key Govone Redoubt, under Brigadier baron Brempt with 2 Croatian companies and 4 Sardinian battalions (Savoy, Royal Allemand Salm-Salm, Genevois, elite Light Infantry of Colli Ricci). Outposts were held by 2 more Sardinian battalions (2nd Acqui, 2nd Royal Grenadiers). The fortified position enjoyed the fire support of four field guns under Artillery Captain Paoletti de Melle.
The far northern end of the line was held by elements of the Belgioioso (Austrian) and Vercelli (Sardinian) regiments.
Bonaparte's plan was to unhinge and outflank the enemy left by a rapid fighting march to the northwest, then eventually turn southwest and get to the vital Castellino Bridge, which the Ceva Army Corps had to cross as it was retreating on Mondovì. At the same time Bonaparte issued orders to secure his right flank against any attempt on the part of Beaulieu to link up with Colli.
This was Bonaparte's hasty attempt to defeat the Sardinians using only one fourth of his total force, while the bulk of his army was facing Beaulieu. The attempt would fail, and the next one - Corsaglia, where Bonaparte raised the size of his attack force to roughly one half of the Armée d'Italie's operational strength - would fail as well. The twin setbacks, caused by Colli's clever choice of positions and by the Sardinians' tough stand, marred Bonaparte's plan to quickly dispose of Colli's corps. As a consequence, he was forced to rapidly reverse the deployment balance, shifting the largest portion of the Army against Colli and leaving only a screen to face a potential Austrian move - which would have put him into a lot of trouble, and his army squeezed between the Austrian hammer and the Sardinian anvil.
16 to 18 April 1796 are hazy days in Napoleon's military career. It was clear to military analysts such as Clausewitz that on those days Bonaparte hesitated, seemingly puzzled about which course of action to take and perhaps even anxious and worried. Later in his life he certainly did not dwell much on his activity in that period, and his contemporary reports to the Directoire look purposely mystifying and distorting - claiming successes and overlooking the "bloody noses" at the hands of the Sardinians. Of course this does not fit in well with the legend of Napoleon the Supreme Victor and was practically erased from history books since.
In fact, it is possible to detect traces of a c0nsiderable diplomatic and political activity going on beneath and behind the military action between Turin, Paris, Vienna and the brother of the guillotined King of France, the man who would later become King Louis XVIII. Those covered up traffics may help provide a more in-depth, if partly hypothetical and tentative, explanation of the 1796 events and the ambiguous role played by Britain. See the "Just Genius: An Alternative View of Bonaparte's Campaign" page for a discussion of the topic. In any case it is very likely that there was much more to the campaign than battles and marches.
The Bovino Line, part of the Ceva fortified area, ran mostly along the turbulent Bovino stream and stretched over 9 kilometers of mountains to the north of Ceva. It was manned (on April 14 - 15) by the rearguard of the Ceva Army Corps (in the meantime withdrawing towards Mondovì, to the west of Ceva). The 6,000 men of the rearguard, elements of 21 battalions and 6 companies, were under the command of Major General Vitali.
The southern sector (6 infantry battalions of which 1 Austrian) included portions of the powerful Ceva fortifications and was indeed placed under the command of the Governor of Ceva, Count Francesco Bruno di Tornaforte.
General Vitali was directly in command over the central sector of the line, with 5 battalions and 4 companies.
The northern sector's nut to crack was the large fortified area of the Pedaggera, with its key Govone Redoubt, under Brigadier baron Brempt with 2 Croatian companies and 4 Sardinian battalions (Savoy, Royal Allemand Salm-Salm, Genevois, elite Light Infantry of Colli Ricci). Outposts were held by 2 more Sardinian battalions (2nd Acqui, 2nd Royal Grenadiers). The fortified position enjoyed the fire support of four field guns under Artillery Captain Paoletti de Melle.
The far northern end of the line was held by elements of the Belgioioso (Austrian) and Vercelli (Sardinian) regiments.
Bonaparte's plan was to unhinge and outflank the enemy left by a rapid fighting march to the northwest, then eventually turn southwest and get to the vital Castellino Bridge, which the Ceva Army Corps had to cross as it was retreating on Mondovì. At the same time Bonaparte issued orders to secure his right flank against any attempt on the part of Beaulieu to link up with Colli.
Battle is joined
As they advanced towards the Sardinian redoubts, the French surrounded and captured at the village of Paroldo a Sardinian battalion - about 500 men - Colli had rather foolishly left there as a vanguard. This would be the only French success of the day - a grievous loss for the outnumbered Sardinians.
At midday the vanguard of Joubert's brigade clashed with 200 elite Sardinian light infantry and, also owing to a bad misjudgment by Joubert, who mistakenly thought he was also being attacked on his flank, the French were badly hit and fell back in disorder.
Beyrand assaulted the Pedaggera redoubts and trenches in front of him, but repeated efforts were thwarted by a stalwart defense. Finally a counterattack by the Savoy battalion and the Genevois Provincials, led by colonel Portier from Nice, drove Beyrand's troops off.
However, the French successfully stormed a redoubt, called La Bastia, after some sharp fighting with the 2nd Acqui Provincial battalion which for a while even captured an enemy gun battery. The Provincials were evicted from their positions, but they could retreat to breathe and regroup as the French occupied the redoubt.
Meanwhile Rusca had surrounded the Govone Redoubt, exploited a gap in the Sardinian line and was dangerously threatening other portions of the line. Had the Sardinians cracked under pressure at that juncture, the entire Ceva Corps rearguard might have been lost.
But from the nearby central sector of the Bovino Line, 600 Sardinians under Jean de Bellegarde launched a timely conterattack, effectively supported by de Melle's guns, pushing Rusca back. A simultaneous attack by the reorganized Acqui Provincials retook the Bastia.
Sardinian artillery played an important role in the victory. Cleverly positioned and daringly led by Captain Paoletti di Melle, later a great artillery expert, its accurate pounding helped frustrate and repel the French outflanking attempts.
Repulsed all along the line, after several hours of hard fighting over tough terrain the exhausted French gave up and turned back to their initial positions.
They had lost about 600 killed, wounded and prisoners. The Sardinians lost 270 men in the battle. Eight Sardinian NCOs and privates were awarded the Medal for Valor.
What-If: Sardinian Reinforcements Rushed to Colli
Could the Sardinian Army have substantially reinforced Colli's corps when Bonaparte struck? Theoretically, yes, it could have done that - if the King had acted quickly and if he had wanted to do so. The snow was still blocking all main Alpine passes into Piedmont, and a serious French attack into Piedmont across the Alps would have been impossible for several weeks more. The supreme headquarters in Turin got to know about the French breakthrough at Millesimo probably on the evening, or the night, of 15 April. A staff officer then might have carried to the army corps along the Alps the order to detach troops and rush them to Colli in southern Piedmont. By April 19th substantial reinforcements might have been in Mondovì: several infantry regiments and grenadier battalions, the whole 3,000-strong cavalry reserve. If skilfully and aggressively employed, that manoeuver force, the last field army the Kingdom of Sardinia could put together, would have forced Bonaparte to change his plans. A major pitched battle might even have taken place around Mondovì or farther north across the Piedmont plain between the massed Armée d'Italie and the Sardinian Army - although admittedly the Sardinians wouldn't have stood tremendous chances of success.
As it was, the King ordered the Susa Department forces to move... towards the capital city, to the north, and no sooner than 21 April, after the decisive battle of Mondovì.
As it was, the King ordered the Susa Department forces to move... towards the capital city, to the north, and no sooner than 21 April, after the decisive battle of Mondovì.